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Interview With Larry Roth
The assistant executive director and COO of the American Society of Civil Engineers shares his views on, among other topics, the ASCE's latest "Report Card" on America's Infrastructure, and EPA grants and funding for vulnerability assessments.
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NFPA 1405 tells land-based firefighters how to respond to fires aboard ships in port. But some essential details are missing, and should be included in future (revised) editions.
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The handgun, the shotgun, and the rifle—each has its advantages and disadvantages. But today's law-enforcement officer needs at least one effective weapon not only to carry out his duties but also to protect himself and the thousands of innocent people he encounters on his daily patrols.
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President Bush's fiscal year 2006 budget plan calls for increased funding for port and maritime security. Some members of Congress say that that is only a start, and significant additional funds are needed – ASAP.
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Interview with Larry Roth, Assistant Executive Director of the American Society of Civil Engineers

By John Fass Morton
Interviews

On March 31, 2005, DomPrep.com's John F. Morton and Martin Masiuk visited with Larry Roth, a professional engineer and the American Society of Civil Engineers' assistant executive director and chief operating officer. Last month, the ASCE released its 2005 Report Card for America's Infrastructure with updated grades on the condition of the nation's roads, bridges, drinking water, transit systems, energy and schools. ASCE represents over 125,000 civil engineers in the public, academic and private sectors. Earlier this year, the association helped develop three security guidance documents that cover the design of online contaminant monitoring systems and physical security enhancements of drinking water, wastewater and stormwater infrastructure systems.

To get the complete audio download of the interview, please go to www.DomesticPreparedness.com

Mr. Roth discusses the ACSE 2005 Report Card and its recommendations and what they mean for first responders and public and private sector facility managers who are also wrestling with the need to address security vulnerabilities. He notes some of the resources currently available to engineering professionals as they consider securing the nation's built infrastructure – from design to building and operating.

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Needed: Revisions to Maritime Response Standard

By Ashley Moore
Standards

The principle of all successful efforts is to try to do not what is absolutely the best, but what is easily within our power, and suited for our temperament and condition.

~ John Ruskin

According to Scotland's Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence, the capture of Al Qaeda's chief of naval operations, Ahmad Belai Al Neshari, has helped reveal the extent of the organization's maritime ambitions. Al Neshari was found carrying a 180-page dossier listing maritime targets of opportunity, such as large cruise liners sailing from Western ports. The Centre claims that Al Qaeda has produced a naval manual filled with detailed instructions about where and how to attack vessels, employ limpet mines, fire rockets or rocket-propelled grenades from high-speed craft, and turn liquefied natural gas (LNG) tankers into floating bombs.

The Centre's director, Magnus Ranstorp, says that the manual also includes instructions on how to detonate various small and medium-sized craft positioned alongside large ships or in ports where there are petroleum or gas storage areas that could explode and produce catastrophic results.

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Interview with Larry Roth

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infrastructure, Mr. Roth outlines the work of The Infrastructure Security Partnership (TSIP) and the American National Standards Institute (ANSI).

In this segment, Mr. Roth talks of Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) grants and funding for vulnerability assessments. He also summarizes recommendations found in this year's ASCE guidance documents and gives a heads-up for future documents in the pipeline.

Finally, Mr. Roth addresses information sharing and coordination across infrastructure sectors, jurisdictional boundaries and geographic locations and makes particular reference to ASCE's Infrastructure Security Professional Advisory Network (I-SPAN).

Needed: Revisions to Maritime Response Standard

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If a maritime terrorism incident happens, local firefighters are expected to use *NFPA 1405 (A Guide for Land-Based Fire Fighters Who Respond to Marine Vessel Fires)* as a baseline for developing their response. However, the 1405 standard, developed by the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA), does not address the core competencies firefighters need when responding to incidents in which radiological, chemical, or biological agents have been released, or where the detonation of an improvised explosive device (IED), such as a small craft loaded with explosives, has released toxic industrial chemicals (TICs) or toxic industrial materials (TIMs) already aboard the ship being attacked.

