

# 2021 District of Columbia Interoperability Summit

*20 Year Anniversary of the  
September 11, 2001, Attack  
on America: Never Forget*


## After Action Report



\*\*\* WE ARE WASHINGTON \*\*\*  
GOVERNMENT OF THE  
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA  
DC MURIEL BOWSER, MAYOR

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# 2021 INTEROPERABILITY SUMMIT AFTER ACTION REPORT AND SUMMARY

## Purpose

The 3rd annual D.C. Interoperability Summit marked the 20th anniversary of the September 11, 2001, attack on America. The Summit highlighted interoperability and emergency communications successes and challenges through real-world accounts from responders who were on the scene of the attacks at the World Trade Center and Pentagon. The Summit also touched on the heroic efforts by the passengers and crew of Flight 93, the creation of the memorial in Shanksville, Pennsylvania, and the challenges faced in the hunt for and capture of Osama Bin Laden.

More than 500 federal, state, and local agency officials participated (virtually/in person) in the one-day event each receiving a booklet that included the Summit agenda, speaker biographies, a letter from District of Columbia Statewide Interoperability Coordinator Charlie Guddemi, timeline of 9/11, and the Top Interoperable Communications Recommendations from the 9/11 Commission Report.

This video link includes the full Summit presentations that were approved for release by the presenters or panelists: [2021 Interoperability Summit Video](#).

\*Individual presentation videos are included in the Summit presentations section below.

# SUMMIT PRESENTATIONS

## WELCOMING REMARKS

Summit recording link: [Welcoming Remarks](#)

*Charlie Guddemi, The District of Columbia's Statewide Interoperability Coordinator (SWIC)*

- Provided overview of the 2021 Interoperability Summit logistics, facts, participation representation map, September 11, 2001 statistics, and reflection.
- Reviewed HEROES, Inc [www.heroes.org](http://www.heroes.org) and who we honor
- Reviewed the Summit Goals
- September is National Preparedness Month
- Reviewed the Emergency Communications Ecosystem

*Monsignor Sal Criscuolo, retired ordained priest and police and fire chaplain*

- Provided overview of where he was on 9/11. He was in the rectory and his pager was going off and was told he needs to get into the city... “we are under attack”
- He was 15 years as a chaplain in DC and what stood out the most to him was the look on first responders faces, he will never forget it because they weren't in control. Every time a plane flew over everyone froze on the ground
- “We will never forget 9/11 but today we remember those who were there that day, those who lost their lives that day, those who made many sacrifices that day, and those who continue to make sacrifices today”
- Lead everyone in prayer reflecting on 9/11

*Dr. Christopher Rodriguez, Director, District of Columbia Homeland Security and Emergency Management Agency*

- Mentioned the central theme of this conference as “Remembering and honoring 9/11 and the 20<sup>th</sup> Anniversary”
- 20 years later our partnerships are stronger, and our collective sacrifices have allowed us to heal and demonstrate our resiliency as a nation
- Looking towards and using the theme “Lessons Learned” we must figure out how we can apply those lessons
- Reflecting upon the insurrection on the Washington Capitol in January, the very idea of truth is under attack and could have disastrous implications, misinformation campaigns reveal a disaster for democratic institutions and the rule law
- What happens when our more traditional foreign adversaries, China, Russia, observe these conditions playing out in the United States and decide to further so discord by fanning the flames of misinformation?
- Our best tool in this fight is Each other

*Christopher Geldart, District of Columbia's Deputy Mayor for Public Safety and Justice*

- 3 Months out of the Marine Corp when 9/11 happened
- The hardest task on that day was getting the right information on what was happening
- We've seen a lot of technology advances over the years to bring us to a point where we could get rapid communications from multiple different types of agencies and entities coming into one place
- Today is a focus on how to get information, and what to do with that information and how that information drives decisions

*Billy Bob Brown, Jr., Executive Assistant Director for Emergency Communications at the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA)*

- Located in Frederick Maryland working for the Marine Corp on September 11<sup>th</sup>, at the time trying to help recruiting staff understand that this was the Marine Corps finest moment to demonstrate that we were ready regardless of the challenges that our Nation was facing
- However, today is not about just discussing the fight from yesterday and yesterday's adversaries using yesterday's tactics.
- We face a sophisticated challenge using emerging technology today, the threats and hazards before us are dynamic and active
- We live in the most creative and innovative nation on the planet, adaptive and actively advancing innovative approaches to keep our advantage.
- Our nation is strong, and our Union is strong because we do not forget. We band together to overcome. We can achieve nationwide interoperability. We are stronger together.

## NEW YORK CITY KEYNOTE SPEAKER

**Summit recording link: Video not available for release**

*Joseph Pfeifer, Senior Fellow at Harvard Kennedy School, Author of Ordinary Heroes: A Memoir of 9/11*

- In 102 minutes – Two planes hit the World Trade Center, a third hit the Pentagon, a fourth crash in PA and both WTC towers collapsed.
- At that time, we had to communicate and make critical decisions
- *Video clip* – Nat Geo ‘One Day in America’
- Recount of day of experience – knew this was a direct attack and not an accident
  - Gave order for fire fighters to come to the scene
  - Game plan – mobilize resources, evacuate the building, regroup on the upper floors to rescue those trapped
  - After the second plane hit the South Tower, Chiefs in the North Tower – decided who would command operations in each tower.
    - Things were happening very quickly – 34-minute after planes hit WTC the Pentagon was attacked
  - Lack of situational awareness to make decisions – information is critical to decision making
    - Gave the command to evacuate the North Tower without knowing the South tower collapsed
  - Water evacuations in New York –400,000-500,000 people were evacuated by boat from Manhattan
  - The last person rescued was 26 hours after the collapse.
  - Fires burnt for four months
- Adaptive Resilience – it is what we go through after a devastating event whether it is 9/11 or an active shooter or a hurricane
  - It is a process
    - Connecting to others. We don't want to be alone in this
    - Reflecting on the past—AAR and storytelling
    - Envisioning the future. looking forward – to embrace hope and a sense of change
    - Enhancing the presence with a new purpose
- Multiple Forces of a Crisis –effects human performance during an incident
  - ‘Physical Force—put the wet stuff on the red stuff and everything will be better’
    - But there is more than just a physical force – there are other forces of a crisis, which are often overlooked
    - Cognitive Force – too much information, information overload

- Robs the working memory of the brain – multitasking is not conducive to interoperability because you only focus on the part that is important to you
- Getting micro-focused is not conducive to interoperable inclusion
- Social Force – of organizational bias
  - Orders to pull everyone back from police dept. – those critical messages never got to the fire dept.
    - Didn't talk to each other at the most critical time
    - Everyone that day was trying to do the right thing but why didn't these two forces talk to each other?
    - Because of organizational bias – turning into their own group to protect each other (natural stress response, which will happen today)
  - We can have all the technology in the world but if we do not address the behavioral issues and set the systems for people to talk together, it won't change
- How do we set the conditions for us to talk to each other?
  - What are the principles of interoperability?
  - What are the principles of leadership?
  - Signs of hope – people helping each other
    - People acted
    - “Without action, there is no hope, and without hope, there is no leadership.”
  - Technology is nothing if we do not know how to make connections.
    - Five Principles of Leadership:
      - Connect (by hastily forming networks)
        - Interoperable voice, video, and data
        - We get to create the systems – how do we visualize information?
      - Collaborate (by exchanging ideas)
        - State, feds, operational people, those who serve – all need to be able to communicate
        - 3 things to consider:
          - Flatten command – who do we have?
            - Include all levels of command from high level leadership to low level supervisors
          - Use crisis empathy – understand where people come from
            - Share the risk among Fire Department, EMS, and Police Department
          - Stay connected – incident command needs to be arm's distance from each other
      - Coordinate
        - Having data is part of interoperability and putting it in a usable form
        - Had negotiated a deal post 9/11 to get direct video from police helicopters and news helicopters
          - During the Miracle on the Hudson was the first to know that everyone had survived – gave that information directly to commissioner and mayor, but also signed directly into DHS network (HISN) and was picked up by the NOC then relayed to the White House
      - Command & Control – through networks
        - How do we command in the networked world?

Pfeifer explains, “The heart of crisis leadership and interoperability is the ability to unify efforts to solve complex problems in the face of great tragedy.”

## U.S. COAST GUARD: COORDINATING THE MANHATTAN BOAT LIFT

Summit recording link: [U.S. Coast Guard: Coordinating the Manhattan Boat Lift](#)

Michael Day, Rear Admiral, US Coast Guard; Military Advisor to the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security

- Why didn't people know about the boat lift?
  - At the time, Coast Guard didn't think it was appropriate
- Played a video
- As first tower fell, Coast Guard lost its communications because its antennas were on top of the tower
  - Was sent to the scene to monitor
- Lt in NY – Thousands of people in a dust cloud on the southern tip of Manhattan
  - Started picking people up on the sea wall
  - Every mode of transportation was shut down in 9/11 except for the boats
- Op Sail 2000
  - Large scale event where hundreds of ships come to Manhattan
    - Had planned for an event to move people for an event – but nothing to the extent of 9/11
- When you need help, ask for it. – Coast Guard did a radio call out to all boats in the area.
- Nonstop cognitive overload on trying to tell the boats where to go
  - A chief suggested sending boats on a back to forth motion (A to B) – which was hard to determine at the height of the moment
  - Not talking to them was actually better than talking to them continuously
- Four days of nonstop flow from boats to the scene – bringing in water, first responders, supplies
- Common radio channel – everyone knew channel 16
- It's in the DNA of the maritime community to help one another
  - Americans wanted to help but didn't know how – the boat effort provided an avenue for that
- Might not have the perfect plan at the moment but might have one that is workable
  - “No plan survives first contact with the enemy”
- Relationships matter – no strangers that day, people working in teams
  - Coast Guard reputation for rescues is a good one

### Q&A:

- In emergency management, maritime should be something considered for alternative transportation and supplies. Has the coast guard taken lead on this?
  - Area Maritime Security Committee
    - Brings stakeholders together and made a tight group even tighter
    - This takes a holistic look at the region to improve the security
    - Encourages communication between groups and carries out exercises

## ATTACK ON THE TWIN TOWERS: NYC RESPONSE (PANEL)

Summit recording link: [Attack on the Twin Towers: NYC Response \(Panel\)](#)

**Moderator:** Keil Green

### Panelists:

Joseph Pfeifer (Panelist 1)  
Jay Kopstein (Panelist 2)  
Frank Fiumano (Panelist 3)  
Dennis Letts (Panelist 4)

### Q&A:

- **Question 1: At the time of 9/11, it was thought that responders were set up in silos. What was done post-attack to break down existing silos and establish the first meetings to break down communications issues?**
  - Pfeifer (1): Jay and I originally were wrestling with each other trying to figure out the best course of action. But we stuck it out and kept communicating to come up with actionable plans. I also remember Frank mentioning that there are never enough resources, which forces us to be dependent on each other for help.
  - Kopstein (2): First, I want to talk about law enforcement and operational interoperability. NYC is surrounded by water and a host of internal and surrounding law enforcement (LE) organizations of local, state, and federal capacity. We gave other agencies the permission to operate on our operational frequencies. When Suffolk County, Nassau County, etc., came in, they just had to switch their channels. When we found that USCG couldn't communicate, we loaned them radios, too.
- **Question 2: What was the process of implementing those policies like?**
  - Kopstein (2): Act before telling your bosses what you're doing. This gives them plausible deniability. If it's unsuccessful, you take the blame and they are safe and if it works, they take credit.
  - Keil (host): Frank, when you became involved, coming from USCG, what was that like?
  - Fiumano (3): I met the Chief of Counter Terrorism at a conference once. When I met him, I mentioned to him that I was looking for him to coordinate communications.
    - The port in NY/NJ worked in a cohesive fashion. 9/11 helped us solidify that. Now, we can all (state, local, and federal) benefit from it. Engage with your NRSC.
    - To date, our Strategic Risk Management Plan (SRMP), has led to more port security than any other port in the United States. One of the strategic things we learned as we were sending land-based people out was that firefighters do well inside buildings, but not on a ship. So, we built a ship simulator with grant money. To date, we have given trainings to over 45,000 officials. This is an example of innovative thinking that we do in the Port of NY/NJ. We also now have all of the feed from NYPD and FDNY coming in for us to view and track. Grant money also helped NYPD put cameras on helicopters. To date, we have spent \$480 million of grant money. 150 patrol boats with LE partners. We've encrypted AIS to give core partners encrypted EAIS so we can do it between the USCG, LE, and first responders. No one should be denied interoperability. We regularly plan and conduct live exercises including a recent active shooter exercise in June.
  - Pfeifer (1): Frank is asking good questions. Frank was giving out grant money and we took it and bought a new fire boat. We looked at the intelligence community and asked what are we seeing in Iraq and Afghanistan? We built out fireboats with a pressurized cabin (\$28 million for a 145-foot fireboat) to keep the crew safe at all times. How do you collapse a bridge? We

didn't know. The port authority and engineers sat in a closed conference and discussed potential plans. All of a sudden, we changed the security profile because we were asking new questions.

Kopstein (2): We started sharing our frequencies with the fire department and other agencies for point-to-point operations. The OEM Commissioner went to the Mayor and every interagency exercise in the City of NY was mandated to have a communications component. FDNY and NYPD arranged a Interoperability component for fire operations. In the past, an interoperability channel was activated at the request of an incident commander. An Interoperability Channel is now activated for major incidents unless an Incident Commander (IC) says not to. In the past, an IC would have to request an aviation asset for a major incident. Now, helicopters will respond unless the IC says not to.

- **Question 3: One of the groups we haven't mentioned but who take such an important role are the call takers. Can we talk about their role?**
  - Chief Pfeifer (1): You hear the dramatic stories of people being trapped saying they're burning up with the dispatcher responding to them telling them someone is coming. They're getting the information and the dispatcher is sending out the response. Then there are emergency operations centers operating in their own silos. But interoperability means that they now talk to each other and feed information. Looking at operations centers in a small county with only five people, why can't we use virtual operations centers? So, an operations center in a nearby county can supplement the rural community's operations center virtually. How do we do that and make it effective? Virtual EOCs.
  - Kopstein (2): We are working on that right now with ECD where various 9-1-1 centers are going to be able to interoperate with one another. Going back before 9/11, NYPD and EMS shared the same CAD. Now, the NextGen 911 Program (NG911) allows for interoperability. Governor of NY signed a piece of legislation designating 9-1-1 personnel as first responders so they get the respect. APCO made a request to stop calling 9-1-1 people dispatchers but calling them telecommunicators. It was rejected because it created a change in employment rights. Depending on where you are, you do much more than just answering a telephone. For example, receiving a call saying shots fired at 2:00 pm in Times Square. They send out a call saying to just be aware since there were no other calls. Versus getting multiple calls about it and making logistical decisions on the spot to ensure correct personnel are allocated to respond.
- **Question 4: You brought up NG9-1-1. During 9/11 there were no iPhones or FirstNet. Was there one thing that stands out that makes you think, "if I only had that."**
  - Pfeifer (1): There are a lot of agencies who respond to a big event that are working on all different frequencies. How do we talk to everyone at the same time? In today's age, we patch all the channels together and called it a Unified Incident Command. One broadcast at a high output can do that. That could've done so much during 9/11.
  - Kopstein (2): Since then, we also made an agreement with DOJ to program the City's 25 gateways identically. All communications responders were trained together to be able to get into another agency's piece of equipment and know they're all identically programmed. We did it for the Republican National Convention in 2004. We put together a 27-frequency network that can be activated via a switch to give everyone the identical message across all agencies.
  - Pfeifer (1): Someone asked me on the break how we get people to work together. The answer is to feed them. Before and after interagency meetings, we gave lunch. We would then go up to the office and let officials mingle.
- **Question 5: Chief Pfeifer, I want to ask you a question about your memoir. You talked about a day that the Forestry Team showed up in Mid-Manhattan. Can you elaborate?**

- Pfeifer (1): 1 week post 9/11 I was standing in front of the FDNY Command Post and a Forestry Official from the Southwest Incident Management Team came up to me from Southwestern US. I was confused because they fight forest fires. I told him there's only one surviving tree at the WTC. Their planning chief used crisis empathy and asked how they could help. They offered to assist us with writing an incident action plan that included the other agencies. I told him to come on in and it changed everything because the Incident Action Plan was written with every agency including four major construction companies. Interoperability was in a written IAP.
- **Question 6: It's been 20 years—there are people watching that weren't born when this tragedy occurred. What do you say to them?**
  - Letts (4): Expect the unexpected. Think about what you would do, and don't assume that it won't happen to you. About 3 years ago, I spoke at the National 9/11 museum. One of the things I decided I needed to say was that in addition to the police and fire that there were heroes everywhere that day. At that time, the only way to communicate was a pager. The one page that had come through was telling agents to move north towards Chelsea Pier and then another to Brooklyn Bridge. We were all over the place. I ran to the seawall and waved my badge and the boat came in. I then told him the captain that I needed his boat and he said he'd help however I needed. No one was coming towards the boat so we went to Chelsea Pier and picked up colleagues and then to the Brooklyn Bridge. We saw a mass of civilians lined along the seawall. We were pulling people up via the seawall. The boat was rocking and people were beginning to fall. Then I heard amongst many of the men, "women and children first." Then a crewmember came up and started breaking down the fence with an ax. When I speak of heroes, I speak of the people who lent a hand, the crew of the NY Ferry, and the ordinary people that stepped up and did what they had to do without even being told.
  - Fiumano (3): Every year post 9/11 the International Maritime Conference is held. They always ask the class where they want to go for their field trip and they always say the Port of NY/NJ. When they ask why, they always say because of all that they've heard that the port did that day. We are proud to serve as a model of example. For us, it's imperative to always be ready and vigilant. To train our counterparts and other parts of the world and to keep terrorism as far away from our shores as possible.
  - Kopstein (2): Life safety is always job one. Save the lives, don't try to guess on what happened or why. Let the people doing the investigation figure it out before you place the blame on someone. The population of the U.S. is broken into 3 parts. The vast majority of people driving down the highway will see an accident and keep driving. A smaller group might phone it in. The smallest group (police, fire, EMS, the military, and civilians) have to do something and stop to lend their own hand.
  - Pfeifer (1): I have never seen such an interest in a 9/11 anniversary as I did this year. The media wanted to connect back 20 years. I stood in Memorial Plaza where the Trade Centers were—there were 15,000 people. The question is, why? Because on 9/12, we felt the sense of unity. We came together as a country, instead of the fragmentation that we feel now. Everyone felt connected to 9/11. There was even a sense of global unity. We have to get back that feeling. We don't know how to get out of this division we are in, but if we can connect back to that feeling of unity, we can make a difference. I saw that sense of unity in our young people and the children of those that died. These young people had tears in their eyes because they wanted to connect back to their loved ones. As I stood at the memorial in uniform they were able to do that. I also sense they know the role they need to play and what we're doing now in building partnerships. As we explore interoperability, I will be happy to see us coming up with new ideas that we would've never dreamt of. Such idea will make the difference at the next extreme event.

