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Editor's Notes

By James D. Hessman

Planned special events draw spectators who expect to have all the excitement and enjoyment they can get and/or have paid for. To protect the VIPs and luminaries, the participants and spectators, and the security forces themselves, hard-working, behind-the-scene professionals must maintain the safety and security of those events. For an event planner, no "excitement" is good news. That is particularly true of National Special Security Events (NSSEs), such as the second inauguration of U.S. President Barack Obama on 21 January 2013, which attracted international attention.

Lt. Gen. H. Steven Blum, USA (Ret.), former chief of the National Guard Bureau – which is almost by definition heavily, and directly, involved in many major U.S. NSSEs – leads this month's wrap-up issue of *DPJ* with information about the importance of advance planning, meticulous preparations, frequent drills and exercises, and, perhaps most of all, collaboration and communications with everyone involved. The full report with contributions from more than 200 participants and survey respondents also is ready for download.

That article is followed by Scott L. Brillman, the mayor's point man for many of the more than 30 agencies involved in the 2012 Baltimore "Sailabration," which commemorated the bicentennial of the beginning of the War of 1812. Next up in this issue's lineup is Richard Morman, who discusses the special dangers and difficulties involved in ensuring the safety and security of spectators at major sporting events – The Ohio State football games, in this case.

Craig DeAtley, the next author in line, returns to the inaugural ceremony and shares the medical and emergency plans discussed, agreed upon, then quietly implemented and enforced before, during, and even after the inauguration itself. Laurel J. Radow focuses special attention on the "road map" of transportation checklists developed and published by the U.S. Federal Highway Administration. Transportation planning is extremely valuable to security forces during NSSEs of any type.

Also included in this month's printable issue are the views of five other distinguished professionals: Joseph Trindal, who reviews the immense difficulties involved in preventing, stopping, and/or even responding to mass killings such as the deadly shootings at Sandy Hook Elementary School in 2012; Raphael M. Barishansky, who unravels some of the intricacies involved in state and/or federal declarations of a medical emergency; and Marko Bourne, who focuses specific attention on the deaths, destruction, and unexpected resiliency in the aftermath of the infamous EF-5 tornado that devastated Joplin, Missouri, in 2011.

Joseph Cahill discusses another highly specialized but often overlooked homeland-security topic: the debate over online versus hands-on training and certification of emergency-response personnel. Stephen Grainer tops off the issue with an entertaining, but nonetheless instructive, discussion of the many special events associated with the 150-year anniversary of the Civil War Battle of First Manassas.

About the Cover: All went well, with no major security incidents, at the 21 January 2013 inauguration of U.S. President Barack Obama. And that was no accident, thanks to the advance planning of the official Inauguration Committee and the immense, and deliberately under-publicized, efforts of numerous public and private agencies, helped by thousands of hard-working volunteers. (Official White House photo by Lawrence Jackson)

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

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Planned Special Events Report

By Lieutenant General H. Steven Blum USA (Ret.), DP40

Every day across the United States, special events – both large and small – are planned and executed. Large-scale special events involving thousands of participants require special attention and coordination at all levels of government – local, state, and national. To address the topic of planned special events, DomesticPreparedness.com hosted an Executive Briefing at the Washington Nationals Park in Washington, D.C., on 16 July 2012.

Hosting the DomPrep Executive Briefing at a venue that is home to special events 365 days a year provided an excellent backdrop. The diversity of attendees – local, state, and national representatives from both the public and private sectors – represented how a successful event should be planned. A whole community approach involves all stakeholders at all stages of the planning process.



No one level of government or jurisdiction has the capabilities and capacity needed for most special events. As such, collaborative efforts and communication are necessary for putting all the pieces of the puzzle together – some bring tools, some bring expertise, and some bring people.

Planning each event should begin with identifying potential risks – the knowns and the unknowns, the vulnerabilities and the gaps. Then it is important to ensure that the right people with the right credentials are included. Volunteers play an important role in many special events, but they must be effectively managed to avoid hindering the efforts. Following predetermined standards and proper training ahead of time will help coordinate efforts within and between jurisdictions. Building relationships with the surrounding jurisdictions is paramount because moving thousands of people into and out of a venue affects much more than the venue itself. Finally, communicating with the public can be a challenge – the message itself and who delivers it are everything.

This analysis reflects the opinions of DomPrep Executive Briefing attendees and responses of DomPrep readers from the most recent DomPrep survey on planned special events. This collaborative effort offers useful information for planning future events. Such planning efforts may not be great right now, but they are better than they were ten years ago and will be even better ten years from now if planners and operations personnel build on the past lessons learned, the relationships formed, and the communications established.

Air, Sea, Land: No Detail Left Unplanned

By Scott L. Brillman, Special Events

Domestic preparedness is nothing new to emergency planners in Baltimore, Maryland. Months before the historic invasion of the Baltimore harbor by British naval ships during the War of 1812, the citizens of Baltimore took the actions needed to prepare their city for the impact of what some historians later described as "the battle that saved America." Taking defense of the city into their own hands, those citizens formed the "Committee of Vigilance and Safety" and used it to train Maryland militias and individual volunteers, coordinate the construction of forts, allocate the scarce human and financial resources available, and manage the logistics involved in distributing arms, pay, military equipment, and even coffins.

Two hundred years later, a new generation of Baltimore's citizens were tasked with preparing the city for what would be one of the largest events in the history of Baltimore: the 2012 Star-Spangled Sailabration, commemorating the beginning of the war that still defines the Chesapeake region. As in 1812, the Bicentennial Sailabration was an all-hands effort that encompassed an entire city, requiring a high level of coordination between citizens, volunteers, professional planners, and Baltimore leaders to make the event a success.

And a major success it was. In June 2012, Baltimore hosted the largest national celebration commemorating the Bicentennial of the beginning of the War of 1812, setting into motion a two-year series of nationwide events that will culminate – again, in Baltimore – in 2014, in observance of not only the Battle of Baltimore and the writing of the Star Spangled Banner but also the end of that war.

The weeklong (13-19 June) Sailabration, which included an international maritime festival and air show in Baltimore's harbor, brought more than 1.5 million visitors to the city in addition to an estimated 45 naval vessels and tall ships, nearly six thousand U.S. and international sailors, and four days of air shows by the U.S. Navy's Blue Angels, which included "flyovers" of downtown Baltimore. More than 700 Sailabration volunteers organized dozens of concerts, reenactments, skydiving events, tactical military presentations, VIP appearances and speeches, and military community-service events, all of them attended by a myriad of federal, state, and local elected officials, foreign dignitaries, and other VIPs.

Baltimore is an experienced city when it comes to special events. A tourism hot-spot, the Inner Harbor alone accommodates more than 15 million visitors per year and regularly hosts marathons, horse races, regattas, the Grand Prix car race, and scores of other events drawing hundreds of thousands of visitors. Baltimore's leadership fully understands the importance of advance planning, cooperation and coordination, and building relationships.

Even so, the Star-Spangled Sailabration presented new and unique challenges that required the collaboration of agencies from all levels of government as well as hundreds of planners. To be truly successful, the Sailabration required a comprehensive planning and coordination effort by the City of Baltimore and its surrounding counties, many state and federal agencies, the U.S. Navy, U.S. Coast Guard, nearly one-hundred private and non-profit businesses, and dozens of impacted communities.

The Sailabration also was an event of numerous "firsts": Baltimore's first air show, repeated for four days; the berthing of 45 U.S. and international tall ships; the influx of more than 1.5 million visitors; and the unprecedented planning and coordination effort required to ensure the safety, comprehensive contingency plans, and seamless execution. To do all that, three major government entities – the U.S. Navy, the U.S. Coast Guard, and the City of Baltimore – had to work meaningfully together for the first time.

Air, Sea, Land: Who Has the Plan?

The U.S. Navy, U.S. Coast Guard, and the City of Baltimore – air, sea, and land – are all large, diverse organizations, and veterans in the special events process. Each also is accustomed to following its own procedures for special events planning. Recognizing that each had its own systems and protocols, and operated in its own silos, it was of particular importance that each agency become more dynamic, more flexible, and more cognizant of one another's needs. For the event

to be successful, all three agencies had to work together. The challenge, therefore, was determining how to plan and operate as one overarching entity.

A full year before the Sailabration, a core Baltimore-based planning team – the Sailabration executive committee – was formed to oversee the coordination of all activities leading up to the historic event. From neighborhood relations to logistics and security for the air show, the Sailabration executive committee established more than a dozen planning groups, each with its own subcommittees that were loosely organized under a larger quasi-governmental state commission tasked with carrying out the planning for the War of 1812 Bicentennial celebrations throughout the state of Maryland.