Although fire-fighting tactics and strategies used aboard vessels are generally similar to those used in fighting structural fires ashore, many aspects of marine fire-fighting warrant special attention, if only because of the unique environment that firefighters will encounter aboard a vessel after an attack in which one or more weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) have been used.

One of the many goals of those helping marine firefighters is to identify ways to improve their preparedness for terrorist attacks and/or other major disasters, and to cope with other emergencies both effectively and efficiently – by, for example, using national standards considered essential to protection of the maritime front of homeland security. To do all this will require a major collaborative effort focused on planning, training, and exercises. The latter will greatly assist in the development and distribution of lessons learned to all stakeholders, and also help in the sharing of best-practices information as well as the development of new training standards to be incorporated in future versions of NFPA 1405. But the understanding does not stop there; it also requires an awareness of the adversary's doctrine, tactics, and current and probable courses of action, along with detailed information about the physical and environmental characteristics of local port areas to identify the gaps in knowledge that are used to define the foundation for standard.

A Practice Cruise in the Malacca Straits

"Al Qaeda has a naval manual which specifies classes of ships, where to attack them, and how much explosives to use – they are very precise in their modus operandi."

~ Magnus Ranstorp

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Needed: Revisions to Maritime Response Standard

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Existing concerns about possible terrorist threats to maritime security were significantly increased by two incidents that took place last year. In March 2004, armed men not only captured and robbed the Indonesian chemical tanker Dewi Madrim in the Malacca Straits, but they also steered the ship through the straits for an hour. That unexpected cruise, according to Dominic Armstrong, a maritime expert for Aegis Security in London, may have been a training mission for the terrorists. In another incident, terrorists seized an oil tanker near Malaysia in August 2004, and took three crewmembers hostage. The $100,000 ransom that was paid went not to pirates but to the Free Aceh Movement, according to government officials in Malaysia.

Maritime terrorist operations such as these have made federal, state, and local governments increasingly aware of the need for re-visiting, and quickly revising, the NFPA standard. However, because several states already have developed their own standards for marine firefighting, it may be difficult to capture the true nature of the type and variety of responses needed, and the possible effects on those responding. In addition, it may be even more difficult to determine the level of pre-planning necessary.

On 29 October 2001, President Bush issued the first of a new series of Homeland Security Presidential Directives (HSPDs) governing the full spectrum of domestic preparedness. Subsequent directives (HSPDs 5, 7, 8, and 13) spell out many of the initial steps needed to implement state and local port planning, training, and exercise requirements. Such implementation should allow jurisdictions to define what needs to be done to prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from a major maritime event.

The Threat Most Likely

The 2005 Homeland Security Port Security Grant program developed by DHS/ODP (the Department of Homeland Security's Office of Domestic Preparedness) establishes many program parameters. What is particularly significant is that the Port Grant program guidelines make it abundantly clear that the IED maritime threat ranks near the top of the list of the most likely WMD scenarios. Curiously, though, the tasks associated with the IED scenario do not explicitly cover the elements in which marine firefighters will be required to operate – more specifically, an environment that includes not just fire but also smoke containing multiple hazardous chemicals as well as a variety of TIC vapors and liquids.

Any approach derived from local planning, training, and exercises should be used to help local responding jurisdictions develop a more specialized response standard. In turn, DHS/ODP and the Port Security Grant program should provide state and local participants with ways both to participate in the development of voluntary consensus standards and to provide solutions to their collaborative efforts – using their lessons learned to improve later versions of NFPA 1405.

The first revised version of NFPA 1405, due in 2006, must meet numerous imperatives. First, it must engage full stakeholder participation to adequately prepare the manual's end-users for WMD and IED attacks. It also must demonstrate, anticipating all possibilities, how an integrated response among the services should look, and it should recommend the protection needed for assigned responders to cope with an adversary's use of WMD(s) within the maritime environment. In addition, NFPA 1405 should be in alignment with numerous other related standards that already have been developed and distributed.