## MAKING OF A NATIONAL MEMORIAL: FROM TRAGEDY TO TRIUMPH, FLIGHT 93-SHANKSVILLE, PENNSYLVANIA

Summit recording link: [Making of a National Memorial: From Tragedy to Triumph, Flight 93 Shanksville, Pennsylvania](#)

Stephen M. Clark, *Superintendent of five National Parks of Western Pennsylvania*

- Flight 93 National Memorial – flight 93 crashed in a very rural area – even in February/March 0 degrees out they still have visitors coming to the site (around 425,000 visit the memorial).
- Presented a virtual tour of the site and discussed the importance of the Next Generation and how the national parks focus on that through education and programming
- Preamble of Mission statement of flight 93- “A common field one day. A field of honor forever”.
- Timeline of September 11, 2001 Attacks and Flight 93 breakdown. After the terrorists took over the plane, the passengers went to the back of the plane and were able to make phone calls and learn in real time what happened to twin towers. These regular people saved so many lives by taking over the plane.
- 13 individuals made 37 phone calls- 4 were recorded. Visitors can pick up the phone and listen to those messages
- Showed a picture of Hemlock trees (PA state tree)- FBI recovered significant evidence in the trees – arborist were brought in from state college to help recover in the canopies of the trees
- Passengers and Crew of United 93- 33 passengers and 7 crew- we honor the 40 passengers and crew members of flight 93
- *Tower of Voices*- 93-foot-high series of columns (8 columns with 40 windchimes that represent the heroes on flight 93)- dedicated in 2018
- *Learning Center*- have training and school groups (dedicated in 2015)
- *The Flight Path Walkway*- walk the exact flight path and view of the crash site from the overlook and view the Wall of Names
- Over 500 family members came for the 20<sup>th</sup> anniversary to celebrate the 40 heroes
- Partnerships are vital. It’s all about partnerships!
- “Gameday is not the time to open a playbook”- Charlie Guddemi... very true regarding interoperability- need to know who you are going to be working with.
- Reviewed UA project

## NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION (NCR) KEYNOTE SPEAKER

Summit recording link: [National Capital Region \(NCR\) Keynote Speaker](#)

Jim Schwartz, *Consultant, Advisor, and Lecturer of Public Safety Leadership*

- When we see attacks occur, we ask ourselves, are we ready? In 1995, following the attack of the Tokyo Subway, we were concerned because in the U.S., we have a subway system that moves the work force. The NCR took it upon itself to petition the federal government to help us fill the gaps we are seeing. We wrote a letter saying if the incident in Tokyo were to occur in D.C., we would not be ready.

- In 1996, during the State of the Union, the Metropolitan Medical Strike Team (MMST) had two caches of chemical anecdote protected in two conference rooms below the House Chamber. The MMST was equipped with HazMat suits in the event that they may need to rescue the legislative leadership of the U.S. Congress. This came out of recognition that the threat landscape is changing and we needed to change our capabilities.
- There are two pages in the 9/11 commission report discussing the attack on the Pentagon and its success for three reasons:
  1. Relationships and trust that existed between the responders
  2. The use of the incident command system (ICS)
  3. The longstanding investment of a regional approach to response
- On 9/11, the Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments (MWCOG) was 40 years old (established in 1957). Its genesis was to gather the region's police chiefs to find how to practice mutual aid in a moment of crisis.
- The Northern VA Fire Departments had been practicing automatic aid for 25 years. In 1975, departments stopped using jurisdictional boundaries to determine who would respond to requests for service and instead of who was closest to the request by way of SOPs.
- On 9/11, Steve McCoy, a firefighter who was placed in command due to his superior being out, sends a radio message out that there is a plane going down near the 14<sup>th</sup> Street bridge and to notify the FBI due to events in 1998. An FBI Field Agent located in D.C. had been investigating the OKC bombing and acknowledged the role of local fire and rescue in the event of a large city massacre. The FBI did not have a relationship with the locals and directed him to begin to work on coordinating with MWCOG. This relationship and mutual understanding prompted Steve McCoy to alert the FBI.
- On September 8<sup>th</sup>, there was a major exercise conducted in Fairfax County including MWCOG and the FBI. All of the resources were in practice that day. The same people practicing that day, used those resources on September 11<sup>th</sup>.
- From a communications standpoint, assets came from far beyond the NCR, but rather spanned across the country. Initial asks included to Motorola to ascertain more radios.
  - Montgomery County had hundreds of radios that were about to go live to use on 800 MHz frequency. When the ask came through from Arlington County, Montgomery County immediately agreed and Motorola volunteered to replace the radios for them.
- Camp Unity was set up by Chief Fox of Fairfax County when help was requested by Arlington County. It acted as a small city to provide the responders with food, water, and counseling in the south parking lot of the Pentagon.
- The topic of interoperability is only necessary to work on when working with disparate groups. Most people are intending to sign up for the routine mission of the department. The problems of today are that the solutions to large, complex problems do not rest with one organization or jurisdiction. One of the largest agencies in the country, FDNY, needed outside assistance on 9/11. Interoperability is admitting the resources of your organization are insufficient to the challenges of dynamic events and seeking out the appropriate partnership to address that gap.

### **NCR AIR SPACE COORDINATION ON SEPTEMBER 11, 2001**

**Summit recording link: [NCR Air Space Coordination on September 11, 2001](#)**

Ken Burchell, *Branch Chief Special Ops, US Dept of Health and Human Services*

- News – free intel, provides some degree of operational intelligence
- After 9/11 – the FAA and supporting industries – created a network called the open circuit so that information can be shared across the country in real time
- Second plane hit – knew it wasn't an accident

- Crash phone – phone line that goes from the airport to all the first responders
  - Tested every day, crews are used to answer it, handles little emergencies
- The closer to normal operations your emergency plan is for extreme events, the better it will be executed
- Recount of Day of:
  - DoD medics were training in the field that day working on protest response
  - Aircraft has a medic on board to fly missions (that’s policy) – but there is a time to color outside the lines
    - Grab two of the medics, add mass casualty kit (allows 3 patients on one side of helicopter)
  - Smoke from the Pentagon was going straight into the control tower at National Airport – command was given to Eagle 1
  - Going to a medivac in Arlington County – in a weird way it was business as usual
    - 11 patients needed to be evacuated – Eagle 1 reached out to Maryland State Police, and they started looking for extra helicopters
  - Critical to set up perimeter around helicopter
    - Military members had set up perimeter for them – what had to get done was done
  - Metropolitan Police – sent up Condor to begin managing Air Traffic Control
  - Command to deploy to cover
  - After patients were taken care of, sent to do security missions
- Incredible bravery that day
  - Calm, organized after the initial chaos – still inspired to this day
- “Feelings she had after 9/11 were the same feelings she had after Pearl Harbor”

### **ATTACK ON THE PENTAGON: NCR RESPONSE (PANEL)**

Summit recording link: [Attack on the Pentagon: NCR Response \(Panel\)](#)

**Moderator:** Keil Green

**Panelists:**

Cathy Lanier (Panelist 1)  
James Murphy (Panelist 2)  
Jim Schwartz (Panelist 3)  
James Jackson (Panelist 4)

- **Question 1: Can each panelist tell their story from that day?**
  - Lanier (1): Had 11yr on the job, was the District Commander of the 4th District in Washington, D.C., I was just blocks away from capitol. In a meeting, didn’t know it was a commercial airplane, until all the pagers went off that a second plane had struck the towers. Went to the lobby and saw crowd gathered around the television. It was the tail end of morning rush hour when the Pentagon was struck and there was an instantons self-evacuation in the city. I made my way back to my District Station on Georgia Avenue and saw my Captains standing on the roof of the station with shotguns. We had to quickly coordinate a mass evacuation, opening all traffic outbound and prohibiting any inbound traffic with Montgomery County, MD without proper interoperability. Nearly every police officer returned to work so we had to force officers that self-deployed to go back home so we would have some relief for the days and weeks to come. Six months after 9/11 Chief Ramsey would ask her to take over the Special Operations Division and build the department’s capabilities to face the threats in the post 9/11 world. Spent

the next 5 years building an agency wide CBRNE detection and response capabilities and improving the interoperability capacity in the National Capitol Region.

- Jackson (4): Was at Ft. McNair, got a note saying planes in NYC hit WTC. Walked down Potomac to see pentagon, told everyone to stop work and prepare to set a command center for Pentagon to see what could be done. Military does a lot of things, but more so putting dents in buildings not so much fixing it. Wanted to establish chain of command, teams out under control of a leadership, military would want to start accounting for people, civilians, contractors, visitors. Worked with hospitals to account for any people who missed the onsite check in. Served as military lead.
- Murphy (2): Rookie assigned to Pentagon, building on west side. Found out from a FedEx truck's radio. Puts up ground barriers at borders. Worked way into impact zone, so many people stepped up who weren't injured to search for people trapped. RDF facility could be used for Recovery.
- **Question 2: I've worked on lots of AAR, usually with a combination of military and civilians it is not smooth, this was definitely not the case here. The 'restraint' showed by military was impressive. I'd like to hear how that came about and how important that was. You had a secretary of defense there that day.**
  - Jackson (4): Military doesn't have expertise to take care of this, military piece, being on military land gave us control of access and people in building would follow instructions for the most part. Once we had command vehicles parked together to communicate. At some point it transitioned to crime scene and FBI took over. Rumsfeld did not shut down pentagon, so still needed to work.
  - Green (Host): Chief is that what you were expecting when you arrived?
  - Schwartz (3): It was good we were a regular presence there (at the Pentagon), Chief Plaughter (then Arlington County Fire Chief) shows up after the plane struck and comes to command post; I go to hand him the command vest, thinking he will assume command. Plaughter said, "no, you keep it, you do operations every day; I can be more valuable to you if I keep people out of your way". The potential for interference was high, and the chief, recognizing that, adapted to meet the needs of the moment. There is no position in ICS for what he did. I think Jackson and Plaughter's willingness to put higher objective over ego made them a good pair and kept focus on what was needed. The fact that we had a command presence that was recognized by Jackson.
  - Jackson (4): Relationships that mattered at the level where things have to get down. Work was being done by my staff, who on my staff knows someone who can make things happen, 'Who do we want to talk to about xyz, doing the grunt work not the high level'. I can sense when there is disorganization and that was not the case that day.
- **Question 3: What about the role of law enforcement during an event like this?**
  - Murphy (2): Methodically investigation that day, especially through the night, analyze each threat as real or not. Constant nuisance of misinformation. Trickle-down effect because how long information took to get verified and called in as fake. Organized chaos
  - Lanier (1): Misinformation follows tragedy, lots of calls about explosions, other attacks we had to triage 911 calls in a call back stack to prioritize getting injured to hospitals
  - Green (host): Can you speak to the role of dispatcher?
  - Schwartz (3): We didn't have the capacity we have today and advances in tech. PSAPs stepped up that day. Opportunities in interoperability why are we operating our own tech, why can't we share. CAD-CAD is a huge advancement, that is still a work around with legacy systems.
  - Lanier (1): Dispatchers are using these systems, were never given one unified message, if you aren't bringing in dispatchers to trainings you aren't covering all your bases, going to drop the ball.
  - Green (host): Radio encryption was a big issue in this area can you speak to that?

- Lanier (1): Frustration that we couldn't secure our radio in 2011, tried to do it quickly and shared with partners, press got wind about 2 weeks ahead and threatened to take us to court over this. Found middle ground with press for significant crimes and large events. Now is becoming an issue again.
- Green (host): What about the incidents that followed, anthrax and sniper, less than a year after, wondering if there was a change in response, lessons learned?
- Lanier (1): Continuation of 9/11 in our opinion, caught flat-footed in compared. Anthrax we were very unprepared, my life's goal is making sure we aren't caught like that again. Took us about 5 years to train the force on other threat and we need to loop in the public.
- Green (host): NIMS comes mind with training, unified command?
- Lanier (1): Integrated into interoperability today, it was a tough sell for police to buy into NIMS, it was seen as a fire thing, took years longer than it should have because of egos.
- Schwartz (3): NIMS as a foundation is essential and should have conversation about how well it is working, bring everyone to table and if not what do we need to adjust. Viewpoint worth looking at for routine event, with SOPs but when you have a complicated event you have never seen before it might not be the best. Want a national review for the next 20 years.
- Green (host): Can you talk about updates you made?
- Jackson (4): Framework for a standing joint taskforce, which we have now, military commander for the district. I think this is the right thing to do. The folks up here have a point of contact in the military they can turn to for assistance.
- Lanier (1): I think our biggest issue in government is lack of agility. Today in the private sector, that situation would be so different. Legislators need to understand how things work and what first responders need. Multiple ways to communicate.
- Murphy (2): It is still there especially for the unplanned chaos, need for interoperable systems
- Lanier (1): We were doing tabletops every week for three years and exercises all the time. When you are 20yr out from the event, are you still doing training and exercises at that level? Are you as prepared as you should be? Too many command buses followed 9/11, every agency, even those that have no response role, has a command bus and they show up at every tragedy and block the roadways. In DC it is command bus envy, everyone has to have one bigger than the others.
- **Question 4: What is that technology that 20 years ago you wish you had?**
  - Lanier (1): Mobile situation awareness, cameras, chats, gps, from phone. Access to video and data other than just radio.
  - Murphy (2): Single source of information, sharing that out to people in the field
  - Schwartz (3): Responder locator, where is everybody, I want x,y, and z coordinates. We still haven't achieved that. We piloted a t-shirt technology in 2002 that monitored the vital signs of firefighters in a building fighting a fire. The technology works all the way up to the point of trying to get the signal out of the building to a command post where such information is useful.
  - Jackson (4): Military lives and dies on situation awareness, need to know those things. Problem in us, military wont share with civilians, branches wont share with other branches. In this case we were lucky we had these things happen on military land, so the response was built in, had it been on civilian land it would have taken longer to even get National Guard to assist.
- **Question 5: What would you tell younger people or people new to this field about 9/11?**
  - Lanier (1): There will always be another crisis, one you never thought of. Between now and then you need to have local, regional, national, global situation awareness. You may be caught off guard, but you should never be unprepared.
  - Murphy (2): Going to have bad days, but those days will end. Mentally those days may not end and mental toll it takes on first responders and dispatchers.
  - Schwartz (3): Get them to recognize early in their career how dependent they are on other professional disciplines. Accept and carry with them the understanding that they operate in a

bigger system where they might not have all the answers. Curiosity and acceptance that some problems are so large and complex they can't do it all.

- Jackson (4): Organization will never have enough money to buy everything but you can find it other places. Military lives with this, we seem to forget we can't predict everything but you train on transferable skills. Focus on doing the basic things right, train like you are going to fight.

## LESSONS FROM THE WAR ON TERROR

Summit recording link: [Lessons from the War on Terror](#)

Leon Panetta, *Chairperson of the Panetta Institute for Public Policy*

1. I think it is important to look at 9/11 and to understand why this country responded the way it did. And to understand that the US had a responsibility to protect against the possibility of any future attacks. Two important missions in regard to responding:
  1. Go after Al Qaeda and those that planned the attacks, brought to justice, and never had the chance to do it again.
  2. Not allow Afghanistan to become a safe have again for a group like that.
    - There is no question of the last 20 years—there have been reports that look at decisions and mistakes. Lots of criticism but there were a lot of people that were willing to come together. Proud of the mission that went after Bin Laden, I'd walk you through the decisions made behind that mission.
    - President Obama made clear one of my primary objectives would be to go after Bin Laden. Clear that there was no hard evidence about his whereabouts or even if he was alive. Decided it was important to establish a taskforce to do that.
    - Need to have a clear mission and individuals that are responsible for it. The more nebulas the mission has, the more confusion there will be. The taskforce gave me weekly updates and sometimes they would tell me there is nothing new. I expected them to come with new ideas to track him down and they heard me and came back with lots of ideas, some worked and some didn't. We need to realize you may look at every possible option, even the outrageous ones. One idea was to track the Bin Laden family, they ended up tracking the son who went to Pakistan and was killed in crossfire. Technologies were used, listened to tapes for background noise that would give clues.
  3. Tried to do everything to find the names of the carriers involved.
    - We were able to locate those names, once we had that we matched them with faces and located them in Pakistan. Surveillance to track their steps to town in Pakistan. The staff came to me saying they may have a location based on irregularities in the compound.
  4. Good intelligence, the ability to analyze and look at a situation and decide what is happening.
    - Gathered intelligence for about 5-6 months, President said it was time to begin planning an operation against that compound.
- Lesson: This proves the importance of intelligence military relationship. Intel looks at targets and shares with special forces, done countless times. Heart and soul of counterterrorism.
- Lesson: Often times you are going to have to make a risky decision, must weigh all the factors but may have to take a risk to complete the mission. Pretend to ask an average citizen about a situation, what would you do. I believe that average citizen would make the decision to go ahead.
- Lesson: Need to be able to move forward with the mission even under difficult circumstances. Backups and contingency plans.
- The war against terror is not over, need to confront it, responsibility to confront it.