U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Andrew Johnson

The Sailabration itself was centered around Baltimore's Inner Harbor, and the executive committee focused its efforts on three distinct geographical command areas: the Waterside Area of Operations (Water); the Baltimore Area of Operations (Land); and the Air Show Area of Operations (Air). Each planning group was made up of 20-30 agencies, all of which were required to plan for their own operations as well as to coordinate those plans with the other agencies involved. From mapping the dredging operations in the harbor to ensuring the safe passage of large ships and small water craft to writing the contingency plans needed to protect the health of U.S. and international sailors, Baltimore planning started on the right track.

However, there was an unexpected "kink" in the planning effort. As the executive committee quickly found out, the Navy also had started its own planning structure for the Sailabration – an event that involved many of the service's own air and sea assets. The Navy's initiative was more than a simple duplication of effort. Two different event action plans were being drafted that included duplicate contact lists, planning lists, and even event schedules.

Recognizing the redundancy and the numerous complications that might result, the executive committee acted fast, reaching out to its federal partners in the Navy and Coast Guard to avoid what might otherwise have been a planning disaster. The Baltimore City Mayor's Office of Emergency Management (MOEM), an active member in the executive committee, was recognized as the agency probably best suited to pull together the two planning processes, and all the disparate stakeholders, into one unified plan.

To do just that, MOEM centralized all plans, maps, and meeting notes in one secure, online location, working closely with the Navy and Coast Guard liaisons. The planners from all agencies downloaded and uploaded documents to and from a shared server, moderated by MOEM. That important step eliminated the need to email documents, which posed the risk of circulating out-of-date plans. All planners had permission to view most documents, although certain sensitive documents (such as police deployments) were password-protected. Global information system planners collected and merged all maps; and MOEM merged the contact lists and schedules into a single (and frequently updated) document.

Acting as a central clearing house, MOEM also made sure that all stakeholders had access to the most up-to-date, relevant plans and information, which streamlined the execution of the event through a unified command structure.

Air, Sea, Land: Who Has Command?

The extensive planning process was necessary because the location, size, and broad geographic scope of the Sailabration required government agencies and private partners to share the authority and jurisdiction needed to coordinate public safety and security. The complexity and unique needs of air, sea, and land operations required each of those components, though, to operate its own individual command posts.

The concept of area command is not a common practice in Baltimore. However, it was essential for the Sailabration – primarily to: (a) ensure interagency coordination; (b) efficiently use one another's resources; (c) promote effective information sharing; and (d) facilitate a safe multi-agency/multi-jurisdictional response.

Five area command posts were established, strategically located to meet the needs of all operations:

- Baltimore Area of Operations, responsible for land events;
- Waterside Area of Operations, operated by the U.S. Coast Guard, responsible for water events;
- Air Show/Martin State Airport Operations, responsible for air-show events;
- Navy Command, responsible for naval events, personnel, and vessels; and
- Fort McHenry Command, responsible for security of the large crowds and VIPs on location.

Each area command shared a common set of objectives and was led by an incident commander, who could communicate with other command posts via landline and radio. Because of the size of the event and the multi-jurisdictional responsibilities involved, the state emergency operations center at the Maryland Emergency Management Agency was activated to: (a) serve as the unified area command; (b) hold and update plans; (c) organize briefings and conference calls; (d) monitor weather conditions; (e) facilitate information sharing; and (f) convene all incident commanders in the event of a crisis.

Operational interactions between the area command posts were carried out through the liaison officers (Fire, Police, U.S. Coast Guard, U.S. Navy, and MOEM representatives) assigned to each area command post. The use of Central Maryland's interoperable 800 MHz radio system allowed each area command post to instantaneously communicate with the others, with their own forces in the field, with a broad spectrum of other state and federal agencies, and with private-sector partners who were provided radios.

To ensure that all public safety personnel received updated information and changes, a one-page event memo was created daily and distributed to everyone in the field. The executive committee also established an offsite media center to register and coordinate the large number of reporters and news teams. The media center also coordinated with the Joint Information Center (JIC), located in the Baltimore Area Command, to respond to any urgent news. The media center and the JIC, working in close coordination with the police and fire departments, and other city and state agencies, used social media tracking software to identify any actual or possible problems that might occur.

The ability to centralize, secure, consolidate, and share documents during the planning process allowed all agencies to plan and coordinate their own activities within a common operating picture. The use of area commands allowed all stakeholders to share resources, instantly communicate across jurisdictions, and, at the same time, focus on their separate missions.

What at first seemed like an immense, and perhaps impossible, planning effort turned out to be one of Baltimore's largest, safest, and most successful events. In September 2014, Baltimore will again take center stage: The Sailabration will return to Maryland to celebrate the 200th anniversary of the end of the War of 1812, commemorate the defense of the nation, and honor the birth of the national anthem. Thanks to the hard work and dedication already demonstrated by those responsible for the success of the 2012 event, the city of Baltimore and its partners will be fully prepared in 2014.

For additional information on:
Baltimore's Harborplace, Baltimore Sun, 24 October 2012, visit *http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2012-10-24/news/bs-ed-harborplace-20121024_1_harborplace-general-growth-properties-pratt-stree-pavilions*

Scott L. Brillman is a lieutenant with the Baltimore City Fire Department and the Director of Special Events for the Baltimore City Mayor's Office of Emergency Management. He led the Baltimore planning teams last summer in one of the largest planned events in Baltimore's history, the 2012 Star Spangled Sailabration. He also oversees the City's Emergency Operation Centers and in that capacity has helped manage the city's response to several major disasters in past years, including the recent derecho (severe thunderstorms and wind). Prior to assuming his current post, he served as a paramedic and instructor with the Baltimore City Fire Department. He also now serves as a medical specialist on Maryland's Urban Search and Rescue Task Force (MD-TF2) – and previously assisted the City of New Orleans twice – in the responses to Hurricane Katrina and Hurricane Gustav. He is a graduate of both the Johns Hopkins University and the University of Maryland, Baltimore County, and can be reached at scott.brillman@baltimorecity.gov.



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Building a Bigger Better Buffer Zone Protection Plan

By Richard Morman, Building Protection

Planning and managing special event security at The Ohio State University goes far beyond the management of traffic, parking, and crowd management. One of the many major events is the university's home football games, which have an average attendance around 105,000 spectators inside the stadium and thousands more outside the stadium.

The Ohio State football game-day security operation has been reviewed by numerous outside agencies (local, state, and federal). There are requests to "shadow" the operation at almost every home game. These agencies have deemed it to be a model program.

Following so many requests to learn more about the operation, the university received UASI (Urban Area Security Initiative) funding from the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to produce a 2009 video titled "Game On: A Large-Venue Security Case Profile."

Buffering Vulnerabilities & Implementing Changes

A key element in the development of current U.S. homeland security contingency programs is the Buffer Zone Protection Plan (BZPP), an infrastructure protection grant program administered by DHS to help identify and mitigate the vulnerabilities of major public- and private-sector buildings and facilities. Following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the special event security plan at Ohio State – including the procedures followed for football games – was re-evaluated and certain changes were implemented.

Over the course of the next two years (2002-2003), the security plan continued to be tweaked. Staying within the guidelines spelled out in then-President George W. Bush's 2003 National Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructure and Key Assets (CI/KA), The Ohio State University's Department of Public Safety worked closely with Ohio Homeland Security and DHS – more specifically, with the department's Protective Security Advisor – to develop an effective BZPP for Ohio Stadium.

A major component of the initial assessment included the use of the "CARVER" (criticality, accessibility, recuperability, vulnerability, effect, and recognizability) target-analysis process to develop a threat matrix that could help identify and evaluate the university's CI/KA, which included Ohio Stadium and the surrounding area. The CARVER tool was originally developed by U.S. Special Forces to help them target the installations of U.S. adversaries, but it continues to serve as an analytical tool to evaluate and analyze physical assets and help establish a weighted value for each of the elements identified by the CARVER tool.

Understanding the CARVER Tool

To understand why and how the CARVER tool was useful in helping develop a workable BZPP, it is instructive to consider an overview of each of the six major elements of CARVER and how the matrix was used by Ohio State.

Criticality reflects the target's intrinsic value. A target is considered critical when its destruction or damage would have a significant impact on operations. In the case of Ohio State, the loss of the use of Ohio Stadium would have a huge impact on not only the university itself but also on the city of Columbus and the surrounding communities. Most of the university's football games are nationally televised, so an attack on the stadium during a game would have an instant impact on other games at other venues throughout the country. (Patrons and game-day employees are included in the Criticality aspect of the analysis.)