Surprise attacks succeed when a government or alliance fails to anticipate the possibilities. In the most successful, and most damaging, maritime attack against the United States – the Japanese bombing of Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941 – the results were sudden, concentrated, and dramatic. The failure, however, was cumulative, widespread, and familiar. The nation's current and future maritime firefighting responders need an operational framework and a standard that embodies the necessary disciplines and operational principles required to assist field incident commanders and their responders when conducting WMD response operations.

Upgrading an Armory: The 1033 Solution

By Jay Kehoe
Law Enforcement

Since the birth of law enforcement in the United States, the judicious use of force – including deadly force, if absolutely necessary – has been accepted by the vast majority of Americans as one of the duties of a peace officer. Today, police officers in every state and almost all large cities in the nation carry handguns as one of several "tools" they might have to use to apply force.

Handguns are portable. Also, and despite the fact that they are generally accepted as a necessary tool of the trade, they can be concealed if and when necessary. They usually are effective – if used properly. Their most important quality,

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though, is that they satisfy the first rule every law-enforcement officer quickly learns about a gunfight: Have your own gun with you, and ready for use.

There is one frequently ignored problem about handguns, though – they often are carried because they are so convenient, rather than because they are necessarily the most effective weapon for any and all situations the law-enforcement officer might face. Because they are not.

Many law-enforcement agencies have relied on the shotgun as a backup or supplement to the handgun. A handgun can be a devastating weapon when used within the boundaries of its effectiveness, but it has certain limitations. It is often used at ranges it was not designed for, for example, and it requires ammunition not always suited to the patrol environment. Shotguns also are difficult for many officers to control, partly because of the shotgun's powerful recoil, but more often because they have not been given the training needed to use shotguns effectively.

Moreover, when using multiple-projectile rounds, shotguns significantly increase the possibility of serious injury, or death, and/or other damage that might be caused by a stray bullet.

It is for these reasons that a number of the nation's more progressive police agencies have been shifting in recent years to the use of rifles for general patrol use. The use of rifles rather than shotguns usually represents a major step forward for these agencies – but only when senior decision making officials have made a firm commitment to provide the resources needed to fund a successful rifle program – and no program can be fully successful without the frequent and effective training of all persons involved in the program.

Commitment: The First Prerequisite

The lessons learned by agencies that have developed effective rifle programs are worth studying by other agencies considering similar programs of their own. The principal lesson learned, as stated earlier, is that the first prerequisite is to have a firm commitment, from the top, of the administration having jurisdiction over the agency. That commitment must include the development of operational objectives governing deployment policies and procedures. These should be in place prior to the start of a rifle program, as should be the funding needed for both initial training and continued training, on a regularly scheduled basis, of the patrol staff. The requirements for rifle training and qualification must be equivalent to the agency's handgun training and qualification requirements.

It is worth repeating, and emphasizing: If the commitment to training is not established, the program is almost sure to fail.

It is axiomatic in law-enforcement agencies that when a new weapon is introduced the maximum benefit to the agency must be realized. Many agencies, unfortunately, have followed what might only be described as "halfway" measures in establishing their rifle programs – deploying a weapon that looks like a rifle, to cite the most common example, but that fires handgun-caliber ammunition.

This mix usually provides an increase in accuracy, but loses the true advantages of using a center-fire rifle. The muzzle energy of a 9mm round fired out of a 16-inch-barrel carbine can be 300-400 pounds of energy, depending on the specific type of ammunition used. The same 16-inch-barrel carbine, chambered for a .223-caliber round, delivers 1,200-1,400 foot-pounds of energy. Because of the differences in bullet configurations, the .223 caliber, even though 3-4 times more powerful, has a much less chance of over-penetration than any of the law-enforcement handgun rounds now being marketed.

There are several pistol-caliber rifles currently being offered to law-enforcement agencies. The manufacturers of these weapons tout such advantages as ammunition compatibility (handguns can use the same ammunition, in other words) and allegedly lower costs. In addition, the smaller-caliber ammunition is less offensive in appearance. But the most important advantage provided by a center-fire rifle, from a law-enforcement point of view, is the accurate delivery of power it provides, without over-penetration, to stop an aggressive act at distances up to more than 100 yards.