## SUCCESS AND TRAGEDY: FROM THE OSAMA BIN LADEN RAID TO THE DOWNING OF EXTORTION 17 AND THE RESCUE OF AN AMERICAN HOSTAGE IN AFGHANISTAN

**Summit recording link: Video not available for release**

Edward Byers, *Retired Navy SEAL Master Chief, Medal of Honor Recipient, Founder and CEO of Minerva 6*

- Teams/Groups that operate within the Special Operations space, can do what they say that they are going to do, but there are times; however, when communication has broken down resulting in lost lives and wasted resources.
- 9/11
  - Being a low ranking enlisted Navy Corpsman with the Marines
    - Depending on what level you are integrated you may be told to:
      - Just prepare to deploy, hurry up and wait with no follow on communication because you didn't warrant it or have the clearance
- 2011: Strategically and cultural important mission of the killing of Bin Laden
  - Significantly important as the Doolittle Raiders and bombing of Tokyo
    - Huge moral boost – For 10 years we have been lost as a Nation trying to get closure
- 2012: Rescue an American hostage in Afghanistan, witnessed countless agencies coming together for the mission. Vast team, joint interagency task force.
- Special forces missions required much inter-agency coordination and cooperation
  - SOF Truth V
    - Majority of SOF operations require Non-SOF support
- High of May 2, 2011, followed by the downing of Extortion 17 in August 2011. Impacted Naval Special Warfare and Naval Special Warfare Development Group as well as the Special Forces community at large. It was the biggest achievement for SOF and the single biggest loss of life in SOF history all within 3 months. What came after was one of the biggest interoperability efforts. CACO teams and every agency possible was leveraged to coordinate the next steps for those that died. 30 CACO teams stood up for around the clock manning for months.
  - Relationships made this possible, no room for ego, forged in times of vulnerability build trust.
- How do you build a team with those who don't have the same experience?
  - How to you get people to buy into your passion and mission?
    - Time and Vulnerability breed Familiarity which breeds trust which breeds loyalty

### Q&A:

- Question 1: How much of an influence did 9/11 have on you becoming a SEAL?
  - A: It didn't, I wanted to be a SEAL since I was young.
- Question 2: What would you tell some of your young people about 9/11?
  - The past 20 years have been intense with highs and lows and so much information. But if you don't ever reflect on those, then all that information just sits in a database. History is important, connect the past with the present to drive the future.
- Question 3: Other than flat hierarchy, what other recommendations do you have for civilian response?
  - The world is becoming ever complex with more complications that need coordination across jurisdictions. This leads to people ultimately shuffling for control in these situations. Agencies need to ensure they are getting out to meet the people you are going to be interacting with. The worst thing that could happen is when something is happening you are meeting people for the first time.
- Question 4: Can you tell us about your company?
  - A: Minerva 6 Solutions is a boutique consulting and advisory firm that specializes in the cross-domain space between corporate and government. Visit us at [www.minervasix.com](http://www.minervasix.com) to learn more.

## CLOSING REMARKS

Summit recording link: [Closing Remarks](#)

*Charlie Guddemi, The District of Columbia's Statewide Interoperability Coordinator (SWIC)*

- This Summit was chosen in September for National Preparedness month
- HSEMA provides a lot of training opportunities if you are interested in attending visit: [www.HSEMAAcademy.com](http://www.HSEMAAcademy.com)
- Interoperability Summit Facts:
  - Summit will be recorded and made available with those presentations cleared to be included in the After-Action Report
  - Any presentations provided by speakers/presenters will be available if we have obtained permission to release them
  - We will follow up with a survey which is critical to measure our performance and help shape next year's Summit
- Reviewed 2021 Participation Representation map (530 registered attendees, representing 27 states and 3 territories)
- Communicate! communicate! communicate! Importance of Interoperability cannot be overstated, it means a lot of things, but we can't do anything without relationships. It is about the people, inclusivity, and diversity we bring
- Why are we here today? To remember what occurred on September 11, 2001 and more importantly to... NEVER FORGET
- Remember lessons learned and groom the future leaders of tomorrow

# INTEROPERABILITY TAKEAWAYS

## Prepare/Plan

- **Conduct Deliberate Planning:** It might not be perfect, but it's better to have a plan that can be improved upon
- **Maintain Situational Awareness:** Maintaining awareness of pertinent local, regional, national, and global situations is critical to being prepared for the next major incident/attack.
- **Prioritize Effectively:** To respond effectively during an incident, priority should be placed on meeting the mission objectives over personal wants or ego.
- **Coordinate, Collaborate, and Cooperate:** Relationships matter. Technology is nothing if we do not know how to make connections. Building partnerships builds unity that extends beyond emergency response.
- **Communicate! Communicate! Communicate!** Importance of Interoperability cannot be overstated, it means a lot of things, but we can't do anything without relationships. It is about the people, inclusivity, and diversity we bring.

## Organize

- **Resource Management/Mutual Aid:** When individuals enter the career field of emergency response, they think they are signing up for the routine mission of the department. However, the problems of today are large, complex problems and solutions do not rest with one organization or jurisdiction. Large, complex events will require assistance from outside agencies. Agencies must admit that the resources within their organization are insufficient to respond to the challenges of dynamic events and plan now for seeking out the appropriate partnership to address the gaps they may face during crisis
- **Protective Measures:** The technological improvements made to advance interoperability must be guarded against threats to the emergency communications ecosystem. These include sophisticated and dynamic cyber threats and attacks, insider threats, and/or physical security threats.

## Exercise/Train

- **Training:** "Gameday is not the time to open a playbook"- Charlie Guddemi. Train on the basics and transfer those skills to the next incident or event.
- Train like you are going to fight: Incorporate the pertinent partners and stakeholders into your training and exercise activities
- **Exercise:** On September 8th, 2001, there was a major exercise conducted in Fairfax County Virginia that included agency participants from Maryland, D.C., and Virginia jurisdictions and federal partners, like the FBI. All of the resources that participated in the exercise were used on September 11<sup>th</sup> at the Pentagon.

## Evaluate

- Continually document best practices and improve upon the lessons learned from incidents and events. This will make a difference for the future leaders of tomorrow.
- Always be thinking of what is next.

# SURVEY RESULTS




## 2021 District of Columbia Interoperability Summit: 20 Year Anniversary of the September 11, 2001, Attack on America: Never Forget

Survey Results as of October 26, 2021



GOVERNMENT OF THE  
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA  
MURIEL BOWSER, MAYOR


### 1. Please rate your level of satisfaction with the following aspects of the Summit (1 (low) - 5 (high))



20 Year Anniversary of the September 11, 2001,  
Attack on America: Never Forget

Answered: 158


**2. For those that attended the Summit in person, please rate your level of satisfaction with the Venue: Kellogg Conference Hotel at Gallaudet University (1 (low) - 5 (high))**



20 Year Anniversary of the September 11, 2001, Attack on America: Never Forget

Answered: 93


**3. For those that attended the Summit virtually, please rate your level of satisfaction with the virtual experience: (1 (low) - 5 (high))**



20 Year Anniversary of the September 11, 2001, Attack on America: Never Forget

Answered: 92


#### 4. What part of the Summit was most valuable? (Select all that apply)



20 Year Anniversary of the September 11, 2001, Attack on America: Never Forget

Answered: 158

#### 5. Please select the presentation that you found most interesting and provide input on what was most compelling about it. (Select only one)



20 Year Anniversary of the September 11, 2001, Attack on America: Never Forget

Answered: 147

## Please explain why this presentation was most interesting to you.


- Being new to public safety and first responders this presentation painted the picture to how imperative interoperability is
- Continuing to tell the narrative of Officers and Responders on duty will help us never forget and continue to enlighten and educate
- This presentation uplifted the memories of that day and highlighted the lives of the people who chose to fight
- Speakers provided insight to the disaster response inner workings and coordination that took place within the NYC public safety agencies
- This presentation expertly wove together impactful leadership concepts
- The discussion about comms and interoperability, what worked well and what didn't
- The Presentation was extremely well organized and encompassed experienced speakers to establish Interoperability and collaboration
- This presentation helps tie together all that is critical in homeland security and public service
- Very informative information and real-life lessons learned
- Hearing personal experiences remind of how important the work we all do is
- Provided good insight from different levels and perspectives
- Tied together the response to 9/11 and response improvement with future direction
- Compassionate honoring of those that lost their lives during tragedies
- Very realistic, real-world depiction of events that occurred in time following the initial critical event presented in plain, understated terms

\*compiled responses edited for length and clarity

20 Year Anniversary of the September 11, 2001,  
Attack on America: Never Forget

Answered: 147

**6. For future Summits, what incidents, or events would you like to see headlined?**



20 Year Anniversary of the September 11, 2001, Attack on America: Never Forget

Answered: 158

**6. For future Summits, what incidents, or events would you like to see headlined?**


**Other**

- Portland and Seattle Riots
- Severe flooding, supply chain collapse
- Cybersecurity
- Terrorist Attack in the NCR
- Wildfire Ops / Evacuations



20 Year Anniversary of the September 11, 2001, Attack on America: Never Forget

7. What topics would you like to see covered in future Summits? (Select all that apply)



20 Year Anniversary of the September 11, 2001, Attack on America: Never Forget

Answered: 158

7. What topics would you like to see covered in future Summits? (Select all that apply)

Other


- General pre-incident planning/actual outcome. Lessons learned from response to non-preplanned events, pre-planned regional, multi-level comms agreements (breaking the barrier of interoperability - cutting through govt red tape and agency it regulations that inhibit interop).
- The use of emerging tech to perpetrate criminal/terrorist activity
- Cross State Collaboration and EMAC coordination's pre-event
- Response to long term grid outage
- C-UAS
- Counterterrorism (IT/DT)
- UAS
- Common Operational Picture



20 Year Anniversary of the September 11, 2001, Attack on America: Never Forget




**8. How likely are you to recommend this Summit to a friend or colleague?**



20 Year Anniversary of the September 11, 2001, Attack on America: Never Forget

Answered: 157



**9. How satisfied were you with the 2021 Interoperability Summit? (1 (low) - 100 (high))**

**Minimum: 0**  
**Maximum: 100**  
**Average: 94.73**

**Total responses: 156**



## Please provide any additional input

- Great panel of speakers
- The Authenticity and overall coverage of 911
- Great job Charlie!! We need to keep the importance of comms on the forefront of everyone's minds
- For the most part the audio and video were exceptional
- Great summit, very well put together
- Overall, well organized with passionate and capable speakers and panelists. Kudos Mr. Guddemi
- Would have liked more downtime for sidebar conversations
- This was one of the best conferences I've ever attended. The content could not have been more impactful
- Start time too early
- A bit long, but some good discussion
- AV issues were very disruptive to the rhythm of the event
- The virtual option was a great addition. Due to my schedule, I would not have been able to see any of it if that wasn't available
- Starting at 7:00 was a challenge but great job and excellent summit
- The mix of keynote speakers coupled with panel discussion was successful in maintaining focus and interest
- No hard data to marry the experiences of the first responders. I wanted to see where technology was and where it is now, the progression of technology, what was done right and how it can be improved
- A very informative and compelling presentation
- As someone who was working in emergency management 9/11 was pivotal for the NCR and the Emergency Management profession
- The login information I received from Eventbrite did not work
- Other regional presentations should model this effort



\*compiled responses edited for length and clarity

20 Year Anniversary of the September 11, 2001,  
Attack on America: Never Forget

## **BILLS SIGNED: H.R. 2278 AND S. 848**

OCTOBER 13, 2021

### STATEMENTS AND RELEASES

On Wednesday, October 13, 2021, the President signed into law:

H.R. 2278, which designates the September 11th National Memorial Trail Route to link the National 9/11 Memorial and Museum in New York, the National 9/11 Pentagon Memorial in Virginia, and the Flight 93 National Memorial in Pennsylvania.

The President was joined by Members of the Board of the September 11th National Memorial Trail Alliance and Members of Congress including Senator Gillibrand and Representatives Connolly, Fitzpatrick, Blunt Rochester, Dean, Scanlon, and Spanberger.

Thank you to Representatives Connolly, Fitzpatrick, and Beyer and Senators Schumer, Gillibrand, and other members who represent stops on the trail, for their leadership; and

S. 848, the “Consider Teachers Act of 2021,” which modifies the service obligation verification process for TEACH Grant recipients and to extend the service obligation window due to COVID-19 or other emergencies.

Thank you to Senators Braun and Sinema, and Representatives Holmes Norton and Spartz for their leadership.

Source: [www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/10/13/bills-signed-h-r-2278-and-s-848/](https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/10/13/bills-signed-h-r-2278-and-s-848/)

# **APPENDIX A: 2021 DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA INTEROPERABILITY SUMMIT BOOKLET**

# HSEMA OVERVIEW



## MISSION

The mission of the District of Columbia Homeland Security and Emergency Management Agency (HSEMA) is to lead the planning and coordination of homeland security and emergency management efforts to ensure that the District of Columbia is prepared to prevent, protect against, respond to, mitigate, and recover from all threats and hazards.

## VISION

A safe and secure District of Columbia prepared for all threats and hazards.

## ABOUT US

As the agency responsible for leading the planning and coordination of the District of Columbia's homeland security and emergency management efforts, HSEMA works closely with our District, federal, and regional partners to ensure that the Nation's Capital is prepared to prevent, protect against, respond to, mitigate, and recover from all threats and hazards.

Our work is divided into the following major areas:

- Emergency Operations
- Public Information and Warning
- Intelligence and Analysis
- National Capital Region Coordination
- Public-Private Partnerships
- Interoperable Communications
- Councils and Commissions
- Emergency Planning, Training, and Exercises

## LETTER FROM THE DC SWIC

Greetings,

This year marks the 20<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the September 11<sup>th</sup> terrorist attacks on America. We remember the tragedy of the 2,977 lives lost at the World Trade Center, the Pentagon, and on Flight 93, but also the dedication, commitment, and strength of those who responded on that day.

To mark this event and all that has transpired since 9/11, the 3<sup>rd</sup> annual D.C. Interoperability Summit will highlight emergency communications and interoperability best practices and lessons learned since the attacks, including the critical strides made in emergency response and emergency communications policy, products, and practices. Through real-world, first-hand accounts from responders on the scenes that day, our panelists, facilitators, and speakers will explore the challenges that emergency responders still face today, and how our nation's response community can best continue to respond to and recover from any emergency.

As we reflect on the sacrifices and selflessness we saw on that sunny Tuesday 20 years ago, we hope you join us, as we commemorate both the emergency responders who gave their lives and those who are still affected today.

Thank you for accepting our invitation to participate in this important event, and we look forward to the discussion we have planned for this Summit.