Accessibility is the path or route by which an extremist or terrorist element could safely reach the target with the personnel and equipment needed to accomplish its intended mission. All routes of accessibility – including roadways, pathways, waterways, railways, and even air space – were considered in evaluating the Accessibility factor. Ohio Stadium and the surrounding CI/KA possess all of these accessibility routes. This aspect of the assessment helped identify and analyze critical access-control issues, including identifying the boundaries of the buffer zone and the locations where physical barriers, both permanent and temporary, and other security assets should be placed.

Recuperability is measured in units of time, meaning how long it would take to replace, repair, and/or bypass the destruction of or damage to the target. This aspect of

the analysis helped determine how long it might take to recover from different types of attacks.

Vulnerability identifies the relative "ease" of carrying out various types of attack. In determining the vulnerability of a target, the scale of what is considered to be a "critical component" must be compared with the capability of the attacking individual or force to destroy or damage that component. This aspect of the analysis was key in helping to identify the "amount" of damage required, and the assets it would take to damage or destroy the stadium and/or surrounding CI/KA. A comprehensive vulnerability analysis also includes determining the materials that may be on-site that could be procured and used against a specific target. All people present – football fans; patrons and sponsors; players, coaches, and officials; and workers (including public-safety personnel) – must be considered as CI/KA assets when evaluating this aspect of the process.

Effect is the measurable amount of probable direct loss from an attack and the impacts at the target and beyond. In this part of the process, it was important to think like the terrorist. The big question was, "What in this context addresses all significant effects, whether desired or not, that might result after the selected target component actually is attacked?"

Recognizability measures the relative "ease" of identifying a target. In this case, Ohio Stadium is very easily recognized – and is also on the National Historical Registry. The university's home games are televised nationally and mentioned in the media on a regular basis. Moreover, most large venues of any type tend to be attractive targets for terrorist activity.

Assess, Develop, Process & Reevaluate

As with most risk-assessment tools, CARVER does involve a certain degree of subjective probability, which is defined by DHS as the "interpretation or estimate of probability as a personal judgment or degree of belief about how likely a particular event is to occur, based on the state of knowledge and available evidence." An inherent flaw in subjective probability, of course, is that it is susceptible to personal bias. For that reason, it is important that the team conducting the assessment reach a consensus when establishing values for the grading scale.

Use of the CARVER process in 2003 helped, among other things, to: (a) identify, analyze, and evaluate Ohio Stadium and the surrounding CI/KA; (b) define the boundaries of an appropriately sized buffer zone extending outward from the stadium; (c) identify not only assets that might be targeted but also specific threats and associated vulnerabilities within the buffer zone; and (d) assist in the development of preventive and protective measures that would make it more difficult for terrorists to successfully target and attack the stadium and/or the surrounding CI/KA.

Security planning is not the development and use of a static one-time operational tool but a continuous process. As threats and technology continue to evolve, so must the art and science of security planning. In 2009, with the assistance of Ohio Homeland Security and DHS, the initial BZPP was reviewed and updated. An Infrastructure Survey Tool (IST) – similar to the Risk Self-Assessment Tool (RSAT) – was used for part of the update. The IST, which was particularly useful in the review process, is a web-based vulnerability assessment tool that applies weighted scores to identify vulnerabilities and trends. In addition to using the IST, the original CARVER assessment was revisited.

Overall, the BZPP became a major part of the framework for the all-hazards Public Safety Game Day Operations Plan. Among the other positive aspects of new security plans that evolved and improved during the BZPP process were even closer partnerships with and between agencies and grant resources that further enhanced the planning, equipment, and training needed to mitigate both site and buffer-zone vulnerabilities.

For additional information on:
Requesting access to the video "Game On: A Large Venue Security Case Profile," visit http://uasi.dps.ohio-state.edu/

Richard Morman has been with The Ohio State University Police Division for 27 years and is currently the deputy chief of police. He is a certified protection professional through ASIS International and a certified personal protection specialist (PPS) through the Executive Protection Institute. He is the section chief for the Homeland Security Contingency for Ohio State University football games. He holds a security clearance and is the terrorism liaison officer for Ohio State University police. He has presented at national conferences and is considered a subject matter expert on the topics of fan behavior and celebratory rioting, large venue security, special event security planning and management, and executive protection. He attended The Ohio State University, graduated from the Police Executive Leadership College, graduated from the 225th Session of the FBI National Academy, and holds a certificate in Law Enforcement Education from the University of Virginia.

Preparing a Region for the Nation's Inauguration

By Craig DeAtley, Health Systems

On 21 January 2013, the United States celebrated the re-election of the 44th U.S. President and Vice President with a swearing-in ceremony at the Capital, a parade along Pennsylvania Avenue, and – later that evening – a number of Inaugural Balls in the Nation's Capital.

These activities, along with various related social events before and after that date, brought nearly a million tourists of all ages into the greater Washington, D.C., area – and, with them, a broad spectrum of planning challenges, particularly from a healthcare perspective.

Planning Committees

As is almost always the case with other types of national security events, the key to successful planning for a presidential inauguration requires considerable advance preparations done by committees – more than 30 of them for the inauguration! Each committee was given a specific area of planning responsibility. Health and Medical Planning, co-chaired by a senior official of the D.C. Department of Health and the National Capital Region Coordinator for the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), was one of the largest committees. A multidisciplinary group of representatives from D.C., Maryland, and Virginia were members of the committee and met regularly as a group starting back in the early fall. However, much of the detailed work was done by the 11 task forces staffed by committee volunteers.

Each health and/or medical-related task force met on a weekly or biweekly basis to draft the list of planning materials they were given to carry out their work. All completed draft materials were posted on a secure website, where members could access materials and read the work done by other task forces. At the large group meetings, each task force reported on its progress; additional information, and potential conflicts or other problems, also were discussed. The participants then reached a consensus on the recommended practices and passed them on to the D.C. government and Presidential Inaugural Committee.

Major Medical Issues

There are obviously a large number of medical planning issues that had to be addressed for each of the three major geographical areas of inaugural activity: (a) the swearing-in at the Capitol; (b) the inaugural parade; and (c) the major inaugural balls. Common to each location was the planning required to address credentialing – by the U.S. Secret Service – of the medical and other staff designated to work at each site.

Vital to the provision of medical care to the sick and injured at any one of the sites was determining the number and strategic location for the medical aid stations (MASs). Each MAS was staffed by personnel qualified to perform advanced life support; teams of doctors, nurses, and a paramedic were assigned to many of the stations. The parade-route MASs were staffed jointly by D.C. Fire and EMS (emergency medical services) staff, along with HHS and DOD (Department of Defense) medical teams. Some of the other sites were staffed by volunteer American Red Cross and D.C. Medical Reserve Corps personnel.

Complementing the personnel at the MASs were roving medical teams – on foot and on "Gators" (small motorized transport vehicles); the members of those teams were often the first to get to a patient. Depending on the nature of the problem, they would either render aid and release the patient or take the patient to the closest MAS. The personnel at a MAS had a variety of medical equipment, medications, and supplies available for performing the appropriate examination and treatment of each patient, thus minimizing the need to transport patients to a local hospital.

D.C. Fire Department and EMS ambulances and other mutual-aid units from Maryland and Virginia were strategically located at each venue. Patients requiring transport to a hospital were taken (usually by Gator) to the nearest available ambulance. Hospital destinations were determined by a central ambulance coordination center, headquartered at a local firehouse, that maintained close contact with other personnel (stationed at the D.C. Department of Health's own Command Center) who monitored hospital bed availability throughout the region.

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No less important to planning for medical care at any and all venues was the planning that focused primarily on the hospitals themselves. Each facility, including those in the Maryland and Virginia suburbs, was asked to ensure that adequate medical equipment, supplies, and medications were on hand. Staff planning proved particularly challenging, though, because Inauguration Day was a holiday for many hospitals and maintaining normal daily or surge staffing added certain costs that would not be reimbursed.

Among the other security precautions put into place were countless city road closures, traffic detours, and security checkpoints – all of which impacted the ability of staff getting to work and, for some facilities, of supplies being delivered on time. The monitoring of blood product utilization and conduct of epidemiological surveillance began before the actual inauguration and continued after it ended.

Standard information sharing among the National Capital Region hospitals was carried out by use of the intranet-based systems and policies used on a daily basis. Patient tracking, another planning priority, included issuing a disaster tag with a unique number assigned to each patient seen at any site venue. Periodically, logs with patient demographic details were submitted by radio or telephone to the D.C. Department of Health Command Center.