Perhaps the biggest problem with several of the pistol-caliber rifles now being marketed to law-enforcement agencies is that they were not designed for the frequently rugged conditions encountered in patrol use. Although somewhat less aggressive in appearance, they were designed for sporting use, and would not necessarily stand up to the firing of the thousands of rounds needed for the training and deployment of a patrol rifle.

The Combat-Tested Option

There is, fortunately, another option available: rifles of military origin (and their semi-automatic counterparts), which before acceptance by the military had to withstand the rigorous endurance standards required for use on the battlefield. Heat, cold, dirt, and water have little effect on the performance of weapon systems such as the Colt M-16/AR-15 (the AR-15 is the semi-automatic clone of the fully automatic M-16) and other weapons manufactured for the military forces of the United States and/or its allies.

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Upgrading an Armory: The 1033 Solution

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There are several ways by which a law-enforcement agency can acquire the type of rifle it needs for patrol use. The most common way is through the normal budgetary process. The second most common way, for a number of agencies, has been to acquire weapons through the Defense Reutilization and Marketing Service (DRMS), the federal agency with jurisdiction over the distribution of original U.S. government surplus property. Under a DRMS program formerly known as "North Star" but now known simply as the 1033 program, the agency can supply government-issue M-16 A-1 rifles to municipalities at no cost.

The DRMS rifles are always in serviceable condition, and in some cases are new. The 1033 program allows law-enforcement departments and agencies, regardless of their size or budget, to obtain equipment that they otherwise might have to go without.

The way the program works is as follows: The governor of each state appoints a coordinator for the 1033 program. The agency seeking to acquire surplus equipment must contact the coordinator, who would name a screening officer to work with the agency and help it obtain whatever surplus equipment it needs, and that is available anywhere in the country.

The 1033 program is not limited to the acquisition of weapons. Thousands of agencies have obtained vehicles, for example, ranging from pickup trucks to armored personnel carriers, to helicopters and boats (for search-and-rescue operations). Surplus clothing also is available, and a variety of other equipment useful in patrol and tactical operations.

Shipping and Modifications Extra

One problem encountered by some agencies is that, although the surplus equipment is available, free of charge, the shipping or transportation of such equipment is the responsibility of the acquiring agency. That is not a major problem with a few cases of rifles. The shipping of a helicopter, though, would be much more difficult.

The M-16 A1 rifles provided to law-enforcement agencies come in their original military configuration – i.e., fully automatic, with a 20-inch barrel and a full butt stock. The program allows the acquiring agency to modify the weapons, at its own cost, in any way it desires, so long as it is done safely. Among the most common M-16 modifications have been the reconfiguration of the rifle to a semi-automatic weapon, replacing the longer barrel with a shorter and more maneuverable 16-inch barrel, and – for easier transport and storage – replacing the original butt stock with a collapsible butt stock. These and other modifications usually can be carried out by an agency-trained armorer, or by having the weapons retrofitted by the manufacturer.

Once it has received some 1033-program weapons, the department is expected to maintain rigid control over them. To ensure program compliance and accountability, state coordinators carry out periodic on-site inventories every year or two.

The possibility of obtaining reliable patrol-type weapons free of charge should be a powerful incentive for any agency that wants to participate in such a program. But the top-level support needed to fund an appropriate training and deployment program must be in place beforehand. Lacking such support, some departments have acquired weapons nonetheless, but then did very little with them except to keep them stored in the department's armory, where they collected dust and became a recurring headache because of the periodic inspections required.

Increases, Shortfalls, and Nightmare Scenarios

By James D. Hessman
Coast Guard

Among the 3,000 passengers aboard the companies newest and most luxurious cruise ship were 100 hijackers – who planned to sink the ship at sea *after* receiving $35 million in ransom from the French government and making their own escape.

That, in brief, was the plot of a cleverly crafted made-for-television mini-series, The French Atlantic Affair, that enthralled audiences in the late 1970s – and which, at that time, seemed to be highly implausible and perhaps impossible. Another movie released in the same general time frame, Juggernaut, envisioned the sinking of a transatlantic liner through the detonation of pre-set time bombs hidden deep in the bowels of the ship. Again, possible, but not very likely.