Sincerely,



Charles J. Guddemi  
Statewide Interoperability Coordinator (SWIC)  
District of Columbia Homeland Security and Emergency Management Agency

## AGENDA

### 0600-0700: REGISTRATION

- Attendees must check in in-person or login virtually
- Continental breakfast served
- Video presentation of 9/11 attacks in New York, Washington, D.C., and Pennsylvania

### 0700-0730: WELCOME REMARKS

- **Charlie Guddemi**
  - **September 11, 2001, position:** *Sergeant, U.S. Park Police at the Statue of Liberty/Ellis Island*
  - **Current position:** *The District of Columbia's Statewide Interoperability Coordinator (SWIC)*
- **Dr. Christopher Rodriguez**
  - **September 11, 2001, position:** *Graduate Student at the University of Notre Dame*
  - **Current position:** *Director, District of Columbia Homeland Security and Emergency Management Agency*
- **Christopher Geldart**
  - **September 11, 2001, position:** *Continuing Education at the University of Maryland*
  - **Current position:** *District of Columbia's Deputy Mayor for Public Safety and Justice*
- **Billy Bob Brown, Jr.**
  - **September 11, 2001, position:** *Commanding Officer, Marine Corps Recruiting Station Frederick, MD*
  - **Current position:** *Executive Assistant Director for Emergency Communications at the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA)*

### 0730-0830: NEW YORK CITY KEYNOTE SPEAKER

- **Joseph Pfeifer**
  - **September 11, 2001, position:** *New York City Fire Department (FDNY) First Chief at the World Trade Center, Battalion Chief*
  - **Current position:** *Senior Fellow at Harvard Kennedy School, Author of Ordinary Heroes: A Memoir of 9/11*

### 0830-0900: U.S. COAST GUARD: COORDINATING THE MANHATTAN BOAT LIFT

- **Michael Day**
  - **September 11, 2001, position:** *Lieutenant, United States Coast Guard (USCG), Sector New York, Chief of Waterways Oversight in the Port of N.Y. and N.J.*
  - **Current position:** *United States Coast Guard (USCG) Rear Admiral (RDML)-Military Advisor to the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security*

### 0900-0920: BREAK

**0920-1030: ATTACK ON THE TWIN TOWERS: NYC RESPONSE (PANEL DISCUSSION)**

- **Moderator: Keil Green**
  - **September 11, 2001, position:** *Lafayette Group Junior Analyst*
  - **Current position:** *Lafayette Group CEO and CISA ECD Support*
- **Joseph Pfeifer**, *Senior Fellow at Harvard Kennedy School, Director of Crisis Leadership at the National Center for Disaster Preparedness at Columbia University*
- **Jay Kopstein**
  - **September 11, 2001, position:** *Deputy Inspector assigned to the Operations Division-New York City Police Department*
  - **Current position:** *Co-chair of the Communications and Interoperability Working Group for the Office of Interoperability & Emergency Communications of the NYS Division of Homeland Security & Emergency Services, member of SAFECOM (currently Second Vice-Chair)*
- **Frank Fiumano**
  - **September 11, 2001, position:** *Commander, USCG, Sector New York, Chief of Engineering*
  - **Current position:** *Senior Port Security Specialist, USCG, Sector New York, Chief of Emergency Management/Contingency Planning*
- **Dennis Letts**
  - **September 11, 2001, position:** *United States Secret Service, New York Field Office; Senior Special Agent*
  - **Current position:** *Security Representative, National Football League, Chairman of the Board of Advisors at the College of Business and Public Management, Kean University*

**1030-1115: MAKING OF A NATIONAL MEMORIAL: FROM TRAGEDY TO TRIUMPH, FLIGHT 93-SHANKSVILLE, PENNSYLVANIA**

- **Stephen M. Clark**
  - **September 11, 2001, position:** *Law Enforcement Ranger at Virgin Islands National Park*
  - **Current position:** *Superintendent of five National Parks of Western Pennsylvania*

**1115-1200: LUNCH**

**1200-1245: NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION (NCR) KEYNOTE SPEAKER**

- **Jim Schwartz**
  - **September 11, 2001, position:** *Assistant Chief of Operations, Arlington County Fire Department*
  - **Current position:** *Consultant, advisor, and lecturer on public safety leadership*

**1245-1315: NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION AIR SPACE COORDINATION ON SEPTEMBER 11, 2001**

- **Ken Burchell**
  - **September 11, 2001, position:** *Pilot/Sergeant, Aviation Section, Special Forces Branch, USPP*
  - **Current position:** *Branch Chief, Special Operations, Emergency Management/Medical Operations, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services*

**1315-1335: BREAK**

**1335-1500: ATTACK AT THE PENTAGON: NCR RESPONSE (PANEL DISCUSSION)**

- **Moderator: Keil Green**, *Lafayette Group CEO and CISA ECD Support*
- **Jim Schwartz**, *Consultant, advisor, and lecturer on public safety leadership*
- **Major General (Retired) James Jackson**
  - **September 11, 2001, position:** *Commanding General of the U.S. Army's Military District of Washington*
  - **Current position:** *Retired*
- **Cathy Lanier**
  - **September 11, 2001, position:** *D.C. Metropolitan Police Department, Commander, Fourth District*
  - **Current position:** *National Football League, Senior Vice President, Chief Security Officer*
- **James Murphy**
  - **September 11, 2001, position:** *Master Patrol officer for the Defense Protection Service (Pentagon)*
  - **Current position:** *Captain, United States Park Police-Commander, Central District*

**1500-1545: LESSONS FROM THE WAR ON TERROR**

- **Leon Panetta**
  - **September 11, 2001, position:** *Chairperson of the Panetta Institute for Public Policy, Chairperson of the PEW Oceans Commission*
  - **Current position:** *Chairperson of the Panetta Institute for Public Policy*

**1545-1645: SUCCESS AND TRAGEDY: FROM THE OSAMA BIN LADEN RAID TO THE DOWNING OF EXTORTION 17 AND THE RESCUE OF AN AMERICAN HOSTAGE IN AFGHANISTAN**

- **Edward Byers**
  - **September 11, 2001, position:** *United States Marines: 2/2 Golf Co. 3rd Plt. Corpsman – Stationed at Camp Lejeune*
  - **Current position:** *Retired Navy SEAL Master Chief, Medal of Honor Recipient, Founder and CEO of Minerva 6*

**1645-1700: CLOSING REMARKS**

- **Charlie Guddemi**, *The District of Columbia's Statewide Interoperability Coordinator (SWIC)*

## TIMELINE OF 9/11

- 7:59 a.m.** Flight 11 takes off from Boston for Los Angeles. Eleven crew members, 76 passengers, and five hijackers are on board.
- 8:15 a.m.** Flight 175 takes off from Boston for Los Angeles. Nine crew members, 51 passengers, and five hijackers are on board.
- 8:19 a.m.** Flight 11 crew members alert ground personnel that a hijacking is underway. Shortly before, one hijacker stabbed a passenger, Daniel Lewin, who was seated in front of him. Officials speculate that Lewin may have tried to stop the hijackers and was likely the first victim of the attacks.
- 8:20 a.m.** American Airlines Flight 77, en-route to Los Angeles, takes off from Washington, D.C. Six crew members, 53 passengers, and five hijackers are on board.
- 8:24 a.m.** Attempting to communicate with passengers, a hijacker contacts air traffic control, unwittingly alerting controllers to the attacks.
- 8:37 a.m.** Boston air traffic control alerts the military. Air National Guard jets in Massachusetts are mobilized to follow Flight 11.
- 8:42 a.m.** San Francisco-bound United Airlines Flight 93 takes off at Newark following a delay. Seven crew members, 33 passengers, and four hijackers are on board.
- 8:46 a.m.** Flight 11 crashes into floors 93 through 99 of the North Tower.
- 8:50 a.m.** President George W. Bush is alerted. His advisors assume this is a tragic accident.
- 8:55 a.m.** The South Tower is declared secure.
- 8:59 a.m.** Port Authority police order the evacuation of both towers. A minute later, the order is expanded to the entire World Trade Center complex.
- 9:00 a.m.** A flight attendant aboard Flight 175 alerts air traffic control that a hijacking is underway.
- 9:03 a.m.** Flight 175 crashes into floors 77 through 85 of the South Tower.
- 9:05 a.m.** President Bush learns that a second plane has crashed into the World Trade Center. Twenty-five minutes later, he addresses Americans, saying that "terrorism against our nation will not stand."
- 9:05 a.m.** Flight 77 passenger Barbara Olson calls her husband, U.S. Solicitor General Theodore Olson.
- 9:36 a.m.** Secret Service agents evacuate Vice President Dick Cheney to the Presidential Emergency Operations Center beneath the White House, who alerts other federal officials of the hijacking.
- 9:37 a.m.** American Airlines Flight 77 crashes into the Pentagon. The crash and fire kill 59 people on the plane and 125 on the ground.
- 9:42 a.m.** The FAA grounds all flights.
- 9:45 a.m.** The White House and U.S. Capitol are evacuated.
- 9:59 a.m.** The South Tower collapses in 10 seconds after burning for 56 minutes. More than 800 people in and around the building are killed.

- 10:03 a.m.** United Airlines Flight 93 crashes near Shanksville, Pennsylvania after passengers and crew storm the cockpit. Forty people on board, excluding the hijackers, perish.
- 10:15 a.m.** The Pentagon's outer ring collapses.
- 10:28 a.m.** The North Tower collapses after burning for 102 minutes. More than 1,600 in and around the building are killed.
- 11:02 a.m.** New York City Mayor Rudy Giuliani orders the evacuation of Lower Manhattan.
- 12:16 p.m.** The last flight still in the air above the continental United States lands.
- 12:30 p.m.** A group of 14 survivors are emerge from a North Tower stairwell.
- 3:00 p.m.** A survivor, Pasquale Buzzelli, is rescued from the rubble of the North Tower
- 5:20 p.m.** After burning for hours, 7 World Trade Center collapses, There are no casualties.
- 8:30 p.m.** President Bush addresses the nation from the White House, assuring Americans that a search is underway for "those who are behind these evil acts."
- 10:30 p.m.** Rescuers locate and extract two PAPD officers injured but alive in debris of the World Trade Center.

Source: [abc7ny.com/911-timeline-anniversary-memorial/5532981/](https://abc7ny.com/911-timeline-anniversary-memorial/5532981/)

## SPEAKER BIOS



### Charles 'Charlie' Guddemi

Charles (Charlie) Guddemi is the District of Columbia's Homeland Security and Emergency Management Agency's (HSEMA) Statewide Interoperability Coordinator (SWIC). He is responsible for coordinating interoperability and communications projects involving voice, data, and video.

Charlie chairs the District's Interoperable Communications Committee (ICC) and Cellular Industry/WiFi Provider Working Group. He serves as the secretary for the Statewide Interoperability Executives Council (SIEC), is a member of the National Council of Statewide Interoperability Coordinators (NCSWIC) and current co-chair of FEMA's Region III Regional Emergency Communications Coordinators Working Group (RECCWG). He also participates on several Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments (MWCOG) committees and working groups.

Charlie Guddemi joined HSEMA after a 25-year career with the United States Park Police (USPP). His assignments included working in Washington, D.C., New York Field Office, San Francisco Field Office, and the National Park Service Northeast Regional Headquarters in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. He achieved the rank of Deputy Chief serving as the Commander of the Services Division.

During his USPP career, Charlie worked six Presidential inaugurations, including serving as the principal planner and Executive Steering Committee member for the United States Park Police 2013 Inauguration. He was responsible for overseeing the safe dedications of the Martin Luther King Jr. Memorial (2011) and the American Veterans Disabled for Life Memorial (2014). After the September 11, 2001, attacks, Charlie designed and implemented the multiplex, defense in depth, multi-jurisdictional, security plan for the Statue of Liberty National Monument and Ellis Island Immigration Museum located in New York Harbor. In 2008, he was awarded the first ever Department of the Interior, Office of Law Enforcement and Security, Excellence in Security Award for his efforts in safeguarding the Statue of Liberty/Ellis Island Complex.

Charlie's professional memberships include: ASIS International, IACP, FLEOA, and the FBI National Academy Association.

He holds a Bachelor of Arts degree in Psychology from the State University of New York at Albany and is a graduate of the 237th session of the FBI National Academy.



### Dr. Christopher Rodriguez

Dr. Christopher Rodriguez is the Director of the Homeland Security and Emergency Management Agency (HSEMA). In this role, Dr. Rodriguez serves as the Homeland Security Advisor and State Coordinating Officer for the District of Columbia. He also is the State Administrative Agent for all homeland security federal grants awarded to the District and the National Capital Region which includes parts of Northern Virginia and Maryland. HSEMA is responsible for emergency planning, preparedness, response, and recovery for the City, including operations for a 24-hour emergency operations center and the District's intelligence fusion center. Under Dr. Rodriguez's leadership, HSEMA, in partnership with the Metropolitan Police Department and Mayor's Office of Religious Affairs, launched the Interfaith Preparedness Advisory Group to improve preparedness and the

resiliency of the District's faith-based organizations for all types of hazards. Additionally, he has supported Mayor Muriel Bowser as Incident Commander for some of the District's most complex, simultaneous emergency responses between COVID-19, First Amendment demonstrations, election security, the January 6 insurrection at the U.S. Capitol, and the 59th Presidential Inauguration.

Prior to HSEMA, Dr. Rodriguez served as Director of New Jersey's Office of Homeland Security and Preparedness from 2014-17, where he led statewide strategies, policies, and operations on counterterrorism, resiliency, and cybersecurity. While serving in New Jersey, his home state, Dr. Rodriguez led the office during the national rise of homegrown violent extremism and established close relationships with the private sector, federal government as well as state, and local law enforcement. Recognizing the critical role the public plays in stopping attacks before they happen, Dr. Rodriguez also increased the office's engagement with the public - building and maintaining key relationships with faith-based communities.

Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, he joined the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), where he became a senior analyst in its Counterterrorism Center. In this position, he monitored terrorist groups in the Middle East and South Asia, closely collaborating with U.S. Intelligence Community partners at the federal, state, and local levels to identify and counter persistent threats to the United States and its allies. During his time at the CIA, Dr. Rodriguez also oversaw an analytic unit that handled global economic and energy security, as well as related counterintelligence and cyber threats. From 2009-11, while deployed at the U.S. Embassy in Brussels, Dr. Rodriguez was a key U.S. interlocutor with the European Union during the height of the Euro crisis. He has been recognized by the CIA and Director of National Intelligence for his leadership and professional achievements.

Dr. Rodriguez received a BA from Williams College and an MA and PhD in political science from the University of Notre Dame.

### **Christopher Geldart**

Mayor Muriel Bowser named Christopher Geldart to serve as Deputy Mayor for Public Safety and Justice on January 28, 2021. Deputy Mayor Geldart comes to the post having previously served as the Director of the DC Department of Public Works.

Mr. Geldart is a recognized leader in emergency management, whose in-depth experience spans municipal, state and federal agencies, as well as the private sector. He is proficient in coordinating resources available to government agencies, regional authorities, public utilities and the private sector to achieve successful outcomes to emergency situations.

Mr. Geldart served as Director of the DC Homeland Security and Emergency Management Agency from 2012-2017, where he led the planning and execution of three presidentially declared disasters and 20 national special security events. During his tenure with HSEMA, he directed the response to major snowstorms as well as Hurricane Sandy. Examples of the special security events are presidential inaugurations and State of the Union Addresses.

On the federal government level, Mr. Geldart's served as the Federal Emergency Management Agency's Director of the National Capital Region Coordination Office. In this capacity, he was the

federal government's lead for domestic preparedness in the National Capital Region. He furthered the region's efforts in risk management, federal participation in regional planning with state and local partners, and catastrophic planning throughout the greater National Capital Region. Before joining FEMA in April 2007, Mr. Geldart worked for the State of Maryland as Assistant Director of the Governor's Office of Homeland Security. He also served in the United States Marine Corps from 1989 to 2001, where he had several leadership positions in the Fleet Marine Force and was certified as an instructor in a joint military formal school environment.

Mr. Geldart earned a bachelor's degree in American History from the University of Maryland.

### **Billy Bob Brown, Jr.**

Billy Bob Brown, Jr., serves as the Executive Assistant Director (EAD) for Emergency Communications within the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA). In this capacity, EAD Brown drives cross-divisional synergy as identified in the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Act of 2018. Mr. Brown most recently served as the Associate Director, Priority Telecom Services Sub-Division as well as the Program Manager for both the DHS Level 2 Program Next Generation Networks Priority Services Program and the Level 3 Program Priority Telecommunications Services Program. In this role, he was responsible for providing priority telecommunications services over commercial networks to enable national security and emergency preparedness (NS/EP) personnel with the ability to communicate during congestion scenarios across the nation.

Previous to this assignment, he served as the Chief Administrative Officer, Office of Emergency Communications (OEC) and worked with a team to develop, coordinate, and implement a Resources Management for OEC that provides fiscal planning, programming, budgeting and execution across the five-year Future Years Homeland Security Program. It also provides integrated facilities planning with human resource and staffing planning, and property management planning to ensure successful resourcing of OEC efforts to unify the entire emergency communications community.

Previous assignments included a detail assignment as Director of Operations Integration, National Protection and Programs Directorate (NPPD), where he achieved Midterm Operational Capability of the NPPD Coordination and Operations as well as the NPPD Regional Pilot. This effort operationally tested the Directorate's integration of field forces to meet Cyber, Physical, and Emergency Communications challenges. Prior to this, Mr. Brown served as Chief, Regional Coordination Branch, OEC, leading a geographically dispersed team that facilitated operational communications coordination and collaboration at all levels of government. He advocated key emergency communications initiatives, programs, and activities designed to unify and lead the nationwide effort to improve NS/EP communications capabilities. Prior to joining the OEC in 2008, Mr. Brown served as an Operations Analyst with General Dynamics Information Technology and served as a career military officer in the United State Marine Corps as an Infantry Officer in various duty assignments with world-wide operational experience ranging from the Infantry Platoon to the Marine Expeditionary Force.

Mr. Brown graduated from the United States Air Force Academy with a Bachelor of Science degree and holds a Master of Business Administration from Webster University. He is a certified Project Management Professional (PMP).

## Joe Pfeifer

Joseph Pfeifer is a Senior Fellow at Harvard Kennedy School, where he teaches Executive Education Programs on crisis leadership and leads research teams to examine international preparedness of major cities and their response to extreme events. He is also the Director for Crisis Leadership at Columbia University's National Center for Disaster Preparedness, a senior fellow at the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, and a visiting instructor at the Naval Postgraduate School. He has taught senior leaders worldwide about crisis leadership, disaster management, critical decision-making, cross-sector communication, and organizational resiliency.

He has written widely and is the author of The New York Times bestseller [Ordinary Heroes: A Memoir of 9/11](#), published for the twentieth [anniversary of 9/11](#).

Pfeifer retired from the New York City Fire Department (FDNY) as an Assistant Chief and the founding director of FDNY's Center for Terrorism and Disaster Preparedness ([New York Times](#)). He was the first Chief at the World Trade Center attack on 9/11, played a significant command role during Hurricane Sandy, and helped manage NYC's Ebola Response efforts. While at FDNY, he served as the Chief of Counterterrorism and Emergency Preparedness, shaping response and technology for managing extreme events.

As a leading professional on crisis leadership, he has appeared in major news interviews and presented at national and international conferences, including the World Knowledge Forum, National Guard Joint Senior Leader Conference, and National Homeland Security Conferences. He has conducted hundreds of simulations to test response capabilities, surge capacity, and coordination. Pfeifer has testified in front of the U.S. Congress and spoke at the United Nations about the threats cities will face in the future.

He is also a senior advisor to McKinsey & Co. He holds Master's Degrees from the Harvard Kennedy School, Naval Postgraduate School, and Immaculate Conception.