Moreover, at each venue, an experimental system – transferring the same patient information via handheld scanners and the intranet – served as a redundant patient tracking system. Hospitals posted the names of the patients they treated related to the inauguration on the patient tracking systems used regularly in D.C., Maryland, and Virginia. The D.C. Department of Health Command Center maintained a composite picture of hospital bed status and the inaugural-day patients being seen, along with the available blood supply. Staffing at the Command Center included public health, EMS, hospital officials, and epidemiologists from across the region.

Medical planning also addressed a variety of other issues – including, for example, inspections for all food vendors at each venue. Because the parade participants included hundreds of horses, extensive medical planning to address their needs also was carried out, as were pre-parade checkups and, to deal with an emergency situation, the strategic placement of veterinarians and horse ambulances near the parade route.

The Game Plan

The end product created collaboratively by all 33 committees was a written comprehensive concept of operations plan. This "game plan" served as the guidance document for all that was done before, during, and even after the inauguration by each and all of the numerous participants. Prior to the final version of the game plan being accepted, it was rehearsed in a series of tabletop exercises (several of which led to some helpful revisions being made). The final version of the plan was distributed to the senior leadership of each participating agency and organization involved to help their own decision-making, communications, and problem-solving processes.

The principal objectives of preplanning for a major event are: (a) to be ready for *any* contingency that might occur; and (b) to prevent problems, if possible, as part of the process. The after-action reviews have yet to be completed; however, if nothing "untoward" happened during the inauguration activities, the final assessment is likely to be that everything went "according to plan."

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National Special Security Events: Transportation Checklists

By Laurel J. Radow, Transportation

Officials in Washington, D.C., have completed their hosting responsibilities for the 2013 Inauguration of President Barack Obama, which was held on 21 January 2013. Second-term inaugurations often do not draw the same sized crowds as the first term; therefore, a repeat of the 1.8 million people who attended the 20 January 2009 event was not expected. However, using the lessons learned from the 2009 inauguration (as well as other events), Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (WMATA) had created a service plan, special fares, and fees to support an estimated 500,000 to 800,000 participants traveling to and from the inauguration activities. The estimate was correct. According to WMATA, the Metrorail ridership totaled 779,787 – about 70 percent of the number of passengers reported on Inauguration Day in 2009.

Ensuring that people arrive on time and leave with minimal delay enables an event to go as planned. Effective transportation planning prior to the event helps mitigate transportation problems.

Regardless of the actual number of participants, special events of national significance – for example, presidential inaugurations, presidential nominating conventions, major sports events such as the Super Bowl, and major international meetings such as G-20 Summits – are designated as National Special Security Events (NSSEs). Although all special events require advance planning, attention to security and safety issues, and coordination among all agencies involved, NSSEs require additional considerations, including the U.S. Secret Service being designated as the lead agency responsible for the operational security of the events.

Checking for Transportation Concerns

Approximately 40 NSSEs were held between September 1998 and the end of 2012. In addition to larger cities like Washington, D.C., New York City, and Chicago, Illinois, that are accustomed to managing major events, smaller cities including Denver, Colorado, Tampa, Florida, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, and St. Paul, Minnesota, also have hosted these security events. As the frequency of NSSEs increases, more cities across the country are likely to host these events in the years to come and, in most cases, the transportation systems for those jurisdictions will be affected.

Checklists are invaluable to those involved in the public safety aspects of major events, as emphasized in Kay Goss's 13 June 2012 *DPJ* article entitled, "Special Events: Pre-Event Planning Checklists." Appropriately designed checklists can also assist transportation planners and operators who have to develop, implement, and manage the transportation plans – including a range of activities such as the halting of work at a construction site – for special events, which can be a daunting task without the proper training. In order to assist those planners and operators, the U.S. Department of Transportation (USDOT), Federal Highway Administration (FHWA), produced the 2011 report, "National Special Security Events: Transportation Planning for Planned Special Events."

The 2011 report includes a series of checklists that focus on three specific phases of the event: (a) Pre-NSSE Planning and Preparedness; (b) Day-of-the-NSSE Execution; and (c) Post-NSSE Review/After Action. Those checklists are based in large part on two previously published FHWA documents, the 2006 "Planned Special Events: Checklists for Practitioners," and the 2003 "Managing Travel for Planned Special Events Handbook." The 2006 document offers users a number of very detailed checklists that can be adjusted to incorporate the greater demands that planners are likely to encounter for NSSEs.

A Planning Overview

In addition to the checklists, the 2011 report provides state departments of transportation (DOTs) – as well as local transportation, public works, and law enforcement agencies responsible for planning and executing

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transportation for NSSEs – with a transportation overview, including but not limited to:

- Lessons learned from previous NSSEs;
- Transportation-focused case studies of two NSSEs;
- A playbook that identifies key transportation activities for an NSSE;
- An NSSE fact sheet;
- A template that provides information about an NSSE to appropriate groups in both the planning and implementation phases of these events; and
- A resource directory.

The planning and implementation of an NSSE can be overwhelming, so the FHWA Office of Operations' Traffic Incident and Events Management Team offers peer-to-peer sessions – Traffic Incident Management/Planned Special Events (TIM/PSE) Peer-to-Peer Program – to assist agencies in better preparing their transportation operations for such events. The TIM/PSE Peer-to-Peer program offers both webinars and organized one- or two-day sessions to help planners prepare for local NSSEs. During those sessions, the transportation peers have the opportunity to share information, accomplishments, and lessons learned from the field, and help one another overcome operational challenges that transportation planners often face.

Transportation is a key component for any NSSE. Very often, the success of any planned special event depends in large part on the planning and implementation of the transportation plans. In fact, the length of time needed and/or expected to get to and from the event may determine the perceived level of enjoyment experienced by the attendees. The checklists, publications, and tools provided by FHWA help ensure that both the preparation for and implementation of the plans include all critical partners – from within the agency and from other agencies at all levels of government, private-sector organizations, or volunteers – and are performed in the spirit of coordination and collaboration.

For additional information on:

FHWA, September 2003, "Managing Travel for Planned Special Events Handbook," visit http://ops.fhwa.dot.gov/publications/fhwaop04010/handbook.pdf

FHWA, October 2006, "Planned Special Events: Checklists for Practitioners," visit http://ops.fhwa.dot.gov/publications/psechecklists/index.htm

FHWA, May 2011, "National Special Security Events: Transportation Planning for Planned Special Events," visit http://ops.fhwa.dot.gov/publications/fhwahop11012/fhwahop11012.pdf

FHWA's peer-to-peer program, including how to apply for peer assistance to answer transportation questions, visit http://ops.fhwa.dot.gov/eto_tim_pse/p2p/index.htm

Kay Goss, 13 June 2012, "Special Events: Pre-Event Planning Checklists," visit http://www.domesticpreparedness.com/Infrastructure/Special_Events/Special_Events%3a_Pre-Event_Planning_Checklists

WMATA, 11 October 2012, "Approval of Special Service & Fares for 2013 Inauguration Day," visit http://www.wmata.com/about_metro/board_of_directors/board_docs/101112_Inaugurationpackage.pdf

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An Overlooked Factor in Mass Killings

By Joseph Trindal, Law Enforcement

National violent crime trends for the past two decades show reassuring declines in some respects; however, incidents of extreme violence seem to be escalating in both magnitude and frequency. In reality, there is a lack of consensus regarding trends of mass killings. The U.S. Department of Justice's Bureau of Justice Statistics has reported a five-year national decline in violent crime, with the homicide rate decreasing by 0.7 percent between 2010 and 2011. In addition, the U.S. Department of Labor's Bureau of Labor Statistics reported an 11.6 percent decline in work-related homicides during that same time frame and a much greater decline, 46.7 percent, in that statistical category since 1997.

Moreover, after a discouraging two-year *incline*, the National Law Enforcement Officer Memorial Fund Research Bulletin reported – in a preliminary analysis of 2012 firearms-related fatalities of police officers – a 32-percent decline since 2011.

To put those numbers into a more understandable context, it should be noted that the Federal Bureau of Investigation distinguishes mass murders – defined as four or more victims killed during the same incident with no distinctive time lapse between the individual murders – from serial and "spree" killings as measured by three separate categories: the number of victims involved; the proximity of the separate killings; and the time of each killing. The FBI definition takes into account, therefore, various scenarios ranging from protracted incidents at a single location to a continuing murderous engagement (that also may become mobile).

Are There Any Actual Trends in Mass Murders?