Today, almost anything is possible – including, for example, the transformation of fuel-laden passenger aircraft into flying bombs that could be used to crumple two of the world's largest buildings into piles of rubble. Which, of course, is why the federal government has allocated billions of dollars in recent years to improve aviation safety.

The safety of the U.S. land borders with Canada and Mexico also has been improved, particularly at the many legal crossings open to tourists and would-be immigrants. Additional funds also have been allocated for the interdiction of illegal migrants seeking to enter the United

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States, usually by land, but also by sea. The exact numbers are not known, but the 9/11 Commission estimated that approximately 500,000 illegal aliens enter the United States each year to join the 11 million illegal migrants already in the country. It has been established that at least some of the illegal migrants are, or have close ties to, terrorists, but no one knows the exact number.

Quick Fixes Possible, But Not Easy

The House Committee on Homeland Security, chaired by Rep. Christopher Cox (R-Calif.) – the committee's ranking member is Rep. Bennie Thompson (D-Miss.) – is seeking to determine whether President Bush's proposed $34.2 billion DHS (Department of Homeland Security) budget for fiscal year 2006 is too much, too little, or exactly on target (which is almost never the case, for any federal department, for any fiscal year). The committee already has determined, in its first-cut "Views and Estimates" statement, that there are a number of problems in the president's budget plan as submitted. Some of the problems can be resolved both quickly and easily – usually by increasing the specific allocations provided for various programs and/or by improving the management of those same programs. The problem here, though, is that increasing the appropriations for one budget account would create shortfalls that must almost always, under congressional rules, be offset by funding reductions elsewhere in the budget.

Perhaps the most intractable problem the committee faces in its efforts to find an acceptable middle ground in the complicated homeland-security equation is how to improve port and maritime security both immediately and for the long term. Because there have been no real-life Juggernaut or French Atlantic catastrophes to take a stranglehold on public and media attention, the possibility of terrorism at sea – or, a more credible scenario in certain respects, from the sea –the nation's sea borders have become the forgotten front in the land-sea-air triad of domestic preparedness.

One long-term fix that has been advocated – by the Heritage Foundation, for example – is to immediately, and massively, increase funding for the Coast Guard's Integrated Deepwater program, an innovative plan to replace the service's antiquated current fleet of cutters and aircraft over a period of 20 years. That is "too long to wait," according to Ranking Member Thompson and his Democratic colleagues, who recommend that the program "be accelerated to be completed in 10 years."

Compressing the Deepwater timeline would not only put more, and technologically superior, Coast Guard ships and aircraft into the active inventory much sooner, it also would generate an estimated $4 billion in savings over the life of the program, according to USCG estimates.

AAPA: The Hard Choices Facing Port Authorities

An acceleration of Deepwater would do little to enhance U.S. port and maritime security in the short term, however. DHS and the Coast Guard have developed and are implementing several low-cost programs – e.g., putting sea marshals aboard large ships entering U.S. ports, starting the inspection of cargo containers overseas, and making it slightly more difficult for illegal migrants to enter the United States in the guise of foreign seafarers. But much of the financial and implementation burden has fallen on the U.S. port industry, which is already struggling to pay for the modernization needed to pay for an expected doubling of cargo throughput projected for the next 15 years.

The port of Miami, for example, "has absorbed $6 million in costs annually for the past three years to pay for additional security improvements," according to Kurt Nagle, president and CEO of the American Association of Port Authorities (AAPA). "The federal government … mandated security enhancements for marine facilities," Nagle said in a statement released in early January, but has not funded those mandates. The result, he said, is the imposition of "huge financial burdens on ports that have both security and economic consequences."

Those consequences will affect all Americans, Nagle made clear. U.S. seaports now support two million jobs, and handle an estimated $2 trillion worth of cargo – not quite 30 percent of the nation's gross domestic product. To handle the massive additional tonnages of cargo expected will require huge expenditures for equipment, additional personnel, and infrastructure improvements. If those expenditures are not made, or are significantly delayed, according to the AAPA, the adverse effects will be felt in all sectors of the American economy.