## Michael Day

Rear Admiral Day assumed the duties of Military Advisor to the Secretary of Homeland Security in June 2021. His primary responsibility is to provide counsel to the Secretary regarding policies, plans, and other affairs between the Department of Homeland Security and the Department of Defense.

Rear Admiral Day previously served as the Executive Assistant to the Commandant and Vice Commandant of the Coast Guard providing senior executive decision support, advice, and recommendations to shape, communicate, and carry out strategic direction, policy, and internal/external communications. Rear Admiral Day also acted as Chief of Staff for all Coast Guard-related functions within the Department of Homeland Security.

Rear Admiral Day served as Commander of Sector New York from 2015 – 2018 and directed all Coast Guard missions in the Ports of New York &, New Jersey, and Albany. In this capacity, he served as Captain of the Port, Officer in Charge of Marine Inspection, Federal Maritime Security Coordinator, Search and Rescue Mission Coordinator, and Federal On-Scene Coordinator for Sector New York's 6,000 square miles area of responsibility.

Rear Admiral Day was commissioned in 1991 at Coast Guard Officer Candidate School in Yorktown, Virginia and has enjoyed a diverse career of operational and staff assignments in the Response Ashore field. Previous assignments include serving in the Strategy and Policy Directorate (J5) for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Commanding Officer of the Pacific Strike Team, where he participated in a variety of emergency responses in locations ranging from the Arctic to Taiwan and throughout the United States.

In response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, as a Lieutenant and while serving as the Chief of Waterways Oversight in the Port of New York and New Jersey, he was immediately designated the Coast Guard on-scene commander for the evacuation of lower Manhattan. In this capacity, he coordinated the response of over 100 civilian vessels in evacuating over 500,000 people in the largest maritime evacuation in history.

Rear Admiral Day has earned Masters degrees in National Security and Strategic Studies from the Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island and in Public Administration from Bridgewater State University. He holds a Bachelor of Science from Wentworth Institute of Technology, Boston, Massachusetts. Rear Admiral Day also completed a one-year fellowship at Harvard University Kennedy School of Government as a National Security Fellow and participated in a one-year Industry Training program with the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey.

Rear Admiral Day has received numerous military and civic awards. However, he considers those awards earned throughout his career associated with unit performance to be most satisfying and representative of Coast Guard service, because they recognize the participation and accomplishment of all crew members.



### **Keil Green**

Keil Green is the Chief Executive Officer of Lafayette Group, a public safety consulting firm that supports the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Mr. Green began his consulting career supporting the Department of Justice's Office for State and Local Domestic Preparedness and has supported DHS since its establishment. Mr. Green was fundamental in the development of the Interoperable Communications Technical Assistance Program (ICTAP) in 2003 and has coordinated ICTAP's support for over 2,000 on-site deliveries to state and local jurisdictions in all 56 states/territories and the District of Columbia. Mr. Green has provided strategic support on the design and implementation of several major DHS initiatives focused on state and local emergency communications including the Tactical Interoperability Initiative, the National Emergency Communications Plan (NECP) Goals validation, the Public Safety Interoperable Communications Grant Program (PSIC), as well as FirstNet (public safety broadband) in cooperation with the Department of Commerce. Prior to his support for DHS, Mr. Green served as the Lafayette Group program lead for state and local law enforcement technology implementations focusing on biometric technology and mobile data deployments. Mr. Green previously supported the Domestic Policy Council at the White House as a post graduate scholar and is a graduate of the University of the South.

## Jay Kopstein

Chief Kopstein retired from the NYPD in March of 2010 after a 37-year career. He continues in a law enforcement capacity as an Anti-Terrorism advisor to a sheriff in New York.

His last assignment was in the Operations Division. His responsibilities included operational planning for special events and other significant incidents, as well as emergency management and counterterrorism.

He is a member of local, regional, state and federal communications committees. He is the Co-Chair of the Communications & Interoperability Working Group of the NYS DHSES OIEC. He is a member of SAFECOM and currently is its Second Vice-Chair.

He participated in the 10, and later 25 major cities communications project, under the USDOJ and later RapidCom and SAFECOM.

He is a US DOS ATAP Instructor specializing in operational planning for special events & civil disorder, NIMS & ICS. He is a NYS LE Instructor specializing in general topics, NIMS & ICS. He holds an AAS in Mechanical Engineering Technology, a BS in Police Science and a MA in Criminal Justice.

He is a member of the IAEM, the NYSACOP and proudly a Life Member of the IACP!

## Frank Fiumano

Frank Fiumano arrived in the Port of New York/New Jersey in late 1999 to assume the duties of Chief of then CGACTNY Engineering Department. In that role he was responsible for the naval and civil engineering requirements for the largest field operational command in the Coast Guard. Following the attacks on 9/11, his department's responsibilities expanded and led to many interactions with federal, state and local port partners. In the aftermath of the attacks, he assisted in supporting law enforcement patrol requirements, extensive vessel maintenance and repair, as well as civil engineering support in the recovery operations working with the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, the Environmental Protection Agency, FDNY, NYPD, Sandy Hook Pilots, U.S., Park Police, as well as numerous other local, state and federal entities. In late 2003, he remained in the port area and assumed the duties of Commanding Officer of CGSENY Vessel Traffic Service NY and Chief of Waterways Management. In 2005, he was assigned as the First CGSECNY Command Center Chief, responsible for the initial set-up and start-up of the Sector Command Center Concept of Operation. In 2006, he assumed the duties of the first CGSECNY Planning Section Chief and the coordination of the largest Area Maritime Security Committee of any port in the Coast Guard. He currently serves as the Chief of Emergency Management and Force Readiness and the Senior Port Security Specialist here at CGSECNY. He has served in this port for approximately 21 years and has had the distinct privilege of serving as a Commissioned Officer in the U.S. Marine Corps (1970-1985) and the U.S. Coast Guard (1986-2010).

## Dennis Letts



In June of 1984, Dennis Letts began his career with the United States Secret Service as a Special Agent assigned to the New York Field Office, located in the World Trade Center. Early in his career, Dennis was assigned to a lead role during the 40th anniversary of the United Nations, where he directed security operations for an event hosted by President Ronald Reagan that drew over 100 heads of state and government. While serving in the New York Field Office, Mr. Letts successfully conducted numerous transnational white-collar investigations involving organized criminal groups. During his career, he provided protection for seven US Presidents from Richard Nixon through George W. Bush.

In 1995, Mr. Letts was selected as the lead Intelligence Advance Agent for the visit of Pope John Paul II to New York and New Jersey. In 1997, Mr. Letts became the first Special Agent to be assigned to the Technical Security Division “HAMMER” team, an elite team designed to provide chemical, biological and radiological countermeasures in support of the Presidential Protective Division.

In July of 2000, Mr. Letts led the advance team for “OpSail2000”, a declared National Special Security Event, where he was responsible for coordinating USSS involvement with the overall security plan in partnership with the Port Authority Police, US Navy and New York City Police Department. This event drew 120 “Tall Ships” and more than 40 naval warships from around the world.

On the morning of September 11th, 2001, Mr. Letts was exiting the North Tower of the World Trade Center when a hijacked aircraft struck the tower directly above him. He immediately started to search for survivors in the exterior plaza, eventually re-entering the North Tower. Mr. Letts initiated and directed the evacuation of the west stairwell, guiding thousands of evacuees to the safety of the underground WTC concourse. He remained in the North Tower until approximately 10 minutes before the collapse of the South Tower. A short time after the collapse of the North Tower, Mr. Letts boarded a New York Waterway ferry boat and began evacuating thousands of civilians from lower Manhattan. The evacuation that followed was described as the “largest maritime evacuation since Dunkirk”. For his actions that day, Mr. Letts was awarded the US Secret Service Medal of Valor.

Shortly after September 11th, 2001, Mr. Letts was selected to lead a comprehensive security assessment of the Statue of Liberty, eventually leading to the safe reopening of this iconic symbol to the public.

In March of 2003, Mr. Letts was promoted to the rank of Assistant Special Agent in Charge and assigned to the Newark (NJ) Field Office.

Between 2003 and 2004, Mr. Letts conceived and supervised a landmark investigation described by then Director Ralph Basham as the most complex criminal investigation in the history of the United States Secret Service. Dubbed “Operation Firewall”, this case involved the first use of a Title III wiretap on a computer network.

In October of 2006, Mr. Letts retired from the Secret Service to accept the position of Vice President, Chief Security Officer for the Avis Budget Group in Parsippany, NJ. His responsibilities included global oversight and coordination of security efforts across the enterprise, including physical security, information security, internal and external investigations, crisis communications, emergency

response, business continuity, employee training and law enforcement liaison.

In August 2017, Mr. Letts left the Avis Budget Group to accept a position with the National Football League. He is currently assigned to the New York Giants as the Security Representative for the NFL. He is responsible for providing the NFL and its member clubs with protective services for players, fans, facilities and major event locations (Super Bowl, Pro Bowl, NFL Draft). He is also responsible for preserving the integrity of the game and for conducting investigations.

In 2013, Mr. Letts returned to his Alma Mater, Kean University, to become a member of the Board of Advisors for the College of Business and Public Management. In January 2018, he was appointed Chairman of the Board, a position he held until 2020.

In March 2019, Mr. Letts was invited by the National September 11th Memorial and Museum to become a guest lecturer, speaking to employees assigned to various US Government intelligence agencies (FBI, CIA, DHS, NCTC, etc.).

Mr. Letts was born and raised in Newark (NJ) and currently lives in Parsippany, NJ with his wife Christine. He's the proud father of two sons, (FBI Special Agent) Daniel and Brian. He was named to the Alumni Roster of Superior Merit by East Side High School (Newark, NJ) and Citizen of the Year by the Township of Parsippany-Troy Hills. In 2019, he was honored by Kean University with the William Livingston Award, in recognition of "Excellence in Business and Philanthropy".

### **Stephen M. Clark**

Steve currently serves as the Superintendent of the National Parks of Western Pennsylvania, which include Flight 93 National Memorial, Johnstown Flood National Memorial, Allegheny Portage Railroad National Historic Site, Fort Necessity National Battlefield and Friendship Hill National Historic Site.

He is a 34-year veteran of the National Park Service, starting his career in 1986 at two of the parks he now manages. Prior to joining the NPS, Clark also worked with the Pennsylvania State Parks and the U.S. Forest Service.

Prior to his current assignment, Steve served as the Chief Ranger for the Northeast Region as well as the Branch Chief of Law Enforcement and Emergency Services for the region.

Other Park assignments include serving as the Chief Ranger at Biscayne National Park and Virgin Islands National Park. He also served as a Park Ranger at Lake Roosevelt National Recreation Area, Delaware Water Gap National Recreation Area, and Shenandoah National Park.

Significant detail assignments include serving as the Superintendent at Congaree National Park, Chief of Visitor Protection in Washington DC for the NPS, two details as Chief Ranger at Gulf Islands National Seashore in the aftermath of the Mississippi Canyon oil spill in 2010 and response to Hurricane Maria in October of 2017.

Clark holds a Bachelor of Science degree in Natural Resource Management with a concentration in Park Management from Slippery Rock University and an Associate's degree in Wildlife Technology from the Pennsylvania State University.



He is also a graduate of the Executive Leadership Program at the Harvard Kennedy School of Government, along with completing the Executive Management Program at Northwestern University in Chicago.

Steve enjoys spending time in the outdoors, especially golfing and fishing, and is an avid baseball fan. He especially enjoys time with his three daughters Brianna, Erin, and Makenna, and his 5 grandchildren.

### **Jim Schwartz**

Jim Schwartz retired in 2021 after five years as the Deputy County Manager for public safety and technology in Arlington, Virginia. Prior to that he served in the Arlington County Fire Department for 32 years, the last eleven as Chief of Department. During his tenure with the fire department, he served in a variety of fire department positions including Assistant Chief for Operations, responsible for all response-related activities, including fire, EMS, hazardous materials and technical rescue response, incident management and operational training. In 2003, he was assigned to the Office of the County Manager where he established a new department of Emergency Management and served as its director until his appointment to Fire Chief in July 2004.

The Arlington County Fire Department was the lead agency for the response to the September 11, 2001 attack at the Pentagon. Chief Schwartz led the unified command effort for the Pentagon incident.

Mr. Schwartz is a senior fellow with the Program on Crisis Leadership at the Harvard Kennedy School and teaches in the Executive Education programs including, Leadership in Crises, the General and Flag Officer Homeland Security Executive Seminar, and Leadership in Homeland Security.

Schwartz provides frequent lectures on Crisis Leadership for organizations such as U.S. State Department, FBI, Georgetown University, American University, George Washington University, and numerous international audiences; he also lectured as part the Joint Counterterrorism Awareness Workshop Series on complex coordinated attack preparedness provided by FEMA from 2014 – 2018.

Schwartz is a member of the International Association of Fire Chiefs Committee on Terrorism and Homeland Security which he chaired from 2008 until August 2014. He previously served on the Advisory Council for the Interagency Threat Assessment and Coordination Group (ITACG) and subsequently the Joint Counterterrorism Assessment Team (JCAT) at the National Counter Terrorism Center. He also served on the Homeland Security Science and Technology Advisory Committee and was a member of the Advisory Committee for the Department of Homeland Security's first Quadrennial Review in 2010.

Mr. Schwartz is a founder of the Northern Virginia Emergency Response System an interdisciplinary, multi-jurisdictional organization that works to support and enhance regional preparedness.

Schwartz is a life-member of Leadership Arlington, an organization that develops and connects leaders in the public, private and non-profit sectors of Arlington County. He received the organization's Leadership Legacy Award for 2012.

Chief Schwartz graduated from the University of Maryland with a bachelor's degree in Fire Administration and is a graduate of the Executive Leaders Program at the Center for Homeland Defense and Security at the Naval Postgraduate School.



## Sergeant Ken Burchell

Ken Burchell is a Bethesda Maryland native and a graduate of the University of Maryland. Ken started his Career as a Firefighter/EMT in Montgomery County Maryland before joining the United States Park Police (USPP) in 1985. Ken started as a Patrol Officer and after several years he was appointed to the USPP SWAT Team. Ken functioned as both an entry Officer as well as a Tactical Medic. While in this role he co-founded the Counter Narcotics Operational Medical Support Program (CONTOMS), a joint USPP Department of Defense training program. Ken served as an Assistant Team Leader until his transfer to the USPP Aviation Unit. In the Aviation Unit, Ken started as an Aviation Rescue Technician (flight Medic) prior to graduating from the U.S. Army Flight School, Fort Rucker Alabama. In his roles as Helicopter Pilot or Medic he flew thousands of Med-evac, Rescue and Police Air missions. Ken “retired” from the USPP after 33 years of service.

Ken is currently the Branch Chief for Special Operations, Emergency Management /Medical Operations, Division of Field Operations, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. Ken oversees the Weapons of Mass Destruction Program, the Operational Training Group and The Tactical Medical Program including the CONTOMS Program.

Ken served in both the U.S. Army and U.S. Coast Guard Reserve and deployed to the Persian Gulf for Operation Desert Storm.

## Major General James Jackson

Major General (Retired) Jackson is a senior-level executive with a successful military career that included ever increasing responsibility in diverse and complex organizations ranging in size from 30 to 17,000 staff. His significant achievements include leading and managing large, multidisciplinary professional teams, resulting in the development of high performing organizations. General Jackson has extensive hands-on experience in program development, personnel management, operations direction, security operations, establishing and meeting strategic and operational goals, and resource allocation. He is a direct and decisive leader, flexible in responding to the changing needs of customers, management, and staff. He displays initiative, innovation, and flexibility in responding to the changing needs of customers, employees, management, and staff. His operational experience includes strategic planning, team building, financial management, communications, risk management, and security operations.

## Cathy Lanier

Over her 26 years in law enforcement and counterterrorism, Cathy Lanier has come to be known for her game-changing leadership. Prior to serving in her current role as Senior Vice President and Chief of Security at the National Football League, Lanier held the position of Chief of Police with the Washington, D.C. Metropolitan Police Department (MPD) from 2007 to 2016. Lanier rose through the ranks of the MPD to earn various commendable honors including becoming the first female police chief of the nation’s capital, the first commanding officer of Homeland Security and Counter-Terrorism for D.C. Police, one of a small number of female chiefs in the nation at the time, and the longest serving chief on the D.C. force.

A highly respected professional in the areas of homeland security and community policing, she took the lead role in developing and implementing coordinated counterterrorism strategies for all units within the MPD and launched the department’s Operation TIPP (Terrorist Incident Prevention Program). She is

also credited for transforming the city once known as the "murder capital of the nation." Lanier's street-smart tactics focus on community empowerment, and dedication to improving technology and intelligence resulted in a 53 percent reduction in homicides from 2008-2012. While leading the MPD, Lanier also demonstrated expertise in securing and managing large events as she oversaw five Presidential inaugurations and several special events including two state funerals and two Papal visits. In 2013, she led the response effort to the Washington Navy Yard mass shooting.

Now, as the Chief of Security for the National Football League, Lanier safeguards the security of all 32 NFL teams and their venues, liaises and collaborates with federal, state and local law enforcement, and ensures security for League events like the Super Bowl. As an innovative force in safety and security, Chief Lanier's service continues to extend beyond the NFL to the Homeland Security Advisory Council, an independent government advisory body, where she currently serves as the Co-Chair of the Emerging Technologies Sub-Committee. She is Vice-Chair of the Commercial Facilities Sector Coordinating Council and Co-Chair of the Sports League Sub-Sector Coordinating Council.