The apparent increase in mass murders may be the result of greater societal awareness stemming from the wide range of 24/7 media coverage now available, and that phenomenon might itself lead to certain misperceptions about such trends – if they actually are trends. On 20 December 2012 the Associated Press released a poll showing that coverage of the 14 December 2012 shooting of 20 school children (and six adults) in Newtown, Connecticut, was voted as the "top news story" of 2012. Certainly, the Sandy Hook Elementary School mass murder is a tragedy that touched the hearts of every American. Even so, it is difficult to measure mass murder in quantifiable terms because, although certain similarities can be identified of what superficially might seem to be more or less "similar" events, no two mass-murder incidents are really alike. The actual number of incidents fails to account for a number of variations in the separate killings involved, but there seems to be little doubt that most high-casualty school killings in the United States, and globally, have occurred within the past 20 years.

Noted criminologist James Allen Fox of Boston's Northeastern University stated in a December 2012 article published at Boston.com that not only is there no typical "pattern" involved, but also that there actually has been no increase in mass killings over the past three decades. Fox's studies indicate, rather, a relatively steady trend of about 20 mass murder incidents in the United States annually since 1976. However, according to other research carried out by Dale Archer, a medical doctor and psychiatrist, there has in fact been a rise in mass murders since the 1980s, when averages increased from one to two mass murders per decade to nine in the 1980s, 11 in the 1990s, and 26 or more since 2000.

John Klofas of the Rochester Institute of Technology reported in 2009 that mass-murder "trends" appear to be cyclical – with "waves" of such killings occurring in the 1920s, the 1930s, and the 1960s. Klofas also suggested that a "contagion effect" might be a contributing factor to this "distribution" pattern. Three other researchers – Thomas Bowers, Eric Holmes, and Ashley Rhom of The Pennsylvania State University-Harrisburg – said, in an article published in the October 2010 issue of the *Journal of Police and Criminal Psychology*, that "our current understanding of the phenomenon indicates these [mass-murder] incidents are not peculiar to only western cultures, and appear to be increasing." Because the measurements and definitions of a mass murder even differ across various studies on the topic, the results postulated by those studies also may vary in certain particulars.

Whether or not the number of mass-murder incidents per se is in fact rising, the media coverage of those incidents is clearly increasing – in both scope and depth. When social media are included in the measurement of media coverage, the trend sharply escalates. However, the quality and reliability of social media are still very subjective by nature and difficult to measure. That factor alone translates into an increased opportunity for misinformation and/or emotionally driven dialogue on almost any major topic – including the issue of mass killings.

Media – Situational Awareness Or a Contributing Factor?

The reasons behind most mass killings continue to elude law-enforcement efforts at predictive intervention. Moreover, before the widespread use of social media, awareness of these terrible incidents was much more localized. The deadliest school massacre in U.S. history, in fact, remains the little known 1927 "Consolidated School Massacre" in Bath, Michigan. The Bath School tragedy involved explosives rigged by a "lone wolf" killer – ironically, a trusted member of the school board – who used the explosives to kill 45 victims (and injure 58 more). Very few Americans living outside of the northern Midwest region of the country ever learned of this incident.

Even today, very few Americans have ever heard of the historical "waves of mass murders" studied by Klofas. However, in the 21st century, mass killings of any type are flashed immediately across the numerous news outlets and social media sources now available not only by the "traditional" print and broadcast media but also by the internet and smart phone apps. Information transmitted by social media today is accompanied by high-definition color imagery and on-site video, with audio recordings.

There also is no shortage of blogs that individual citizens can use to broadcast their opinions – with unfettered emotional context included.

In addition to the bombardment of news about mass killings in the United States and other nations throughout the world, most media outlets with easy access to graphic information also cover global terrorism. Complicating the situation even further is the fact that, even in the context

of political dialogue, there is a struggle in making clear distinctions between acts of terrorism and workplace violence – the 2009 Fort Hood shooting rampage is an obvious example. Of course, from a would-be assailant's perspective in planning and rationalizing murderous acts, perhaps any distinction is moot. Clearly, though, there is an abundance of evidence that suggests considerable internet-sourced influence on a significant number of mass killers in the 21st century.

This trend is not uniquely American, of course. Anders Breivik, the convicted murderer in the 2011 Oslo, Norway, massacre that took the lives of 77 people, seems to have been deeply influenced by the world as he perceived it through the internet; he not only planned his attack through internet research but also determined the specific tactics he would use. In the Far East, where many nations prohibit the ownership of firearms, there have been numerous incidents of mass attacks involving edged weapons, including swords, knives, and machetes. Some of these attacks have targeted school children – e.g., the 14 December 2012 attack on Chenpeng Village Primary School in China in which 22 children were wounded by cuts and stabs as classes were just starting. Over the past decade, there also has been an escalation in "catastrophic" attacks such as: (a) the 2004 hostage incident at Beslan School No. 1 in the Russian republic of North Ossetia that resulted in more than 300 deaths, including 156 children; and (b) the 2008 multiple attacks in the downtown area of Mumbai, India, that claimed more than 160 lives.

When enhancing preparedness and response measures to address mass murders, another concern is the previously mentioned "contagion effect" caused by mass media reports on the methods and tactics assailants may use. Along with other potential contributing factors, the ease by which a person contemplating murderous acts can co-opt the tactics used by terrorists and mass killers in previous violent incidents should be carefully considered. Society's holistic approach to coping with mass killings perhaps should expand to include a broad spectrum of threat scenarios employing simple, cross-adaptable, response techniques to rapidly avoid, mitigate, and defeat such threats.

If nothing else, preparedness planning for such threats should include specific strategies for: deterrence; early detection; and multi-layered defeat – concentrating on the denial of access and/or the denial of targets. A concerted, continuing, and community-wide inclusive approach can make a significant difference in countering the current casualty trends in mass killings – and keep those trends from escalating to higher levels in the future.

For additional information on:
John Klofas, 15 May 2009, "Summary of Research on Mass Murder," visit http://www.rit.edu/cla/cpsi/WorkingPapers/2009/2009-11.pdf

Thomas G. Bowers, Eric S. Holmes & Ashley Rhom, October 2010, "The Nature of Mass Murder and Autogenic Massacre," visit http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs11896-009-9059-6

Dale Archer, 28 July 2012, "Mass Murders Are on the Rise," visit http://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/reading-between-the-headlines/201207/mass-murders-are-the-rise

A list of "Mass Shootings in the United States Since 2005," 14 December 2012, visit http://www.bradycampaign.org/xshare/pdf/major-shootings.pdf

Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2010 and 2011 data, visit http://www.bls.gov/iif/oshwc/cfoi/osar0016.htm and http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/cfoi.pdf
James Allen Fox, 19 December 2012, "Top 10 Myths About Mass Shootings," visit http://boston.com/community/blogs/crime_punishment/2012/12/top_10_myths_about_mass_shooti.html

Associated Press, 20 December 2012, "AP poll: Mass shootings voted top 2012 news story," visit http://www.ap.org/Content/AP-In-The-News/2012/AP-poll-Mass-shootings-voted-top-2012-news-story

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Hands-On Training in an Internet World

By Joseph Cahill, EMS

Because so many educational programs are now being offered online, today's busy professionals have the opportunity not only to learn at their own paces but also at the times and locations that are most personally convenient for them. Many state, regional, and/or local oversight agencies – as well as many employers and the National Registry of Emergency Medical Technicians (NREMT) – require a minimum number of continuing education (CE) hours periodically (usually every two to three years) in order to maintain certification. To ensure that the CE hours will be accepted by the agencies requiring them, the students should be fully aware of the requirements and pre-approval processes of those organizations and agencies.

The principal goal of *professional development* training, in contrast, is almost always to gain additional knowledge or skills, usually without certification and/or CE credit requirements involved. In other words, although courses designed for certification and/or CE credit must meet the standards set by certifying or oversight agencies, there is no such requirement for professional development programs – and, as a result, the content and quality of those courses can and do vary widely. However, to ensure that a professional development program is produced by a reputable organization, one strategy used by some agencies and individual trainees is to enroll in CE programs even if additional CE credits are not needed.

The added convenience of taking CE and professional development training online certainly has advantages. However, when considering enrolling in courses for base training purposes, there are some notable disadvantages as well – primarily involving skills training and testing – that also should be considered.

The Basics of Base Training

In the United States, the EMS (emergency medical services) professions – emergency medical technicians (EMTs) or paramedics, for example – require that candidates acquire specific certifications. The principal goal of base training is to provide the training and skills needed by previously untrained persons to achieve a specific certification and/or to prepare them for employment. However, a main hurdle that an online program must overcome is in skills training, which typically involves the following four-step process: (1) Learn the skill by practicing in simulation; (2) Test the skill in simulation; (3) Perform the skill during practicum on real people; and (4) Test the skill during a certifying test.