The Achille Largo and USS Cole Precedents

The security improvements cannot and should not be delayed under any circumstances, not only because they are federally mandated, but because the potential cost, in lives as well as in dollars, of *not* improving security could be much greater than the 9/11 attacks on the Pentagon and the World Trade Center towers. Cruise ships larger than the French Atlantic are already carrying an estimated seven million passengers into and out of U.S. ports each year – again, according to AAPA data. Al Qaeda would not need

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100 willing martyrs to board a large cruise ship disguised as passengers and, later, to take whatever suicidal actions are needed to sink it – at sea, in the middle of the night, when immediate lifesaving help might not be available. The Achille Largo incident showed how easy it would be for just a small handful of dedicated and well-trained terrorists to take over a large cruise ship – or another commercial ship of any type.

The guided-missile destroyer USS Cole provides another illustrative example. A powerful, well-armed, U.S. Navy ship of the line, the Cole was refueling in Aden, Yemen, on 12 October 2000 when it was heavily damaged and almost sunk by an inflatable terrorist speedboat carrying a bomb. Seventeen members of the ship's company were killed, and 39 others injured. A similar attack, in port or at sea, against a cruise ship could kill hundreds of passengers, and perhaps thousands.

There is a long list of other nightmare scenarios that DHS, the Coast Guard, U.S. port authorities, and other organizations and agencies working in the defense of the U.S. homeland have to think about – *prior* to a new terrorist attack, preferably, rather than afterward. The possibility of an attack, World Trade Center style, by a privately owned aircraft flying into a ship from a local airport, for example. The launching of guided missiles from a bridge, or from any of dozens of buildings ashore. The deliberate ramming of one ship into another.

The deliberate sinking of a large ship in the Panama Canal, or in the Saint Lawrence Seaway – as was deliberately done by Egypt in the Suez Canal both in November 1956 and in June 1967 (to keep Western ships from using the canal) – is another possibility that, although not as costly in lives, could do incalculable damage to the U.S. economy.

In the long run, the final choice will be up to the American people – who will have to decide, by putting pressure on Congress and the president now, whether to provide the funding needed to prevent other and perhaps more cataclysmic terrorist attacks – if prevention is even possible – or to take a chance, wait a while, postpone what many experts believe is inevitable, and pay a much higher price later.

If, indeed, the past is prologue to the present, the nation's future could be extremely grim.

States of Preparedness

By Anthony Lanzillotti
State Homeland News

PENNSYLVANIA
Focuses on agro-terrorism, rural issues

Pennsylvania is proposing changes in the way federal funding is awarded to individual states, and at the same time is pushing certain emergency-preparedness and bio-terrorism issues into the spotlight. These initiatives are one result of a 2003 study – conducted in part by the Harvard School of Public Health and the University of Pittsburgh – that included a survey of public health officials from 26 states which revealed that most rural areas of the country not only are unprepared for a bio-terror attack but also that those areas would not be able to handle a large influx of citizens fleeing from an attack in an urban area.

Pennsylvania lawmakers and the state's homeland-security officials hope to use the results of the study to help persuade the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to take note of the different threats to, and vulnerabilities of, the nation's rural areas. Agro-terrorism is the most obvious of those threats, and is compounded by the presence in many rural areas of large water supplies and in some areas by the activities of domestic terror groups. In undertaking this effort, Pennsylvania and other states that are much more rural in their economies and demographics are urging DHS to distribute funds based on a broader risk assessment that takes into account *all* threats, not just the better-publicized threats facing large cities and urban populations. In other words, the size of a state's population, and the history of previous attacks, should be *among* the factors considered in the distribution of funds, but should not be the only or necessarily the principal factors.

Related Notes: Pennsylvania already has one fully operational public health laboratory, in Philadelphia, that would be a major asset in dealing with terrorist attacks (of any nature), and it has been proposed that another one be built in Pittsburgh. The Pennsylvania Department of Health has issued guidance on biological agents and other weapons of mass destruction. The department's very informative website (www.dsf.health.state.pa.us) provides excellent information on various topics related to emergency preparedness in a format that is easy for those outside of the medical profession to understand.