### James Murphy

James Murphy has served with the United States Park Police for over 20 years and is currently the Commander of Central District. His area of responsibility encompasses some of the world's most visited Monuments, and Memorials which include the Washington Monument, Lincoln and Jefferson Memorials, President's Park, and the National Mall.

Prior to his assignment as the Central District Commander, he also served as the Assistant Commander of the Training Branch, before becoming the Executive Officer for Chief Robert MacLean. Additionally, Mr. Murphy rotated through various positions within the United States Park Police Special Events Unit serving as a Sergeant and then Commander. Some events of note include the 2013 Inauguration as a principle planner, and Operations Chief for the Concert for Valor (2014), Papal Visit (2015), and July Fourth Celebrations (2014 and 2015). Mr. Murphy was then detailed back into the special event arena as the acting Commander of Icon Protection Branch from 2020-2021. During this detail he served as a member of the NPS Incident Management Team, as Operations Chief for the 2021 Inauguration.

Mr. Murphy started his public service and law enforcement career in 1995, as a United States Marine Corps, Military Police Officer. His law enforcement career continued as a Police Officer with the Defense Protective Service (Currently known as Pentagon Force Protection Agency) from 2000 to 2001. Mr. Murphy served as a Master Patrol Officer assigned to the Remote Delivery Center on the Pentagon Reservation. Mr. Murphy was awarded the Department of Defense Medal of Valor, in February 2002. Mr. Murphy then continued his service career as a Special Agent with the Defense Security Service, prior to coming to the United States Park Police.

Mr. Murphy holds a Bachelor of Science Degree from Alvernia University, and a Master of Science Degree from Saint Joseph's University. He is a graduate of the 277th Session of the FBI's National Academy. Mr. Murphy's outside interests include coaching youth football and baseball which he has done for over 20 years and spending time with his greatest accomplishments his wife and five children.



## Leon E. Panetta

The son of Italian immigrants, born and raised in Monterey and graduate of Santa Clara University and Santa Clara University School of Law, Secretary Panetta began his long and distinguished public service career in 1964 as a First Lieutenant in the United States Army, and upon discharge went to work in Washington as a legislative assistant to United States Senate Minority Whip Tom Kuchel of California. In 1969, he was appointed director of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare's Office for Civil Rights, where he was responsible for enforcing equal education laws. Later, he served as executive assistant to the mayor of New York City. He then returned to Monterey, where he practiced law until his election to the United States House of Representatives in 1976.

Serving in Congress for 16 years, Secretary Panetta was a key participant in agriculture, healthcare, ocean and federal budget issues. From 1989 to 1993, he chaired the House Budget Committee. He authored a wide range of legislation, including the Hunger Prevention Act of 1988, Medicare and Medicaid coverage for hospice care for the terminally ill, and numerous measures to protect the California coast, including creation of the Monterey Bay National Marine Sanctuary.

In 1993, Secretary Panetta left Congress to serve as director of the Office of Management and Budget for the Clinton administration. There, he was instrumental in developing the policies that led to a balanced federal budget and eventual surpluses. In 1994, he accepted appointment as the president's chief of staff, and immediately brought order and focus to White House operations.

Upon leaving the Clinton administration in 1997, Secretary Panetta joined with his wife Sylvia to establish and co-direct The Panetta Institute for Public Policy, based at California State University, Monterey Bay. Reflecting Secretary Panetta's own ideals and personal example, the nonpartisan, not-for-profit study center seeks to attract thoughtful men and women to lives of public service and prepare them for the policy challenges of the future.

Returning to public service in the Obama administration as director of the CIA, he ran the operation that brought Osama bin Laden to justice, and, as Secretary of Defense, led the effort to develop a new defense strategy, helped bring two wars to an end, and opened up opportunities for everyone to serve in the military.

Secretary Panetta returned to the Panetta Institute as chairman on February 27, 2013 and resumed his role as moderator of the renowned Leon Panetta Lecture Series. He chronicles his life in public service in his best-selling memoir *Worthy Fights*, which was published in 2014.



## Edward Byers

6-Word Story

Founder, Medal of Honor, SEAL, Philomath

Edward Byers is the Founder & CEO of Minerva 6 – A Service-Disabled Veteran-Owned Small Business (SDVOSB) operating in the National Capital Region, Washington DC, that offers specialized consulting services and government contracting solutions.

Prior to founding Minerva 6, Edward served 21 years in the Navy; as a Navy Corpsman and a Navy SEAL. Serving with 2/2 Marines, SEAL Team 4, SEAL Team 6—Gold Squadron Team Leader, and Pentagon Joint Staff. He retired as a Master Chief in 2020.

Edward is the recipient of the Congressional Medal of Honor - Our Nation's Highest award for Valor. He is the 1st Special Warfare Operator from SEAL Team 6, and the 6th Navy SEAL in history, to be awarded the Medal of Honor. He is 1 of 27 Medal of Honor Recipients since 9/11, and 1 of 67 living members of the Congressional Medal of Honor Society. He is also the recipient of 5 Bronze Stars with Valor, 2 Purple Hearts, and numerous other valorous awards.

Edward earned a Bachelor of Science in Strategic Studies and Defense Analysis from Norwich University- Summa Cum Laude.

Edward earned his MBA from The Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania - Class 45 - while working as an Operating Executive for Behrman Capital, a middle market private equity firm in NYC.

His charitable work involves serving on the board of the C4 Foundation and the honorary advisory board of the Navy SEAL Foundation, both of which are focused on assisting Active Duty, Veterans, Gold Stars, and their Families.

Edward's inductions include: Special Operations (Hall of Fame) Commando Hall of Honor, Ohio Veterans Hall of Fame, Ohio Military Hall of Fame, and Norwich University's Bi-Centennial Stairs.

Edward was selected as a Pat Tillman Scholar in 2019, and was honored by the Great State of Ohio when he had State Route 65 renamed after him in 2020.

He is a member of the Knights of Columbus, and his personal motto "Strength through Humility©" guides him daily. He is married and has a daughter.

**INTEROPERABLE COMMUNICATIONS RELATED  
RECOMMENDATIONS FROM THE 9/11 COMMISSION  
REPORT EXCERPT**

[govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/report/911Report.pdf](http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/report/911Report.pdf)

## THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT

### Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States

#### EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

We present the narrative of this report and the recommendations that flow from it to the President of the United States, the United States Congress, and the American people for their consideration. Ten Commissioners—five Republicans and five Democrats chosen by elected leaders from our nation's capital at a time of great partisan division—have come together to present this report without dissent.

We have come together with a unity of purpose because our nation demands it. September 11, 2001 was a day of unprecedented shock and suffering in the history of the United States. The nation was unprepared.

#### A NATION TRANSFORMED

At 8:46 on the morning of September 11, 2001, the United States became a nation transformed.

An airliner traveling at hundreds of miles per hour and carrying some 10,000 gallons of jet fuel plowed into the North Tower of the World Trade Center in Lower Manhattan. At 9:03, a second airliner hit the South Tower. Fire and smoke billowed upward. Steel, glass, ash, and bodies fell below. The Twin Towers, where up to 50,000 people worked each day, both collapsed less than 90 minutes later.

At 9:37 that same morning, a third airliner slammed into the western face of the Pentagon. At 10:03, a fourth airliner crashed in a field in southern Pennsylvania. It had been aimed at the United States Capitol or the White House, and was forced down by heroic passengers armed with the knowledge that America was under attack.

More than 2,600 people died at the World Trade Center; 125 died at the Pentagon; 256 died on the four planes. The death toll surpassed that at Pearl Harbor in December 1941.

This immeasurable pain was inflicted by 19 young Arabs acting at the behest of Islamist extremists headquartered in distant Afghanistan. Some had been in the United States for more than a year, mixing with the rest of the population. Though four had training as pilots, most were not well-educated. Most spoke English poorly, some hardly at all. In groups of four or five, carrying with them only small knives, box cutters, and cans of Mace or pepper spray, they had hijacked the four planes and turned them into deadly guided missiles.

Why did they do this? How was the attack planned and conceived? How did the U.S. government fail to anticipate and prevent it? What can we do in the future to prevent similar acts of terrorism?

#### **A Shock, Not a Surprise**

The 9/11 attacks were a shock, but they should not have come as a surprise. Islamist extremists had given plenty of warning that they meant to kill Americans indiscriminately and in large numbers. Although Usama Bin Ladin himself would not emerge as a signal threat until the late 1990s, the threat of Islamist terrorism grew over the decade.

In February 1993, a group led by Ramzi Yousef tried to bring down the World Trade Center with a truck bomb. They killed six and wounded a thousand. Plans by Omar Abdel Rahman and others to blow up the Holland and Lincoln tunnels and other New York City landmarks were frustrated when the plotters were arrested. In October 1993, Somali tribesmen shot down U.S. helicopters, killing 18 and wounding 73 in an incident that came to be known as "Black Hawk down." Years later it would be learned that those Somali tribesmen had received help from al Qaeda.

In early 1995, police in Manila uncovered a plot by Ramzi Yousef to blow up a dozen U.S. airliners while they were flying over the Pacific. In November 1995, a car bomb exploded outside the office of the U.S. program manager for the Saudi National Guard in Riyadh, killing five Americans and two others. In June 1996, a truck bomb demolished the Khobar Towers apartment complex in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, killing 19 U.S. servicemen and wounding hundreds. The attack was carried out primarily by Saudi Hezbollah, an organization that had received help from the government of Iran.

Until 1997, the U.S. intelligence community viewed Bin Ladin as a financier of terrorism, not as a terrorist leader. In February 1998, Usama Bin Ladin and four others issued a self-styled fatwa, publicly declaring that it was God's decree that every Muslim should try his utmost to kill any American, military or civilian, anywhere in the world, because of American "occupation" of Islam's holy places and aggression against Muslims.

In August 1998, Bin Ladin's group, al Qaeda, carried out near-simultaneous truck bomb attacks on the U.S. embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. The attacks killed 224 people, including 12 Americans, and wounded thousands more.

In December 1999, Jordanian police foiled a plot to bomb hotels and other sites frequented by American tourists, and a U.S. Customs agent arrested Ahmed Ressam at the U.S. Canadian border as he was smuggling in explosives intended for an attack on Los Angeles International Airport.

In October 2000, an al Qaeda team in Aden, Yemen, used a motorboat filled with explosives to blow a hole in the side of a destroyer, the USS *Cole*, almost sinking the vessel and killing 17 American sailors.

The 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon were far more elaborate, precise, and destructive than any of these earlier assaults. But by September 2001, the executive branch of the U.S. government, the Congress, the news media, and the American public had received clear warning that Islamist terrorists meant to kill Americans in high numbers.

### **Who Is the Enemy?**

Who is this enemy that created an organization capable of inflicting such horrific damage on the United States? We now know that these attacks were carried out by various groups of Islamist extremists. The 9/11 attack was driven by Usama Bin Ladin.

In the 1980s, young Muslims from around the world went to Afghanistan to join as volunteers in a jihad (or holy struggle) against the Soviet Union. A wealthy Saudi, Usama Bin Ladin, was one of them. Following the defeat of the Soviets in the late 1980s, Bin Ladin and others formed al Qaeda to mobilize jihads elsewhere.

The history, culture, and body of beliefs from which Bin Ladin shapes and spreads his message are largely unknown to many Americans. Seizing on symbols of Islam's past greatness, he promises to restore pride to people who consider themselves the victims of successive foreign masters. He uses cultural and religious allusions to the holy Qur'an and some of its interpreters. He appeals to people

disoriented by cyclonic change as they confront modernity and globalization. His rhetoric selectively draws from multiple sources-Islam, history, and the region's political and economic malaise.

Bin Ladin also stresses grievances against the United States widely shared in the Muslim world. He inveighed against the presence of U.S. troops in Saudi Arabia, which is the home of Islam's holiest sites, and against other U.S. policies in the Middle East.

Upon this political and ideological foundation, Bin Ladin built over the course of a decade a dynamic and lethal organization. He built an infrastructure and organization in Afghanistan that could attract, train, and use recruits against ever more ambitious targets. He rallied new zealots and new money with each demonstration of al Qaeda's capability. He had forged a close alliance with the Taliban, a regime providing sanctuary for al Qaeda.

By September 11, 2001, al Qaeda possessed:

- leaders able to evaluate, approve, and supervise the planning and direction of a major operation
- a personnel system that could recruit candidates, indoctrinate them, vet them, and give them the necessary training
- communications sufficient to enable planning and direction of operatives and those who would be helping them
- an intelligence effort to gather required information and form assessments of enemy strengths and weaknesses
- the ability to move people great distances
- the ability to raise and move the money necessary to finance an attack

### **1998 to September 11, 2001**

The August 1998 bombings of U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania established al Qaeda as a potent adversary of the United States.

After launching cruise missile strikes against al Qaeda targets in Afghanistan and Sudan in retaliation for the embassy bombings, the Clinton administration applied diplomatic pressure to try to persuade the Taliban regime in Afghanistan to expel Bin Ladin. The administration also devised covert operations to use CIA-paid foreign agents to capture or kill Bin Ladin and his chief lieutenants. These actions did not stop Bin Ladin or dislodge al Qaeda from its sanctuary.

By late 1998 or early 1999, Bin Ladin and his advisers had agreed on an idea brought to them by Khalid Sheikh Mohammed (KSM) called the "planes operation." It would eventually culminate in the 9/11 attacks. Bin Ladin and his chief of operations, Mohammed Atef, occupied undisputed leadership positions atop al Qaeda. Within al Qaeda, they relied heavily on the ideas and enterprise of strong-willed field commanders, such as KSM, to carry out worldwide terrorist operations.

KSM claims that his original plot was even grander than those carried out on 9/11-ten planes would attack targets on both the East and West coasts of the United States. This plan was modified by Bin Ladin, KSM said, owing to its scale and complexity. Bin Ladin provided KSM with four initial operatives for suicide plane attacks within the United States, and in the fall of 1999 training for the attacks began. New recruits included four from a cell of expatriate Muslim extremists who had clustered together in Hamburg, Germany. One became the tactical commander of the operation in the United States: Mohamed Atta.

U.S. intelligence frequently picked up reports of attacks planned by al Qaeda. Working with foreign security services, the CIA broke up some al Qaeda cells. The core of Bin Ladin's organization nevertheless remained intact. In December 1999, news about the arrests of the terrorist cell in Jordan and the arrest of a terrorist at the U.S.-Canadian border became part of a "millennium alert." The government was galvanized, and the public was on alert for any possible attack.

In January 2000, the intense intelligence effort glimpsed and then lost sight of two operatives destined for the "planes operation." Spotted in Kuala Lumpur, the pair were lost passing through Bangkok. On January 15, 2000, they arrived in Los Angeles.

Because these two al Qaeda operatives had spent little time in the West and spoke little, if any, English, it is plausible that they or KSM would have tried to identify, in advance, a friendly contact in the United States. We explored suspicions about whether these two operatives had a support network of accomplices in the United States. The evidence is thin—simply not there for some cases, more worrisome in others.

We do know that soon after arriving in California, the two al Qaeda operatives sought out and found a group of ideologically like-minded Muslims with roots in Yemen and Saudi Arabia, individuals mainly associated with a young Yemeni and others who attended a mosque in San Diego. After a brief stay in Los Angeles about which we know little, the al Qaeda operatives lived openly in San Diego under their true names. They managed to avoid attracting much attention.

By the summer of 2000, three of the four Hamburg cell members had arrived on the East Coast of the United States and had begun pilot training. In early 2001, a fourth future hijacker pilot, Hani Hanjour, journeyed to Arizona with another operative, Nawaf al Hazmi, and conducted his refresher pilot training there. A number of al Qaeda operatives had spent time in Arizona during the 1980s and early 1990s.

During 2000, President Bill Clinton and his advisers renewed diplomatic efforts to get Bin Ladin expelled from Afghanistan. They also renewed secret efforts with some of the Taliban's opponents—the Northern Alliance—to get enough intelligence to attack Bin Ladin directly. Diplomatic efforts centered on the new military government in Pakistan, and they did not succeed. The efforts with the Northern Alliance revived an inconclusive and secret debate about whether the United States should take sides in Afghanistan's civil war and support the Taliban's enemies. The CIA also produced a plan to improve intelligence collection on al Qaeda, including the use of a small, unmanned airplane with a video camera, known as the Predator.

After the October 2000 attack on the USS *Cole*, evidence accumulated that it had been launched by al Qaeda operatives, but without confirmation that Bin Ladin had given the order. The Taliban had earlier been warned that it would be held responsible for another Bin Ladin attack on the United States. The CIA described its findings as a "preliminary judgment"; President Clinton and his chief advisers told us they were waiting for a conclusion before deciding whether to take military action. The military alternatives remained unappealing to them.

The transition to the new Bush administration in late 2000 and early 2001 took place with the *Cole* issue still pending. President George W. Bush and his chief advisers accepted that al Qaeda was responsible for the attack on the *Cole*, but did not like the options available for a response.

Bin Ladin's inference may well have been that attacks, at least at the level of the *Cole*, were risk free.

The Bush administration began developing a new strategy with the stated goal of eliminating the al Qaeda threat within three to five years.

During the spring and summer of 2001, U.S. intelligence agencies received a stream of warnings that al Qaeda planned, as one report put it, "something very, very, very big." Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet told us, "The system was blinking red."

Although Bin Ladin was determined to strike in the United States, as President Clinton had been told and President Bush was reminded in a Presidential Daily Brief article briefed to him in August 2001, the specific threat information pointed overseas. Numerous precautions were taken overseas. Domestic agencies were not effectively mobilized. The threat did not receive national media attention comparable to the millennium alert.