Because pre-hospital medicine is a hands-on task, sufficient provision for skills practice must be made not only to meet the requirements postulated for state certification but also to prepare the student for using his or her newly acquired skills in the real world. By their very nature, however, many EMS skills cannot be completely simulated within the two-dimensional world of the computer screen. Of course, some students may be able to master certain components of a skill online, but exercising that skill on a living (or dying) person provides a completely different experience.

A more viable strategy, therefore, is for program organizers to partner with local agencies in developing the skill training and practicum aspects of the program. However, as with traditional classes, the student must be at a set location during a set time. Because many states have specific practicum requirements, a potential student should check with his or her state certifying agency to see that the program offered does in fact fully meet the certifying requirements mandated.

Reasonable Goals: Two Key Questions

Before spending the time or money needed for an online EMT or paramedic program, the individual student should ask himself (or herself) at least two questions: (a) "Is there a compelling reason to take the program online rather than in person?" (b) "Does the online training meet my goals?" The first question is one that only the student can answer. To answer the second question, though, each student must first formulate his or her own coherent goals. Following are a few additional details for consideration in relation to both questions:

1. Is there a compelling reason to take the program online rather than in person? There are certain training advantages (as well as a few "prestige" bonus points) in enrolling in traditional classroom programs. Some

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states, of course, may allow the practicum for out-of-state online courses to be supervised locally, but the provisions made for skills practice may not prepare students sufficiently for the skills testing required within a student's state. Moreover, although each skill itself does not change from state to state, the steps that are critical to pass the skill station sometimes do. For example, the intravenous (IV) skill station in New York City requires that candidates clean the site in three specific steps, whereas Pennsylvania protocols simply state that candidates must clean the site. A traditional – i.e., local classroom – program will better provide such details and train students accordingly.

As an added bonus, there are certain EMT and paramedic programs that, in ways similar to the possession of a Harvard or Yale degree, are so highly regarded that certification by those programs has a much higher value in the job market. After a person is certified and has accumulated some valuable working experience, of course, EMS managers may not care how or where that person started his/her training. Nonetheless, when applying for that first job, online training may not hold the same status as a more traditional and better known "on site" program – particularly one that is highly respected within the EMS community.

2. Does the online training meet my goals? Even when the practicum for an online program can be carried out locally, the school's own requirements may be satisfied – but that in itself does not guarantee that the state's requirements for certification also will be met. By contacting the state licensing agency – and, perhaps, a few potential employers – a prospective student can determine if an online class will meet the minimum requirements mandated by the state. If those requirements are not met, the agency or employer may review the application either as an out-of-state reciprocity request – or simply as unacceptable for other reasons. When this happens, the students may end up either having to pay additional money to complete requirements that the online classes did not meet – and/or, worse, having to start over from scratch.

An additional factor worth considering is that there frequently are local tests, over and above the minimum licensing required for approval to practice in a specific community or locality. Most agencies accept state certification as proof of the training needed to take such tests, but candidates also must be able to demonstrate their skills. The added advantage provided by traditional classes is that, by their nature, they are local and will better prepare students for local tests as well as for the state certifying tests.

Without an absolutely compelling reason to obtain training online, therefore, it seems clear that base training and skill sets are often best learned within a classroom setting. Online classes serve as a strong tool for achieving many EMS training goals and those set for other first responders, but students also must be aware of their own personal goals and the potential limitations of the training routes available to achieve those goals.

For additional information on:
The National Registry of EMTs CE requirements, visit
http://www.nremt.org/nremt/EMTServices/recert_info.asp

FEMA's professional development training, visit http://training.fema.gov/is/crslist.asp?page=all

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Special Events Challenges – A Sesquicentennial Example

By Stephen Grainer, Fire/HazMat

Planned events provide an opportunity for incident management teams to practice their trade without the same degree of urgency or stress generally associated with sudden unexpected incidents. However, even during planned or scheduled events, there are numerous challenges that must be confronted and solutions to those challenges that must be developed. One of the most valuable reasons for planning an event, in fact, is to prevent emergency incidents of any type from actually occurring before or during such events.

Among the most common challenges that cannot be thoroughly planned in advance are weather and geographical variables, the number of participants expected, and the security measures that must be developed and practiced. The National Weather Service has significantly refined its own longer-range forecasting for potentially severe weather conditions, but daily weather forecasts still mention the numerous variables that also must be covered. Although information from past events and the nature of the event itself can help in predicting the types and numbers of participants expected to attend, some events will attract individuals or groups seeking to protest the event itself or to draw attention to their own causes – which might have nothing at all in common with the event at which the protest occurs. Largely for that reason, the provisions planned and implemented for event security must go well beyond fundamental event-admission and activities-management responsibilities.

When planning for a special event, it is not only mandatory to plan for the potential dangers already known, but also to predict – and develop a contingency plan to cope with – the unexpected dangers and difficulties as well.

One special event that necessarily included greater attention on not only weather conditions but also new security considerations was Virginia's Sesquicentennial (150th anniversary) Reenactment of the Battle of First Manassas, which ran from 18 July through 24 July 2011. The principal reenactment activities for the Sesquicentennial were held on 21 and 22 July. However, there were a host of other public memorials and recognition activities scheduled both before and after those dates. Even with numerous lessons learned from previous special events of the same type, the Manassas Sesquicentennial posed some unique challenges.

Weather, Geographic & Population Complications

To begin with, Virginia's summer is typically hot and humid – with temperatures often ranging to the upper 80s or low 90s, and the humidity index even higher (100 degrees or more). Such stressful conditions are frequently compounded by sudden localized thunderstorms, which in that area usually start early in the afternoon and continue into the evening. Some of the storms are capable of reaching severe conditions – considerably intensified by frequent and intense lightning and with wind gusts in excess of 60 miles per hour. When there is heavy rainfall as well, flash flooding also can occur, but the sudden onset of such storms and their potential severity are the most notable concerns for event managers and security personnel.

The largely preserved rural condition of the Manassas area's annual commemoration site is today somewhat of an anomaly because most of the surroundings are now, for all practical purposes, considered to be outer suburbs of the greater Washington, D.C., metropolitan area. Although two 4-6 lane commuter routes – an east-west interstate highway (I-66) and a north-south U.S. highway (US-29, also known as Lee Highway) – and several other major highways serve the region, most of the local roads closer to the event site are more narrow and more difficult to navigate, even at lower speeds. The two-lane "country" roads are a challenge for moving large volumes of traffic, and nearly impossible for the transportation of heavy equipment, staging, and other outsized cargo and supplies. Hence, although access to

the area is good, ingress and egress travel to the site during the Sesquicentennial commemoration poses significant challenges for event planners.

Because National Park Service (NPS) regulations prohibit most events from taking place on NPS property, all of the reenactment proceedings and many of the preliminary and associated gatherings took place on the private property surrounding and adjoining the public park area. However, NPS assumed responsibility for a number of the public tributes and memorials. Thus, the event was not only multi-faceted but also involved the use of and activities within a broad spectrum of federal, state, and local properties.

For the 2011 event, planners projected the following: attendance ranging anywhere from 150,000 to 300,000 visitors; several thousand re-enactors; a relatively large number of livestock (horses, primarily – most of them owned and brought by the re-enactors); and numerous local as well as national politicians and other dignitaries scheduled to deliver speeches and memorial addresses during the event. In addition to the concerns posed by what could be a rapid onset of severe weather, the site of the activities presented another major challenge: approximately 3,000 acres of combined national park property, private property, and a state forest tract, all of which led to and required numerous divisions of authority, based primarily on the land owners involved.

Shade for the Horses, Heavy Wool for the Fighting Men

Largely because of the separate land ownerships – and the associated regulations under which each of the political entities represented were required to execute their individual responsibilities – the planning process was not "unified." Although separate action plans were ultimately agreed upon and promulgated, the separate command groups also developed a number of helpful information-exchange protocols to maintain a common situational awareness.

The reenactment itself presented several major planning challenges, particularly those related to safety and security. One prominent example: The Civil War re-enactor uniforms were made of the same type of wool fabric – heavy, hot, and very cumbersome – worn by the original soldiers. Virtually every other tangible item worn or used by the combatants on both sides of the epic battle was replicated: combat equipment; tools; canvas tents; campfires; and even the hand carts used to carry tents, blankets, and personal gear.

