- Funding has increased by more than 700% since September 11, 2001.
- Funding for port security was approximately $259 million in FY 2001.
- DHS spent approximately $1.6 billion on port security in FY 2005.
- The recent business transaction taken by DP World, a United Arab Emirates based company, to acquire British company Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Company (P&O) does not change the operations or security of keeping our nation’s ports safe. The people working on the docks also will not change as a result of this transaction.
- This transaction is not an issue of controlling United States’ ports. It is an issue of operating some terminals within U.S. ports.
- DP World will operate at the following terminals within the six United States’ ports currently operated by the United Kingdom company, P & O:o Baltimore - 2 of 14 total o Philadelphia - 1 of 5 (does not include the 1 cruise vessel terminal) o Miami - 1 of 3 (does not include the 7 cruise vessel terminals) o New Orleans - 2 of 5 (does not include the numerous chemical plant terminals up and down the Mississippi River, up to Baton Rouge) o Houston – 4 of 12 (P&O work alongside other stevedoring* contractors at the terminals)o Newark/Elizabeth – 1 of 4 o (Note: also in Norfolk - Involved with stevedoring activities at all 5 terminals, but not managing a specific terminal.)*Stevedoring – provides labor, carries physical loading and unloading of cargo.
- P&O and DP World made a commitment to comply with current security programs, regulations and partnerships to which P&O currently subscribes, including: o The Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT); o The Container Security Initiative (CSI); o The Business Alliance on Smuggling and Counterfeiting (BASC); and, o The Megaports Initiative MOU with the Department of Energy.
- All P&O security arrangements will remain intact, including cargo security cooperation with CBP, compliance with USCG regulations (ISPS and MTSA) regarding port facilities/terminals, and foreign terminal operations within CSI ports.
- Dubai was the first Middle Eastern entity to join the Container Security Initiative (March 2005). As a result, CBP officer are working closely with Dubai Customs to screen containers destined for the U.S. Cooperation with Dubai officials has been outstanding and a model for other operation within CSI ports.
- The Customs Administration must be able to inspect cargo originating, transiting, exiting, or being transshipped through a country.
- Non-intrusive inspectional (NII) equipment (including gamma or X-ray imaging capabilities) and radiation detection equipment must be available and utilized for conducting such inspections. This equipment is necessary in order to meet the objective of quickly screening containers without disrupting the flow of legitimate trade.
- The seaport must have regular, direct, and substantial container traffic to ports in the United States. As part of agreeing to participate in CSI, a Member State’s Customs Administration and the seaport must also:
- Commit to establishing a risk management system toentify potentially high-risk containers, and automating that system. This system should include a mechanism for validating threat assessments and targeting decisions andentifying best practices.
- Commit to sharing critical data, intelligence, and risk management information with the United States Customs Service in order to do collaborative targeting, and developing an automated mechanism for these exchanges.
- Conduct a thorough port assessment to ascertain vulnerable links in a port’s infrastructure and commit to resolving those vulnerabilities.
- Commit to maintaining integrity programs to prevent lapses in employee integrity and toentify and combat breaches in integrity.
Subscribe to the DPJ Weekly Brief newsletter:
Subscribe