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MASSACHUSETTS
Sets Bio-Warfare Priorities

The Massachusetts Department of Public Health (MDPH) has been preparing a guidance document designed to assist emergency managers and medical personnel who are called on to respond to a biological attack. The document, titled "Emergency Dispensing Site Management and Operations" – most recently updated at the beginning of March 2005 – identifies the specific roles and responsibilities of the medical personnel and state agencies most likely to be involved in Emergency Dispensing Site (EDS) operations.

During a state emergency, MDPH will work through the Massachusetts Emergency Management Agency (MEMA) to identify areas where vaccines and/or medications are needed. The document not only offers guidance to communities for planning and setting up their local EDSs but also lays out the objectives for setting up EDS locations within 24 hours of the initial notification of a biological incident or event, or other type of biological release. Convenient checklists are included to facilitate EDS planning and implementation.

By prioritizing the issues of preparedness for, and response to, a biological weapon attack, the Massachusetts document might well be used as an example by other states seeking a blueprint for their own preparedness efforts. It can safely be assumed that emergency planners in other states will be particularly interested in seeing how well the Massachusetts plans facilitate operations during exercises, especially when carried out in conjunction with the federal BioWatch program, which is designed to provide early warning of a biological attack. Ideally, these and similar efforts throughout the country will help mitigate the effects of future attacks and keep casualties at a minimum.

ILLINOIS
Governor Blagojevich Upgrades HS Capabilities

Illinois Governor Rod R. Blagojevich has announced the award of grants to two Illinois companies that support the homeland-security industry. Through the governor's "Opportunity Returns" program, grants of $100,000 each were awarded to TechAlt Inc. and Midco Inc. for employee training and development to meet the state's homeland-security needs. The grants were awarded after Blagojevich committed – in his "State of the State" address earlier this year – to reinforcing the state's homeland-security capabilities. TechAlt provides solutions for secure communications platforms for first responders; Midco provides certain technological products used for integrating secure communications across diverse technology platforms as well as routers for physical-security systems.

In other preparedness news, the Illinois Emergency Services Management Association (IESMA) has started to implement the Illinois Emergency Management Mutual Aid System (IEMMAS). The goal of IESMA – an organization of the state's local emergency services and disaster agencies – is to support local jurisdictions and counties requesting help during emergency situations. Through the IEMMAS program, IESMA drafted a mutual-aid agreement with the Illinois Emergency Management Agency (IEMA) for providing mutual aid anywhere within the State of Illinois when requested through the State Emergency Operations Center. Three regional support teams are being developed to support local agencies within the state during natural disasters, terrorist attacks, and/or other emergencies. The continued support for homeland security and emergency-preparedness initiatives provided by independent associations and the private sector is not unique to Illinois, but is characteristic of that state's approach to such matters.

WYOMING
Adds Multipurpose Boat for Inland Waterways

The Wyoming Office of Homeland Security allocated funds last year to the Wyoming Game and Fish (WGF) Department for the purchase of a new multipurpose boat that could be used for patrol, incident-prevention, and incident-response operations throughout the state's extensive inland-waterways system. Various dams and power plants are co-located with the numerous reservoirs and rivers in Wyoming. The WGF has other watercraft in its inventory, but the sturdy welded aluminum hull of the newly acquired boat will make it particularly useful for operations in deep water. The boat – which is outfitted with a full complement of law-enforcement and safety equipment – will be made available to other state agencies for a variety of missions.

The acquisition of the new watercraft comes in the wake of a 26 percent reduction in federal homeland-security grants to the state. An undetermined number of state projects will be affected by the federal cuts, but Wyoming remains optimistic because of the new categories added to authorized purchases and the technical assistance being offered by the U.S. Office of Domestic Preparedness. All of the states affected by the reductions will have to improvise, and perhaps even compromise, on their efforts to achieve their goals, and Wyoming's planned use of the new boat provides a good example of how to do it. Federal, state, and local officials disagree on many issues, but they all agree that interoperability and cooperation both need to be stressed in order to efficiently and effectively utilize all available resources in the Global War on Terrorism.