However, even though most of the re-enactors observed sound personal safety and protective precautions – such as maintaining adequate hydration and seeking shade when necessary – event planners still were concerned about the potential for heat-related casualties. Largely for that reason, special plans were made for the rapid deployment of medical support personnel using four-wheel quick-response equipment and other EMS support resources. Because of concern for the well-being of the horses used in the mock battles, state forest authorities permitted the re-enactors to tether their horses in the shade of the adjoining Conway-Robinson State Forest when not engaged in the reenactment activities.

Unfortunately, this raised another complication. Because of state forest regulations, the re-enactors could not set up camp with their horses and thus had to stay on the adjoining private property. This concern presented a security issue for the Virginia Department of Forestry and necessitated daily patrols by the department's personnel to prevent establishment of campsites on the forest property.

Horses, Soft Perimeters & Other Security Concerns

Security in general was a significant challenge for all of the event management personnel. There were three different "command" elements with divergent authorities and responsibilities – all using adjoining property with no "hard perimeters." It was necessary for the federal, state, and local event managers to coordinate closely to ensure safety and security for the event. According to Zeph Cunningham, NPS's mentor to the designated deputy incident commander who ensured that all NPS regulations were followed, one of the most serious challenges was the need to encourage and coordinate intelligence sharing among the key personnel.

The general concerns were threefold. First, the on-scene authorities were working with what was called a "soft perimeter." As such, there were no formal distinctions between the federal, state, or private land. In addition,

there was no system by which visitors were admitted to or contained within specific areas of the entire site.

Second, access control was minimal and the NPS authorities had no way of assessing visitors' interests or intent. Usually, when visitors enter a national park or monument site, the parking or admission process provides officials a quick way to assess the visitors' motives for being there. When this security process does not exist or is suspended, the customary protective measures cannot be employed. Therefore, Cunningham was concerned that the event could pose both safety and security issues beyond the customary procedures followed by the event management teams.

Third, his concerns also reflected the current realities of both timing and politics because the commemoration was taking place during a politically charged atmosphere – at a time in which major public events have become an almost irresistible magnet for terrorists, political and ideological protestors, and advocates for or against various causes. Many national as well as state dignitaries and politicians were scheduled for presentations, so the security concerns included uncertainty about who might arrive without prior notifications and/or require extra security measures.

Moreover, if groups or individuals attended with the intent to disrupt the event, additional personnel would be needed to prevent confrontations.

For that reason, among others, the NPS established an operations branch – made up of both uniformed and plain-clothes personnel – dedicated to law enforcement and security. The uniformed personnel provided a clearly visible cadre, whereas the plain-clothes contingent maintained a constant undetected presence. In addition, the NPS event managers coordinated with the U.S. Park Police to supplement the ground resources already assigned with additional security resources. During all daytime activities, the Park Police provided aerial overhead support with at least one helicopter, which provided direct intelligence to the helicopter's ground-based partners using real-time, live-stream video capabilities. The park police also provided highly trained and well-disciplined horse-mounted riders trained to mix easily with the crowds and provide direct safety and security resources.

To briefly summarize, major special events require the thorough and effective planning needed, well in advance, to prevent such events from evolving into sudden emergencies. Not incidentally, these same events also provide excellent real-life opportunities for incident management personnel and teams to apply and practice their training and skills under non-emergency conditions. In any case, whether the scenario is an unexpected incident or a carefully planned special event, the need for action planning has been validated and affirmed, and the National Incident Management System has provided a template by which both the incident- and event-management resources used continue to strengthen the nation's overall homeland security efforts.

For additional information on:
The National Incident Management System, visit http://www.fema.gov/pdf/emergency/nims/NIMS_core.pdf

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Understanding Public Health Emergency Declarations

By Raphael M. Barishansky, Public Health

The seemingly obvious phrase "public health emergency" is in fact one of the most frequently misunderstood terms in the emergency management lexicon. Individual states may declare a statewide public health emergency with or without a federal declaration and, by doing so, would allow the states themselves to: (a) purchase and distribute additional antivirals and personal protective equipment; (b) communicate directly and more freely with local public health officials, healthcare providers, other state and federal agencies, and private partners; and (c) allow a broad spectrum of state agencies and departments to implement various plans to deal with such emergencies. This is, in fact, what happened during the 2009-2010 H1N1 pandemic when various states – including Virginia, California, and Texas – declared public health emergencies.

Public health preparedness is moving beyond the "traditional" public health events. By temporarily changing the rules, disaster survivors can receive the healthcare they need when they need it the most.

Under Section 319 of the Public Health Services Act (42 U.S.C. § 247d), the Secretary of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) may declare a federal public health emergency if the Secretary determines, after consultation with other public health officials, that "(1) a disease or disorder presents a public health emergency; or (2) a public health emergency, including significant outbreaks of infectious diseases or bioterrorist attacks, otherwise exists." This broad definition gives HHS the discretion, therefore, to determine if a particular event does in fact constitute a public health emergency. If that determination is made, the declaration lasts for 90 days, but can be terminated earlier if the Secretary determines that the emergency no longer exists. If the emergency persists, though, the determination may be renewed for an additional 90 days.

The conditions leading to these declarations include, but are not necessarily limited to, any of the following dangers or situations: contaminated flood water; compromised sewage treatment plants; unsafe drinking water; carbon monoxide poisoning; food poisoning; and/or mold caused by flooding. The HHS Secretary also has the discretion to determine that a specific disease or condition presents a public health emergency, and/or that a public health emergency otherwise exists because of conditions that were present prior to a natural catastrophe or the actual outbreak of a disease.

Impacts of a Public Health Emergency Declaration

Events that constitute a public health emergency declaration can potentially overwhelm existing healthcare resources – hospitals and nursing homes, for example, as well as dialysis centers and EMS (emergency medical services) agencies. The declaration provides, among other things, state healthcare systems more flexibility in assisting crisis victims and permits Medicare patients to receive care at nursing homes without the normally required three-day hospital stay.

Under Section 1135 of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. § 1320b-5), the HHS Secretary also may temporarily waive or modify certain Medicare, Medicaid, and/or CHIP (Children's Health Insurance Program) requirements to ensure that: (a) sufficient healthcare material resources, and services, are available to meet the needs of people in the emergency area and time periods; and (b) the providers of such services, in good faith – i.e., absent any determination of fraud or abuse – can be reimbursed and exempted from sanctions. Section 1135 also lists various requirements that can be waived or modified – e.g., revising bed limits for hospitals – to help states expand their surge capacities. When the Secretary issues an 1135 waiver, hospitals and other healthcare facilities usually work directly with the HHS's own Regional Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMSs) to seek specific waivers or modifications on a case-by-case basis.

Among the most frequent examples of the circumstances governing when, and why, 1135 waivers or modifications are issued are the following:

- Requirements that physicians and other healthcare professionals be licensed in the state in which they are providing services – provided, however, that they (the physicians and other healthcare professionals) have equivalent licensing in another state. (This waiver is for purposes of Medicare, Medicaid, and CHIP reimbursement only – state laws determine whether a non-federal provider is authorized to provide services in the state without state licensure);
- The imposition of Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act (EMTALA) sanctions for the direction or relocation of an individual to receive a medical screening examination in an alternative location pursuant to an appropriate state emergency preparedness plan – or, in the case of a public health emergency involving pandemic infectious disease, a state pandemic preparedness plan. Also for the transfer of a patient who has not been stabilized if the transfer is necessitated by the circumstances of the declared emergency (a waiver of EMTALA requirements is effective only if the actions authorized under the waiver do not discriminate on the basis of a patient's source of payment or ability to pay); and
- Limitations that have been imposed on payment for healthcare items and services furnished to Medicare Advantage enrollees by non-network providers.

Floods, Pandemics & Superstorms

The March 2009 Red River flood experienced in North Dakota required a public health emergency declaration (issued under section 319 of the Public Health Service Act). That flood also served, not incidentally, as a prime example of the unfortunate fact that, even with weeks of advance warning, preparation activities still may not be enough to hold back the river, which crested at 23 feet above the flood stage – the second highest level recorded over the past 150 years. It took more than a month, in fact, for the Red River to show signs of receding, which also put an immense burden on the local infrastructure and

created a variety of public health concerns – involving and/or related to, for example, environmental health, the outbreak of communicable diseases, and numerous other dangers and difficulties. Similar once-per-century natural disasters, of course, could occur in almost any state or city in the country, and it would be extremely difficult – exorbitantly expensive, as well – to fully and effectively prepare for such rare occurrences.