While the United States continued disruption efforts around the world, its emerging strategy to eliminate the al Qaeda threat was to include an enlarged covert action program in Afghanistan, as well as diplomatic strategies for Afghanistan and Pakistan. The process culminated during the summer of 2001 in a draft presidential directive and arguments about the Predator aircraft, which was soon to be deployed with a missile of its own, so that it might be used to attempt to kill Bin Ladin or his chief lieutenants. At a September 4 meeting, President Bush's chief advisers approved the draft directive of the strategy and endorsed the concept of arming the Predator. This directive on the al Qaeda strategy was awaiting President Bush's signature on September 11, 2001.

Though the "planes operation" was progressing, the plotters had problems of their own in 2001. Several possible participants dropped out; others could not gain entry into the United States (including one denial at a port of entry and visa denials not related to terrorism). One of the eventual pilots may have considered abandoning the planes operation. Zacarias Moussaoui, who showed up at a flight training school in Minnesota, may have been a candidate to replace him.

Some of the vulnerabilities of the plotters become clear in retrospect. Moussaoui aroused suspicion for seeking fast-track training on how to pilot large jet airliners. He was arrested on August 16, 2001, for violations of immigration regulations. In late August, officials in the intelligence community realized that the terrorists spotted in Southeast Asia in January 2000 had arrived in the United States.

These cases did not prompt urgent action. No one working on these late leads in the summer of 2001 connected them to the high level of threat reporting. In the words of one official, no analytic work foresaw the lightning that could connect the thundercloud to the ground.

As final preparations were under way during the summer of 2001, dissent emerged among al Qaeda leaders in Afghanistan over whether to proceed. The Taliban's chief, Mullah Omar, opposed attacking the United States. Although facing opposition from many of his senior lieutenants, Bin Ladin effectively overruled their objections, and the attacks went forward.

### **September 11, 2001**

The day began with the 19 hijackers getting through a security checkpoint system that they had evidently analyzed and knew how to defeat. Their success rate in penetrating the system was 19 for 19. They took over the four flights, taking advantage of air crews and cockpits that were not prepared for the contingency of a suicide hijacking.

On 9/11, the defense of U.S. air space depended on close interaction between two federal agencies: the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD).

Existing protocols on 9/11 were unsuited in every respect for an attack in which hijacked planes were used as weapons.

What ensued was a hurried attempt to improvise a defense by civilians who had never handled a hijacked aircraft that attempted to disappear, and by a military unprepared for the transformation of commercial aircraft into weapons of mass destruction.

A shutdown authorization was not communicated to the NORAD air defense sector until 28 minutes after United 93 had crashed in Pennsylvania. Planes were scrambled, but ineffectively, as they did not know where to go or what targets they were to intercept. And once the shutdown order was given, it was not communicated to the pilots. In short, while leaders in Washington believed that the fighters circling above them had been instructed to "take out" hostile aircraft, the only orders actually conveyed to the pilots were to "ID type and tail."

Like the national defense, the emergency response on 9/11 was necessarily improvised.

In New York City, the Fire Department of New York, the New York Police Department, the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, the building employees, and the occupants of the buildings did their best to cope with the effects of almost unimaginable events-unfolding furiously over 102 minutes. Casualties were nearly 100 percent at and above the impact zones and were very high among first responders who stayed in danger as they tried to save lives. Despite weaknesses in preparations for disaster, failure to achieve unified incident command, and inadequate communications among responding agencies, all but approximately one hundred of the thousands of civilians who worked below the impact zone escaped, often with help from the emergency responders.

At the Pentagon, while there were also problems of command and control, the emergency response was generally effective. The Incident Command System, a formalized management structure for emergency response in place in the National Capital Region, overcame the inherent complications of a response across local, state, and federal jurisdictions.

### **Operational Opportunities**

We write with the benefit and handicap of hindsight. We are mindful of the danger of being unjust to men and women who made choices in conditions of uncertainty and in circumstances over which they often had little control.

Nonetheless, there were specific points of vulnerability in the plot and opportunities to disrupt it. Operational failures-opportunities that were not or could not be exploited by the organizations and systems of that time-included:

- not watchlisting future hijackers Hazmi and Mihdhar, not trailing them after they traveled to Bangkok, and not informing the FBI about one future hijacker's U.S. visa or his companion's travel to the United States
- not sharing information linking individuals in the *Cole* attack to Mihdhar
- not taking adequate steps in time to find Mihdhar or Hazmi in the United States
- not linking the arrest of Zacarias Moussaoui, described as interested in flight training for the purpose of using an airplane in a terrorist act, to the heightened indications of attack
- not discovering false statements on visa applications
- not recognizing passports manipulated in a fraudulent manner
- not expanding no-fly lists to include names from terrorist watchlists
- not searching airline passengers identified by the computer-based CAPPS screening system

- not hardening aircraft cockpit doors or taking other measures to prepare for the possibility of suicide hijackings.

### **GENERAL FINDINGS**

Since the plotters were flexible and resourceful, we cannot know whether any single step or series of steps would have defeated them. What we can say with confidence is that none of the measures adopted by the U.S. government from 1998 to 2001 disturbed or even delayed the progress of the al Qaeda plot. Across the government, there were failures of imagination, policy, capabilities, and management.

#### **Imagination**

The most important failure was one of imagination. We do not believe leaders understood the gravity of the threat. The terrorist danger from Bin Ladin and al Qaeda was not a major topic for policy debate among the public, the media, or in the Congress. Indeed, it barely came up during the 2000 presidential campaign.

Al Qaeda's new brand of terrorism presented challenges to U.S. governmental institutions that they were not well-designed to meet. Though top officials all told us that they understood the danger, we believe there was uncertainty among them as to whether this was just a new and especially venomous version of the ordinary terrorist threat the United States had lived with for decades, or it was indeed radically new, posing a threat beyond any yet experienced.

As late as September 4, 2001, Richard Clarke, the White House staffer long responsible for counterterrorism policy coordination, asserted that the government had not yet made up its mind how to answer the question: "Is al Qida a big deal?"

A week later came the answer.

#### **Policy**

Terrorism was not the overriding national security concern for the U.S. government under either the Clinton or the pre-9/11 Bush administration.

The policy challenges were linked to this failure of imagination. Officials in both the Clinton and Bush administrations regarded a full U.S. invasion of Afghanistan as practically inconceivable before 9/11.

#### **Capabilities**

Before 9/11, the United States tried to solve the al Qaeda problem with the capabilities it had used in the last stages of the Cold War and its immediate aftermath. These capabilities were insufficient. Little was done to expand or reform them.

The CIA had minimal capacity to conduct paramilitary operations with its own personnel, and it did not seek a large-scale expansion of these capabilities before 9/11. The CIA also needed to improve its capability to collect intelligence from human agents.

At no point before 9/11 was the Department of Defense fully engaged in the mission of countering al Qaeda, even though this was perhaps the most dangerous foreign enemy threatening the United States.

America's homeland defenders faced outward. NORAD itself was barely able to retain any alert bases at all. Its planning scenarios occasionally considered the danger of hijacked aircraft being guided to American targets, but only aircraft that were coming from overseas.

The most serious weaknesses in agency capabilities were in the domestic arena. The FBI did not have the capability to link the collective knowledge of agents in the field to national priorities. Other domestic agencies deferred to the FBI.

FAA capabilities were weak. Any serious examination of the possibility of a suicide hijacking could have suggested changes to fix glaring vulnerabilities—expanding no-fly lists, searching passengers identified by the CAPPSS screening system, deploying federal air marshals domestically, hardening cockpit doors, alerting air crews to a different kind of hijacking possibility than they had been trained to expect. Yet the FAA did not adjust either its own training or training with NORAD to take account of threats other than those experienced in the past.

### **Management**

The missed opportunities to thwart the 9/11 plot were also symptoms of a broader inability to adapt the way government manages problems to the new challenges of the twenty-first century. Action officers should have been able to draw on all available knowledge about al Qaeda in the government. Management should have ensured that information was shared and duties were clearly assigned across agencies, and across the foreign-domestic divide.

There were also broader management issues with respect to how top leaders set priorities and allocated resources. For instance, on December 4, 1998, DCI Tenet issued a directive to several CIA officials and the DDCI for Community Management, stating: "We are at war. I want no resources or people spared in this effort, either inside CIA or the Community." The memorandum had little overall effect on mobilizing the CIA or the intelligence community. This episode indicates the limitations of the DCI's authority over the direction of the intelligence community, including agencies within the Department of Defense.

The U.S. government did not find a way of pooling intelligence and using it to guide the planning and assignment of responsibilities for joint operations involving entities as disparate as the CIA, the FBI, the State Department, the military, and the agencies involved in homeland security.

## **SPECIFIC FINDINGS**

### **Unsuccessful Diplomacy**

Beginning in February 1997, and through September 11, 2001, the U.S. government tried to use diplomatic pressure to persuade the Taliban regime in Afghanistan to stop being a sanctuary for al Qaeda, and to expel Bin Ladin to a country where he could face justice. These efforts included warnings and sanctions, but they all failed.

The U.S. government also pressed two successive Pakistani governments to demand that the Taliban cease providing a sanctuary for Bin Ladin and his organization and, failing that, to cut off their support for the Taliban. Before 9/11, the United States could not find a mix of incentives and pressure that would persuade Pakistan to reconsider its fundamental relationship with the Taliban.

From 1999 through early 2001, the United States pressed the United Arab Emirates, one of the Taliban's only travel and financial outlets to the outside world, to break off ties and enforce sanctions, especially those related to air travel to Afghanistan. These efforts achieved little before 9/11.

Saudi Arabia has been a problematic ally in combating Islamic extremism. Before 9/11, the Saudi and U.S. governments did not fully share intelligence information or develop an adequate joint effort to track and disrupt the finances of the al Qaeda organization. On the other hand, government officials of Saudi Arabia at the highest levels worked closely with top U.S. officials in major initiatives to solve the Bin Ladin problem with diplomacy.

### **Lack of Military Options**

In response to the request of policymakers, the military prepared an array of limited strike options for attacking Bin Ladin and his organization from May 1998 onward. When they briefed policymakers, the military presented both the pros and cons of those strike options and the associated risks. Policymakers expressed frustration with the range of options presented.

Following the August 20, 1998, missile strikes on al Qaeda targets in Afghanistan and Sudan, both senior military officials and policymakers placed great emphasis on actionable intelligence as the key factor in recommending or deciding to launch military action against Bin Ladin and his organization. They did not want to risk significant collateral damage, and they did not want to miss Bin Ladin and thus make the United States look weak while making Bin Ladin look strong. On three specific occasions in 1998-1999, intelligence was deemed credible enough to warrant planning for possible strikes to kill Bin Ladin. But in each case the strikes did not go forward, because senior policymakers did not regard the intelligence as sufficiently actionable to offset their assessment of the risks.

The Director of Central Intelligence, policymakers, and military officials expressed frustration with the lack of actionable intelligence. Some officials inside the Pentagon, including those in the special forces and the counterterrorism policy office, also expressed frustration with the lack of military action. The Bush administration began to develop new policies toward al Qaeda in 2001, but military plans did not change until after 9/11.

### **Problems within the Intelligence Community**

The intelligence community struggled throughout the 1990s and up to 9/11 to collect intelligence on and analyze the phenomenon of transnational terrorism. The combination of an overwhelming number of priorities, flat budgets, an outmoded structure, and bureaucratic rivalries resulted in an insufficient response to this new challenge.

Many dedicated officers worked day and night for years to piece together the growing body of evidence on al Qaeda and to understand the threats. Yet, while there were many reports on Bin Laden and his growing al Qaeda organization, there was no comprehensive review of what the intelligence community knew and what it did not know, and what that meant. There was no National Intelligence Estimate on terrorism between 1995 and 9/11.

Before 9/11, no agency did more to attack al Qaeda than the CIA. But there were limits to what the CIA was able to achieve by disrupting terrorist activities abroad and by using proxies to try to capture Bin Ladin and his lieutenants in Afghanistan. CIA officers were aware of those limitations.

To put it simply, covert action was not a silver bullet. It was important to engage proxies in Afghanistan and to build various capabilities so that if an opportunity presented itself, the CIA could act on it. But for more than three years, through both the late Clinton and early Bush administrations, the CIA relied on proxy forces, and there was growing frustration within the CIA's Counterterrorist Center and in the National Security Council staff with the lack of results. The development of the Predator and the push to aid the Northern Alliance were products of this frustration.

### **Problems in the FBI**

From the time of the first World Trade Center attack in 1993, FBI and Department of Justice leadership in Washington and New York became increasingly concerned about the terrorist threat from Islamist extremists to U.S. interests, both at home and abroad. Throughout the 1990s, the FBI's counterterrorism efforts against international terrorist organizations included both intelligence and criminal investigations. The FBI's approach to investigations was case-specific, decentralized, and geared toward prosecution. Significant FBI resources were devoted to after-the-fact investigations of major terrorist attacks, resulting in several prosecutions.

The FBI attempted several reform efforts aimed at strengthening its ability to prevent such attacks, but these reform efforts failed to implement organization-wide institutional change. On September 11, 2001, the FBI was limited in several areas critical to an effective preventive counterterrorism strategy. Those working counterterrorism matters did so despite limited intelligence collection and strategic analysis capabilities, a limited capacity to share information both internally and externally, insufficient training, perceived legal barriers to sharing information, and inadequate resources.

### **Permeable Borders and Immigration Controls**

There were opportunities for intelligence and law enforcement to exploit al Qaeda's travel vulnerabilities. Considered collectively, the 9/11 hijackers

- included known al Qaeda operatives who could have been watchlisted
- presented passports manipulated in a fraudulent manner
- presented passports with suspicious indicators of extremism
- made detectable false statements on visa applications
- made false statements to border officials to gain entry into the United States
- violated immigration laws while in the United States

Neither the State Department's consular officers nor the Immigration and Naturalization Service's inspectors and agents were ever considered full partners in a national counterterrorism effort. Protecting borders was not a national security issue before 9/11.

### **Permeable Aviation Security**

Hijackers studied publicly available materials on the aviation security system and used items that had less metal content than a handgun and were most likely permissible. Though two of the hijackers were on the U.S. TIPOFF terrorist watchlist, the FAA did not use TIPOFF data. The hijackers had to beat only one layer of security—the security checkpoint process. Even though several hijackers were selected for extra screening by the CAPPS system, this led only to greater scrutiny of their checked baggage. Once on board, the hijackers were faced with aircraft personnel who were trained to be nonconfrontational in the event of a hijacking.

### **Financing**

The 9/11 attacks cost somewhere between \$400,000 and \$500,000 to execute. The operatives spent more than \$270,000 in the United States. Additional expenses included travel to obtain passports and visas, travel to the United States, expenses incurred by the plot leader and facilitators outside the United States, and expenses incurred by the people selected to be hijackers who ultimately did not participate.

The conspiracy made extensive use of banks in the United States. The hijackers opened accounts in their own names, using passports and other identification documents. Their transactions were unremarkable and essentially invisible amid the billions of dollars flowing around the world every day.

To date, we have not been able to determine the origin of the money used for the 9/11 attacks. Al Qaeda had many sources of funding and a pre-9/11 annual budget estimated at \$30 million. If a particular source of funds had dried up, al Qaeda could easily have found enough money elsewhere to fund the attack.

### **An Improvised Homeland Defense**

The civilian and military defenders of the nation's airspace-FAA and NORAD-were unprepared for the attacks launched against them. Given that lack of preparedness, they attempted and failed to improvise an effective homeland defense against an unprecedented challenge.

The events of that morning do not reflect discredit on operational personnel. NORAD's Northeast Air Defense Sector personnel reached out for information and made the best judgments they could based on the information they received. Individual FAA controllers, facility managers, and command center managers were creative and agile in recommending a nationwide alert, ground-stopping local traffic, ordering all aircraft nationwide to land, and executing that unprecedented order flawlessly.

At more senior levels, communication was poor. Senior military and FAA leaders had no effective communication with each other. The chain of command did not function well. The President could not reach some senior officials. The Secretary of Defense did not enter the chain of command until the morning's key events were over. Air National Guard units with different rules of engagement were scrambled without the knowledge of the President, NORAD, or the National Military Command Center.

### **Emergency Response**

The civilians, firefighters, police officers, emergency medical technicians, and emergency management professionals exhibited steady determination and resolve under horrifying, overwhelming conditions on 9/11. Their actions saved lives and inspired a nation.

Effective decision-making in New York was hampered by problems in command and control and in internal communications. Within the Fire Department of New York, this was true for several reasons: the magnitude of the incident was unforeseen; commanders had difficulty communicating with their units; more units were actually dispatched than were ordered by the chiefs; some units self-dispatched; and once units arrived at the World Trade Center, they were neither comprehensively accounted for nor coordinated. The Port Authority's response was hampered by the lack both of standard operating procedures and of radios capable of enabling multiple commands to respond to an incident in unified fashion. The New York Police Department, because of its history of mobilizing thousands of officers for major events requiring crowd control, had a technical radio capability and protocols more easily adapted to an incident of the magnitude of 9/11.

### **Congress**

The Congress, like the executive branch, responded slowly to the rise of transnational terrorism as a threat to national security. The legislative branch adjusted little and did not restructure itself to address changing threats. Its attention to terrorism was episodic and splintered across several committees. The Congress gave little guidance to executive branch agencies on terrorism, did not reform them in any significant way to meet the threat, and did not systematically perform robust oversight to identify, address, and attempt to resolve the many problems in national security and domestic agencies that became apparent in the aftermath of 9/11.

So long as oversight is undermined by current congressional rules and resolutions, we believe the American people will not get the security they want and need. The United States needs a strong, stable,

and capable congressional committee structure to give America's national intelligence agencies oversight, support, and leadership.

### **Are We Safer?**

Since 9/11, the United States and its allies have killed or captured a majority of al Qaeda's leadership; toppled the Taliban, which gave al Qaeda sanctuary in Afghanistan; and severely damaged the organization. Yet terrorist attacks continue. Even as we have thwarted attacks, nearly everyone expects they will come. How can this be?

The problem is that al Qaeda represents an ideological movement, not a finite group of people. It initiates and inspires, even if it no longer directs. In this way it has transformed itself into a decentralized force. Bin Ladin may be limited in his ability to organize major attacks from his hideouts. Yet killing or capturing him, while extremely important, would not end terror. His message of inspiration to a new generation of terrorists would continue.

Because of offensive actions against al Qaeda since 9/11, and defensive actions to improve homeland security, we believe we are safer today. But we are not safe. We therefore make the following recommendations that we believe can make America safer and more secure.

## **RECOMMENDATIONS**

Three years after 9/11, the national debate continues about how to protect our nation in this new era. We divide our recommendations into two basic parts: What to do, and how to do it.

### **WHAT TO DO? A GLOBAL STRATEGY**

The enemy is not just "terrorism." It is the threat posed specifically by Islamist terrorism, by Bin Ladin and others who draw on a long tradition of extreme intolerance within a minority strain of Islam that does not distinguish politics from religion, and distorts both.

The enemy is not Islam, the great world faith, but a perversion of Islam. The enemy goes beyond al Qaeda to include the radical ideological movement, inspired in part by al Qaeda, that has spawned other terrorist groups and violence. Thus our strategy must match our means to two ends: dismantling the al Qaeda network and, in the long term, prevailing over the ideology that contributes to Islamist terrorism.

The first phase of our post-9/11 efforts rightly included military action to topple the Taliban and pursue al Qaeda. This work continues. But long-term success demands the use of all elements of national power: diplomacy, intelligence, covert action, law enforcement, economic policy, foreign aid, public diplomacy, and homeland defense. If we favor one tool while neglecting others, we leave ourselves vulnerable and weaken our national effort.

What should Americans expect from their government? The goal seems unlimited: Defeat terrorism anywhere in the world. But Americans have also been told to expect the worst: An attack is probably coming; it may be more devastating still.

Vague goals match an amorphous picture of the enemy. Al Qaeda and other groups are popularly described as being all over the world, adaptable, resilient, needing little higher-level organization, and capable of anything. It is an image of an omnipotent hydra of destruction. That image lowers expectations of government effectiveness.

It lowers them too far. Our report shows a determined and capable group of plotters. Yet the group was fragile and occasionally left vulnerable by the marginal, unstable people often attracted to such causes. The enemy made mistakes. The U.S. government was not able to capitalize on them.

No president can promise that a catastrophic attack like that of 9/11 will not happen again. But the American people are entitled to expect that officials will have realistic objectives, clear guidance, and effective organization. They are entitled to see standards for performance so they can judge, with the help of their elected representatives, whether the objectives are being met.

We propose a strategy with three dimensions: (1) attack terrorists and their organizations, (2) prevent the continued growth of Islamist terrorism, and (3) protect against and prepare for terrorist attacks.

### **Attack Terrorists and Their Organizations**

- Root out sanctuaries. The U.S. government should identify and prioritize actual or potential terrorist sanctuaries and have realistic country or regional strategies for each, utilizing every element of national power and reaching out to countries that can help us.
- Strengthen long-term U.S. and international commitments to the future of Pakistan and Afghanistan.
- Confront problems with Saudi Arabia in the open and build a relationship beyond oil, a relationship that both sides can defend to their citizens and includes a shared commitment to reform.

### **Prevent the Continued Growth of Islamist Terrorism**

In October 2003, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld asked if enough was being done "to fashion a broad integrated plan to stop the next generation of terrorists." As part of such a plan, the U.S. government should

- Define the message and stand as an example of moral leadership in the world. To Muslim parents, terrorists like Bin Ladin have nothing to offer their children but visions of violence and death. America and its friends have the advantage-our vision can offer a better future.
- Where Muslim governments, even those who are friends, do not offer opportunity, respect the rule of law, or tolerate differences, then the United States needs to stand for a better future.
- Communicate and defend American ideals in the Islamic world, through much stronger public diplomacy to reach more people, including students and leaders outside of government. Our efforts here should be as strong as they were in combating closed societies during the Cold War.
- Offer an agenda of opportunity that includes support for public education and economic openness.
- Develop a comprehensive coalition strategy against Islamist terrorism, using a flexible contact group of leading coalition governments and fashioning a common coalition approach on issues like the treatment of captured terrorists.
- Devote a maximum effort to the parallel task of countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
- Expect less from trying to dry up terrorist money and more from following the money for intelligence, as a tool to hunt terrorists, understand their networks, and disrupt their operations.

### **Protect against and Prepare for Terrorist Attacks**

- Target terrorist travel, an intelligence and security strategy that the 9/11 story showed could be at least as powerful as the effort devoted to terrorist finance.

- Address problems of screening people with biometric identifiers across agencies and governments, including our border and transportation systems, by designing a comprehensive screening system that addresses common problems and sets common standards. As standards spread, this necessary and ambitious effort could dramatically strengthen the world's ability to intercept individuals who could pose catastrophic threats.
- Quickly complete a biometric entry-exit screening system, one that also speeds qualified travelers.
- Set standards for the issuance of birth certificates and sources of identification, such as driver's licenses.
- Develop strategies for neglected parts of our transportation security system. Since 9/11, about 90 percent of the nation's \$5 billion annual investment in transportation security has gone to aviation, to fight the last war.
- In aviation, prevent arguments about a new computerized profiling system from delaying vital improvements in the "no-fly" and "automatic selectee" lists. Also, give priority to the improvement of checkpoint screening.
- Determine, with leadership from the President, guidelines for gathering and sharing information in the new security systems that are needed, guidelines that integrate safeguards for privacy and other essential liberties.
- Underscore that as government power necessarily expands in certain ways, the burden of retaining such powers remains on the executive to demonstrate the value of such powers and ensure adequate supervision of how they are used, including a new board to oversee the implementation of the guidelines needed for gathering and sharing information in these new security systems.
- Base federal funding for emergency preparedness solely on risks and vulnerabilities, putting New York City and Washington, D.C., at the top of the current list. Such assistance should not remain a program for general revenue sharing or pork-barrel spending.
- Make homeland security funding contingent on the adoption of an incident command system to strengthen teamwork in a crisis, including a regional approach. Allocate more radio spectrum and improve connectivity for public safety communications, and encourage widespread adoption of newly developed standards for private-sector emergency preparedness—since the private sector controls 85 percent of the nation's critical infrastructure.

### **HOW TO DO IT? A DIFFERENT WAY OF ORGANIZING GOVERNMENT**

The strategy we have recommended is elaborate, even as presented here very briefly. To implement it will require a government better organized than the one that exists today, with its national security institutions designed half a century ago to win the Cold War. Americans should not settle for incremental, ad hoc adjustments to a system created a generation ago for a world that no longer exists.

Our detailed recommendations are designed to fit together. Their purpose is clear: to build unity of effort across the U.S. government. As one official now serving on the front lines overseas put it to us: "One fight, one team."

We call for unity of effort in five areas, beginning with unity of effort on the challenge of counterterrorism itself:

- unifying strategic intelligence and operational planning against Islamist terrorists across the foreign-domestic divide with a National Counterterrorism Center
- unifying the intelligence community with a new National Intelligence Director

- unifying the many participants in the counterterrorism effort and their knowledge in a network-based information sharing system that transcends traditional governmental boundaries
- unifying and strengthening congressional oversight to improve quality and accountability
- strengthening the FBI and homeland defenders

### **Unity of Effort: A National Counterterrorism Center**

The 9/11 story teaches the value of integrating strategic intelligence from all sources into joint operational planning-with *both* dimensions spanning the foreign-domestic divide.


- In some ways, since 9/11, joint work has gotten better. The effort of fighting terrorism has flooded over many of the usual agency boundaries because of its sheer quantity and energy. Attitudes have changed. But the problems of coordination have multiplied. The Defense Department alone has three unified commands (SOCOM, CENTCOM, and NORTHCOM) that deal with terrorism as one of their principal concerns.
- Much of the public commentary about the 9/11 attacks has focused on "lost opportunities." Though characterized as problems of "watchlisting," "information sharing," or "connecting the dots," each of these labels is too narrow. They describe the symptoms, not the disease.
- Breaking the older mold of organization stovepiped purely in executive agencies, we propose a National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) that would borrow the joint, unified command concept adopted in the 1980s by the American military in a civilian agency, combining the joint intelligence function alongside the operations work.
- The NCTC would build on the existing Terrorist Threat Integration Center and would replace it and other terrorism "fusion centers" within the government. The NCTC would become the authoritative knowledge bank, bringing information to bear on common plans. It should task collection requirements both inside and outside the United States.
- The NCTC should perform joint operational planning, assigning lead responsibilities to existing agencies and letting them direct the actual execution of the plans.
- Placed in the Executive Office of the President, headed by a Senate-confirmed official (with rank equal to the deputy head of a cabinet department) who reports to the National Intelligence Director, the NCTC would track implementation of plans. It would be able to influence the leadership and the budgets of the counterterrorism operating arms of the CIA, the FBI, and the departments of Defense and Homeland Security.
- The NCTC should *not* be a policymaking body. Its operations and planning should follow the policy direction of the president and the National Security Council.

### **Unity of Effort: A National Intelligence Director**

Since long before 9/11-and continuing to this day-the intelligence community is not organized well for joint intelligence work. It does not employ common standards and practices in reporting intelligence or in training experts overseas and at home. The expensive national capabilities for collecting intelligence have divided management. The structures are too complex and too secret.

- The community's head-the Director of Central Intelligence-has at least three jobs: running the CIA, coordinating a 15-agency confederation, and being the intelligence analyst-in-chief to the president. No one person can do all these things.
- A new National Intelligence Director should be established with two main jobs: (1) to oversee national intelligence centers that combine experts from all the collection disciplines against common targets- like counterterrorism or nuclear proliferation; and (2) to oversee the agencies that contribute to the national intelligence program, a task that includes setting common standards for personnel and information technology.

- The national intelligence centers would be the unified commands of the intelligence world—a long-overdue reform for intelligence comparable to the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols law that reformed the organization of national defense. The home services—such as the CIA, DIA, NSA, and FBI—would organize, train, and equip the best intelligence professionals in the world, and would handle the execution of intelligence operations in the field.



*Unity of Effort in Managing Intelligence*

- This National Intelligence Director (NID) should be located in the Executive Office of the President and report directly to the president, yet be confirmed by the Senate. In addition to overseeing the National Counterterrorism Center described above (which will include both the national intelligence center for terrorism and the joint operations planning effort), the NID should have three deputies:
  - For foreign intelligence (a deputy who also would be the head of the CIA)
  - For defense intelligence (also the undersecretary of defense for intelligence)
  - For homeland intelligence (also the executive assistant director for intelligence at the FBI or the undersecretary of homeland security for information analysis and infrastructure protection)
- The NID should receive a public appropriation for national intelligence, should have authority to hire and fire his or her intelligence deputies, and should be able to set common personnel and information technology policies across the intelligence community.
- The CIA should concentrate on strengthening the collection capabilities of its clandestine service and the talents of its analysts, building pride in its core expertise.
- Secrecy stifles oversight, accountability, and information sharing. Unfortunately, all the current organizational incentives encourage over-classification. This balance should change; and as a start, open information should be provided about the overall size of agency intelligence budgets.

### Unity of Effort: Sharing Information

The U.S. government has access to a vast amount of information. But it has a weak system for processing and using what it has. The system of "need to know" should be replaced by a system of "need to share."

- The President should lead a government-wide effort to bring the major national security institutions into the information revolution, turning a mainframe system into a decentralized network. The obstacles are not technological. Official after official has urged us to call attention to problems with the unglamorous "back office" side of government operations.
- But no agency can solve the problems on its own-to build the network requires an effort that transcends old divides, solving common legal and policy issues in ways that can help officials know what they can and cannot do. Again, in tackling information issues, America needs unity of effort.

**Unity of Effort: Congress** Congress took too little action to adjust itself or to restructure the executive branch to address the emerging terrorist threat. Congressional oversight for intelligence-and counterterrorism-is dysfunctional. Both Congress and the executive need to do more to minimize national security risks during transitions between administrations.

- For intelligence oversight, we propose two options: either a joint committee on the old model of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy or a single committee in each house combining authorizing and appropriating committees. Our central message is the same: the intelligence committees cannot carry out their oversight function unless they are made stronger, and thereby have both clear responsibility and accountability for that oversight.
- Congress should create a single, principal point of oversight and review for homeland security. There should be one permanent standing committee for homeland security in each chamber.
- We propose reforms to speed up the nomination, financial reporting, security clearance, and confirmation process for national security officials at the start of an administration, and suggest steps to make sure that incoming administrations have the information they need.

### **Unity of Effort: Organizing America's Defenses in the United States**

We have considered several proposals relating to the future of the domestic intelligence and counterterrorism mission. Adding a new domestic intelligence agency will not solve America's problems in collecting and analyzing intelligence within the United States. We do not recommend creating one.

- We propose the establishment of a specialized and integrated national security workforce at the FBI, consisting of agents, analysts, linguists, and surveillance specialists who are recruited, trained, rewarded, and retained to ensure the development of an institutional culture imbued with a deep expertise in intelligence and national security.

At several points we asked: Who has the responsibility for defending us at home? Responsibility for America's national defense is shared by the Department of Defense, with its new Northern Command, and by the Department of Homeland Security. They must have a clear delineation of roles, missions, and authority.

- The Department of Defense and its oversight committees should regularly assess the adequacy of Northern Command's strategies and planning to defend against military threats to the homeland.
- The Department of Homeland Security and its oversight committees should regularly assess the types of threats the country faces, in order to determine the adequacy of the government's plans and the readiness of the government to respond to those threats.

\* \* \*

We call on the American people to remember how we all felt on 9/11, to remember not only the unspeakable horror but how we came together as a nation-one nation. Unity of purpose and unity of effort are the way we will defeat this enemy and make America safer for our children and grandchildren.

We look forward to a national debate on the merits of what we have recommended, and we will participate vigorously in that debate.

9/11 Commission Report Recommendations	Progress to Date
<p>Congress should support pending legislation which provides for the expedited and increased assignment of radio spectrum for public safety purposes. (Page 414)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The First Responder Network Authority was created as part of the Middle Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act (PUBLIC LAW 112–96), which was signed into law on February 22, 2012. The law allocated 20 megahertz of spectrum and \$7 billion to establish a broadband network dedicated to the nation's first responders and gave the FirstNet Authority the mandate to ensure the building, deployment, and operation of the network. Congress also required that the network extend coverage in rural areas through buildout milestones. The inaugural meeting of the FirstNet Authority Board took place on Sept. 25, 2012.</li> <li>• In March 2018, the FirstNet buildout of Band 14, public safety’s spectrum, launched nationwide according to the governor-approved State Plans, and the FirstNet Core was delivered. In October 2018, the FirstNet Deployable Network Asset Program was announced. FirstNet’s public safety users gained access to an entire fleet of dedicated deployable network assets to bolster coverage and capacity during emergencies or planned events.</li> </ul>
<p>High-risk urban areas such as New York City and Washington, D.C., should establish signal corps units to ensure communications connectivity between and among civilian authorities, local first responders, and the National Guard. Federal funding of such units should be given high priority by Congress. (Page 414)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• No specific progress, however, at a Congressional Hearing (PUBLIC SAFETY COMMUNICATIONS FROM 9/11 TO KATRINA: CRITICAL PUBLIC POLICY LESSONS) multiple interoperability support programs that fall under the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) were noted including SAFECOM and the Interoperable Communications Technical Assistance Program (ICTAP).</li> </ul>

9/11 Commission Report Recommendations	Progress to Date
<p>The Department of Homeland Security was established to consolidate all of the domestic agencies responsible for securing America’s borders and national infrastructure, most of which is in private hands. It [DHS] should identify those elements of our transportation, energy, <b>communications</b>, financial and other institutions that need to be protected, develop plans to protect that infrastructure, and exercise the mechanisms to enhance preparedness (page 428)<sup>1</sup></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Critical Infrastructure Security Assessments: DHS has conducted more than 1,900 security surveys and 2,500 vulnerability assessments of the nation’s critical infrastructure to identify potential vulnerabilities and provide recommendations on protective measures</li> <li>• Public Safety Interoperability Communications (PSIC) Grants program (Washington, D.C. received a \$12 million grant in 2007.)</li> <li>• Emergency and Interoperable Communications Plans: In 2008, the DHS Office of Emergency Communications (OEC) developed the National Emergency Communications Plan in coordination with more than 150 public safety practitioners at all levels of government and across responder disciplines, which serves as the first nationwide strategic plan to improve emergency communications and drive measurable progress.</li> <li>• Urban Area Emergency Communications: In 2010, OEC worked with 60 urban areas to assess emergency communications during a real-world situation. All 60 urban areas successfully demonstrated response-level emergency communications. OEC has also trained more than 3,500 first responders, technicians, and planners to lead communications at incidents across the nation.<sup>2</sup></li> <li>• PPD 21</li> <li>• National Infrastructure Coordinating Center</li> <li>• Communications Sector Specific Plan 2015 – Annex to NIPP 2013</li> </ul>

<sup>1</sup> This item is not explicitly called out as a recommendation in the 9/11 Commission report

<sup>2</sup> <https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/highlights-of-our-progress-implementing-9-11-commission-recommendations-progress-report-2011.pdf>