A public health emergency declaration was made in 2009-2010 by HHS in response to the H1N1 pandemic. Millions of doses of Tamiflu were distributed from the Strategic National Stockpile (SNS) to locations where states could quickly access them as needed. In addition to the public health emergency declaration, President Obama declared a national emergency, which encouraged U.S. businesses to take certain preparedness actions on their own – by, for example, informing and educating their employees on how to help stop the spread of the flu and develop business continuity-of-operations plans.

The fact that the H1N1 pandemic was declared both a national emergency and a public health emergency not only helped to ensure that the medical resources needed to fight the disease were available to states and local communities, but also led to follow-on long-term planning initiatives at all levels of government and in the private sector. This sequence is similar to how the anthrax letter mailings in 2001 (shortly after the 9/11 terrorist attacks) led to a permanent change in the public health emergency preparedness landscape and focused significant public health resources on the advance planning needed to cope with biological attacks of any type in the future.

More recently, Superstorm Sandy wreaked havoc on several East Coast states in late October 2012, causing an estimated $50 billion or more in property damage and precipitating a national public health emergency declaration (primarily, though, for New York and New Jersey). That declaration was made by the HHS Secretary, working in close coordination with the White House, and permitted some of the exemptions mentioned earlier to be made to the healthcare systems in the affected states.

The Future of Public Health Emergency Declarations

Past events demonstrate that public health declarations can and are being made during natural disasters and/or other "non-traditional" public health events. In the future, there are likely to be even more declarations of public health emergencies, the ramifications of which will continue to have a major impact on the nation's healthcare and public health infrastructure, particularly in regards to the resources available, the costs incurred, staffing requirements, and various other factors.

Recent developments in public health emergency preparedness (PHEP) include the promulgation, by the U.S. Centers for Disease Control & Prevention (CDC), of Public Health Preparedness Capabilities, as well as the alignment of the CDC's own PHEP (Public Health Emergency Preparedness) and HPP (Hospital Preparedness Program) grants.

In the short term, these recent changes represent an encouraging move toward a better understood and more closely coordinated era of public health preparedness with clear goals and objectives. The same developments also have allowed federal, state, and local public health agencies to better organize their work, plan their priorities, and decide which capabilities they are able to build or sustain with current resources. The total long-term effects of these moves, however, have yet to be seen.

For additional information on:
EMTALA Implementation and Enforcement Issues, visit http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-01-747

The Public Health Services Act (42 U.S.C. § 247d), visit http://uscode.house.gov/download/pls/Title_42.txt

Section 1135 of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. § 1320b-5), visit http://www.ssa.gov/OP_Home/ssact/title11/1135.htm

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The Local Imperative for Building and Sustaining National Resilience

By Marko Bourne, CIP-R

When C.J. Huff, EdD, took office as superintendent of schools in Joplin, Missouri, his primary mission was to reduce high-school dropout rates. To achieve that goal, he talked with administrators, developed relationships, and reached out to the community. Unbeknownst to Huff at that time, he was doing more than just helping kids stay in school; he also was helping to lay the foundation for building a more resilient community.

On 22 May 2011 – the day of its graduation ceremony – Joplin High School and the surrounding area were hit by a devastating EF-5 tornado. Much of the town was totally destroyed, and half of the district's students were displaced. However, the next day, parents, students, and other residents left behind the remains of their homes and rallied behind Huff. School buses became ambulances, and the schools still intact became temporary shelters.

In the early hours of 24 May 2011, in the counselor's office of a middle school that had been converted into an emergency command center, Huff was wide awake. He knew that his primary responsibility was to take care of the children of Joplin and, for that reason, he spent the night mapping a path forward. The next morning, he met with his administrative team, and set the proper tone for Joplin's recovery: "School starts in 84 days. Let's get to work." That fall, as promised, the students did go back to school as scheduled, and its football team also took the field. Life went on.

Huff had helped his community carry on in the face of a catastrophic and life-altering event. By fighting to curb the schools' dropout rates, he also had helped to create a powerful community network. By forging close working relationships out of ordinary circumstances, he had gathered – and, in effect, helped to train – a circle of people with whom he shared a high level of mutual trust. He also gave Joplin what no outside leader could: resilience.

Resilience begins at the local level – and flourishes when federal and state agencies facilitate and support the efforts, plans, and actions of local communities, and local leaders, as they rebuild their homes and businesses, recover losses, and restore a sense of normalcy.

A New Kind of Response

Today, natural disasters (Superstorm Sandy is just the latest example) continue to impact communities around the world in unpredictable ways. For that reason, coordinated responses to the numerous complex problems that follow are critical. The responsibility of providing disaster relief often falls on individual states. Unfortunately, during widespread disasters, the rules governing the responsibilities of local, state, and federal agencies can become blurred and lead to confusion and gridlock.

The stakes are even higher now than probably at any other time. News events such as the Joplin tornadoes or, more recently, the Sandy Hook Elementary School shootings, command massive public, media, and political attention and participation. Such exposure, however, presents both challenges and constraints. When executed according to plan, communications may be reasonably effective among and between officials, responders, and volunteers. But responses to complex problems are often scrutinized, commented upon, and criticized as events continue to unfold in real time – and often before relevant and important information is fully understood or shared through official channels.

Think Locally, Act Horizontally

After assessing the damages, grieving for what has been lost, and picking up the pieces, communities can begin to rebuild and return to normal. Federal and regional networks can provide crucial aid, but only the

communities directly impacted know what "normal" means to them. Therefore, the best path to full recovery should begin locally. If and when it does, new leaders will emerge – many of them from unlikely places.

Nonetheless, no one group – volunteer organizations, human services associations, or even local governments – possesses *all* of the knowledge, jurisdictional capabilities, or material resources needed to act unitarily. These groups must therefore collaborate horizontally, pooling their resources and expertise, to lead response operations that are more powerful and meaningful than could be achieved by any one group working alone.

The ability to collaborate is a defining factor of resilience – an abstract and still not fully understood term. A community, like a human body's immune system, may harbor certain preconditions – for example, a high population density, a large aging population, or homes clustered near bodies of water – that determine and sometimes limit the possibilities of what can and should be done in times of sudden disaster. Although some factors cannot be controlled and not every adverse eventuality can be avoided, at least some barriers can be put in place to minimize the impact of disasters when they do occur by anticipating, preparing for, and bouncing back from such events.

Expectations & Challenges; Prerequisites and Residual Benefits

A resilient community, like a strong immune system, demands certain expectations. At the individual level, social capital is important. Huff intuitively understood this. Working horizontally across the town's schools, government, nonprofit organizations, and faith community, he had built a strong, effective, and durable network and, in doing so, had earned social currency that proved invaluable at a time when Joplin needed it most. As a school superintendent, he emerged as an unexpected leader of a unified resilience effort.

Resilience is significantly enhanced, of course, when the whole government and whole community work together toward common goals. Unfortunately, though, it can be a major challenge to: (a) carefully coordinate with a broad spectrum of groups that often have opposing objectives; (b) develop a common vocabulary; and (c) jointly understand the diverse factors involved in a specific emergency situation. Meeting these challenges will help make the response efforts targeted, flexible, and scalable. In addition, the benefit of working together during one event is that an improved capacity is left behind, thus making recovery more manageable the next time disaster strikes.

Community efforts like those exhibited in Joplin demonstrate how resilient networks are already being successfully built at the sub-state level – resulting not from official mandate but, rather, emerging seemingly on their own. Rather than relying on federal work crews and outside organizers, communities are becoming more able to organize themselves and to build networks of local outreach groups.

To respond to today's challenges, government agencies should serve as conveners and advocators of action, a hub through which countless local efforts may flow. Recognizing that the most robust responses can at times come from unlikely places, government leaders should focus on fostering inclusiveness and empowering local leaders – those who are best positioned to bring about true, longer lasting, and more effective change.

The preceding article is based on presentations given by Admiral Thad Allen (USCG, Ret.) and Marko Bourne on 13 November 2012 at The National Press Club in Washington, D.C., as part of a DomPrep Executive Briefing.

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Significant contributions to this article were made by Thad Allen, the senior vice president at Booz Allen Hamilton (BAH). In 2010, President Barack Obama selected him to serve as the national incident commander for the unified response to the Deepwater Horizon oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico. Prior to his assignment as the 23rd commandant of the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG), he served as USCG chief of staff. In 2005, he was designated principal federal official for the U.S. government's response and recovery operations in the aftermath of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita throughout the Gulf Coast region. Other USCG assignments included duty as commander, Atlantic area; in that post he led the USCG's Atlantic area forces following the 9/11 terrorist attacks. A fellow in the National Academy of Public Administration and a member of the Council on Foreign Relations, he also currently serves as a director on the Coast Guard Foundation and Partnership for Public Service.

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

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